On April 1, 2007, the New York Times published a review of Brian Doherty’s new book, Radicals for Capitalism, an extensive history of the libertarian movement that focuses on such libertarian luminaries as Leonard Read, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Ayn Rand, and Milton Friedman.
The book review, “Free for All,” by David Leonhardt, leveled several criticisms at both the book and the libertarian movement, but the one criticism that really caught my attention appeared at the end of the review:
"In fact, across a range of major issues — energy policy, health care, retirement savings — a hybrid form of laissez-faire capitalism and collectivism seems to be ascendant. The market will be allowed to work its efficient magic, but government will step in to correct the market’s failures. “Libertarian paternalism” is the name two University of Chicago professors, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, have devised for one version of this philosophy."
What more insulting and devastating critique of the libertarian movement than that? And yet, the problem is that it’s true. For the past several years, some libertarians have promoted both minor and major reforms of socialist programs in the name of libertarianism. Why would it surprise us that people would naturally conclude that libertarianism is a hybrid of freedom and collectivism and that libertarians stand for “libertarian paternalism” or even “libertarian socialism”?
Consider, for example, school vouchers, which some libertarians have advanced as a libertarian proposal, employing such libertarian rhetoric as “choice” or “free-market education.”
Yet, what really is a system of school vouchers? It is nothing more than a reform of the socialist government-school system. Yes, it might improve the state’s educational system and, yes, it might provide parents with more options within that educational system. Nonetheless, it is not libertarian in the least. It is simply a reform of a socialist program.
Socialism involves the state’s forcible taking of one person’s money and giving it to another person. Isn’t that what school vouchers do? They involve the state’s taking one person’s money — a person who might not even have children — and giving it to another person in order to help him educate his children.
In principle, school vouchers are no different from, say, food stamps, a socialist welfare program that libertarians (and conservatives) have long condemned. Food stamps involve a process by which the state taxes some people in order to provide food assistance to other people. School vouchers involve a process by which the state taxes some people in order to provide educational assistance to other people.
As libertarians, all of us would agree that people should be free to advance any program they wish. But the problem is that when such reform programs are promoted as libertarian proposals, people get the impression that this is what libertarianism is all about — using the state to take one person’s money in order to give more “choice” or more “freedom” to another person. Couldn’t it be said that food stamps also give people more “choice” and more “freedom”?
Therefore, wouldn’t it be better, from the standpoint of libertarianism, if libertarians who advocated such welfare-state reform plans described them for what they actually are — conservative reforms of socialist programs? After all, it’s not a coincidence that the Heritage Foundation, the premier conservative organization in the country, has long supported school vouchers, given that conservatives long ago abandoned any commitment to genuine free-market principles. But what is the average person to conclude when libertarians also support school vouchers and describe them as a libertarian solution to the government-school crisis?
Libertarians often lament that liberals “stole” the term “liberal,” which once meant “libertarian,” and corrupted it to mean a support of the welfare state, the exact opposite of what libertarians stand for. But haven’t libertarians been doing the same thing for many years with the term “libertarian” by promoting conservative reform plans of liberal socialist programs in the name of libertarianism? Isn’t that why there are now people saying that “libertarian paternalism” is on the ascendancy?
What is the average person to conclude when he hears the “libertarian case” for vouchers? Isn’t he likely to conclude that libertarians believe that the state has a legitimate role in education? Would it be unreasonable for him to say, “Yes, I agree with the libertarians that we need a mixture of educational vehicles from which people can choose — public schools, private schools, charter schools, and home schooling. Choice is a good thing!”?
Yet all that is the antithesis of libertarianism, whose genuine principles dictate a complete separation of school and state, just as libertarianism calls, for example, for a complete separation of church and state. After all, can you imagine libertarians calling for a mixed system of state churches, private churches, charter churches, and church vouchers and suggesting to people that that is what libertarianism is all about? Wouldn’t it be better if those who advanced such systems of “choice” emphasized to people that they are conservative approaches to education and religion, not libertarian ones?
Social Security reform
Consider another area that has led people to conclude that libertarians are paternalists — Social Security, a government program that has its roots in German socialism. It’s not a coincidence that the Social Security Administration has a picture of Otto von Bismarck, the “iron chancellor” of Germany, on its website. It was Bismarck who introduced social security to Germany after having gotten the idea from German socialists.
Libertarianism stands for the principle that people should be free to keep their own money, handle their own retirement, and take care of their own parents and others through voluntary charity. That’s what genuine freedom is all about — the freedom to be responsible or irresponsible, the freedom to honor one’s parents or not, the freedom to help those in need or not. If people are forced to be responsible or caring, then they cannot truly be considered free.
Under Social Security, the state forcibly takes a portion of people’s earnings and distributes them to the elderly. Despite the illusion that the government has created with IOUs issued to the Social Security Administration by the Treasury Department, and contrary to what people have convinced themselves over the years, there is no Social Security fund and there never has been. The idea of a Social Security fund has long been a deception by the state and a self-deception by the citizenry. It consists of nothing more than IOUs issued by the Treasury Department in exchange for the cash that the Social Security Administration has collected, IOUs that cannot be paid until the government first raises the money (by additional taxes) to redeem them.
Thus, in actuality Social Security is a straight socialist transfer scheme — one in which the state takes a young Peter’s money to distribute it to an elderly Paul. In other words, it is a classic socialist or paternalistic program, one in which people look to government to play the role of a parent watching over and taking care of his adult children.
Yet for the past several years what some libertarians have done is to adopt conservative reform proposals and repackage them as libertarian solutions to the Social Security crisis. The Social Security reform plans come in a variety of packages, but they all revolve around the rhetoric of “choice,” just as school-voucher proposals do. Under these “choice” proposals, the state continues to run the Social Security program, but people have the “freedom” to direct the state to deposit and invest their money (which the state takes from them) into a particular fund selected by the taxpayer. It comes as no surprise that the fund to be selected must come from a list of state-approved funds.
Even conceding that a Social Security system in which people have “ownership” rights in their state-mandated retirement funds is an improvement over the current Social Security system, is it really legitimate to call such a system libertarian? Isn’t it nothing more than a conservative reform of a socialist program, albeit a reform that improves the program? Doesn’t it retain the state’s role in the areas of retirement and charity? Doesn’t it accept the underlying premise that the state has a legitimate place in directing and manipulating what people should do with what is supposed to be their own money?
Moreover, all the Social Security reform plans call for continuing to pay current Social Security recipients, which means continuing the socialist process of taking money from young Peters to pay elderly Pauls.
There is no way that any of the Social Security reform plans can legitimately be considered libertarian. Leaving the state in charge of retirement and continuing to use the coercive mechanism of the state to fund Social Security payments is the very antithesis of libertarian principles. Libertarianism is the absence, not the presence, of government involvement in people’s peaceful choices, especially with respect to what they do with their own money.
What’s wrong with promoting reform of Social Security? Nothing, so long as promoters emphasize that what they’re promoting is nothing more than a reform of a liberal social-welfare program. The problem arises when they describe such reform plans as libertarian, because then people are likely to reach the conclusion that libertarians believe in a hybrid form of free-market socialism, in which it is the job of the state to take care of people and in which it is the job of the free market to improve the state’s socialist programs.
Health-care reform
The principle is the same with other reform programs, such as those pertaining to Medicare and Medicaid. Rather than simply call for a repeal of these two socialist programs, some libertarians call for “choice,” which entails, for example, a medical IRA in which people can deposit a tax-deductible portion of their income into a special account to help with medical expenses.
Again, the problem arises in their failure to describe such IRAs as nothing more than a conservative plan to fix a liberal socialist program. By communicating to people that medical IRAs are a libertarian approach to health care, they suggest that libertarianism stands for the principle that the state plays a legitimate role in health care, when, in fact, that is the antithesis of libertarianism.
I recently met a man who described himself as a “moderate libertarian.” From the context of our subsequent conversation, it was clear to me that by that term he meant that he believes in such things as Social Security, Medicare, public schooling, and economic regulation, albeit all in a reformed or improved way. In actuality, he was a conservative, not a libertarian. My hunch is that the reason he believed he was a “moderate libertarian” is that he’s come to believe that libertarianism means a hybrid of socialist programs and “free-market” reforms.
“Contracting out” reforms
Another problem area involves the contracting out of government services, which is often billed as libertarian. Consider, for example, the Interstate Highway System, a public-works, government-owned boondoggle that was modeled after the National Socialist autobahn system in Germany.
The libertarian position, which is based on the principles of private property and free markets, is simply to sell the Interstate Highway System to private owners and leave the pricing mechanism to the free market, i.e., to the interactions between owners and consumers. But because some libertarians consider that too “radical” a solution to suggest to people, they instead come up with reform plans that they promote as libertarian.
For example, one proposal might be to close down a state’s paving department and contract out the paving to private companies. Obviously, such a proposal would constitute only a reform of how the state operates its publicly held highways. Yet some libertarians would advance such a reform as libertarian because it involves contracting out the paving of a socialist project to private companies.
Another example involving roads might be proposing special toll lanes or varying toll rates according to the time of day in order to alleviate traffic congestion. Libertarians often advance such proposals as libertarian, when in fact they are nothing more than conservative ways to reform the socialist road and highway system.
Libertarianism or reform?
Ultimately, every socialist reform plan is doomed to fail because, as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek argued so well, socialism is inherently defective. However, if people believe that such reforms constitute libertarianism, then in their minds what will have failed is not socialism but rather libertarianism.
Unfortunately, most Americans remain wedded to the principles of the socialistic welfare state and consider it too “extreme” to repeal, not reform, socialist programs. Thus, they’re likely to be much more comfortable with a libertarianism that isn’t too “extreme,” that is a libertarianism that doesn’t abolish their socialist programs. So they’re much more likely to sign on to and support libertarianism if it involves keeping their socialist programs intact and even using the free market to reform and improve them.
But what does that methodology accomplish? Doesn’t it simply continue the status quo, albeit in a reformed way? And doesn’t it end up confusing people about the true meaning of libertarianism and the genuinely free society?
Obviously the arguments for libertarianism are significantly different from those in favor of reform. For example, suppose a libertarian who is advancing libertarianism and a libertarian who calls for reform of socialist programs are giving speeches in front of the same audience. The libertarian must convince people to challenge the role of the state in such areas as education, health care, and highways, not a simple task, especially since nearly everyone has grown up with state involvement in these fields. On the other hand, all the reformer has to do is tell people, “You don’t have to give up any of your programs. I’m here to tell you how to improve them with free-market principles.”
Thus, advancing libertarianism is much more difficult than advancing conservative reform. Telling people what they need to hear is a much more difficult task than telling people what they want to hear. Moreover, everyone knows that it is a much more difficult task to persuade people to abandon the paradigm to which they are accustomed in favor of a new paradigm, even if they become convinced that the old paradigm is inherently defective and that the new paradigm will improve their lives. Change, especially radical change, is difficult for most people.
If we are ever to restore economic liberty to America, we must advance libertarianism, not reform of socialist programs. While reformers sometimes suggest that their reforms will inevitably lead to the eradication of the programs they’re reforming, that’s not realistic. After all, why should people conclude that eradication is desirable, when the reformer himself has convinced them that their socialist programs are capable of being reformed and improved with “free-market” plans? If the reformer himself doesn’t believe in libertarianism enough to call for it openly and forthrightly, how likely is it that the person who accepts his call for reform will become a stronger advocate of eradication than the reformer? Moreover, once the reform is adopted, the reformer himself has a vested interest in the success of his reform, which obviously means keeping the program in existence.
A revival of economic freedom in America depends on the power of pure libertarian principles and ideals. Compromise and dilution of libertarian principles through proposals to reform socialist programs only impede our goal of achieving a free society. To restore economic liberty to our land, we must advance libertarianism, not libertarian paternalism or libertarian socialism.
Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
This article originally appeared in the June 2007 edition of Freedom Daily.
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
A Critique of Libertarian Paternalism
In the September 26, 2007 Future of Freedom Foundation article "Libertarian Paternalism," Jacob G. Hornberger provides a critique of libertarian paternalism:
Friday, August 31, 2007
The Opportunity Cost of War in Iraq
The August 31, 2007 article "The Opportunity Cost of War in Iraq," provides data and links to estimate the U.S. opportunity cost of the war in Iraq.
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Lead in toys provides another example of the dangers of unregulated markets
The lead in Chinese toys is an example of how unregulated markets provide many socially undesirable outcomes. Can you imagine what might be in products if there were no safety and labeling laws?
In the June 19, 2007 New York Times article "As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in China," Eric S. Lipton and David Barboza report there are cries for increased government oversight to prevent the recurrence of events such as this.
In the June 19, 2007 New York Times article "As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in China," Eric S. Lipton and David Barboza report there are cries for increased government oversight to prevent the recurrence of events such as this.
WASHINGTON, June 18 — China manufactured every one of the 24 kinds of toys recalled for safety reasons in the United States so far this year, including the enormously popular Thomas & Friends wooden train sets, a record that is causing alarm among consumer advocates, parents and regulators.
The latest recall, announced last week, involves 1.5 million Thomas & Friends trains and rail components — about 4 percent of all those sold in the United States over the last two years by RC2 Corporation of Oak Brook, Ill. The toys were coated at a factory in China with lead paint, which can damage brain cells, especially in children.
Just in the last month, a ghoulish fake eyeball toy made in China was recalled after it was found to be filled with kerosene. Sets of toy drums and a toy bear were also recalled because of lead paint, and an infant wrist rattle was recalled because of a choking hazard.
Over all, the number of products made in China that are being recalled in the United States by the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission has doubled in the last five years, driving the total number of recalls in the country to 467 last year, an annual record.
It also means that China today is responsible for about 60 percent of all product recalls, compared with 36 percent in 2000.
Much of the rise in China’s ranking on the recall list has to do with its corresponding surge as the world’s toy chest: toys made in China make up 70 to 80 percent of the toys sold in the country, according to the Toy Industry Association.
Combined with the recent scares in the United States of Chinese-made pet food, and globally of Chinese-made pharmaceuticals and toothpaste, the string of toy recalls is inspiring new demands for stepped-up enforcement of safety by United States regulators and importers, as well as by the government and industry in China.
“These are items that children are supposed to be playing with,” said Prescott Carlson, co-founder of a Web site called the Imperfect Parent, which includes a section that tracks recalls of toys and other baby products. “It should be at a point where companies in the United States that are importing these items are held liable.”
The toy trains and railroad pieces are made directly for RC2 at plants it oversees in China, presumably giving it some control over the quality and safety of the toys made there. Staci Rubinstein, a spokeswoman for RC2, declined on Monday to comment on safety control measures at company plants in China.
The Toy Industry Association, which represents most American toy companies and importers, also declined to comment.
Julie Vallese, a spokeswoman for the Consumer Product Safety Commission, said the agency recognizes that more must be done to prevent the importation of hazardous toys and other products from China. “It is a big concern. And the agency is taking steps to try to address that as quickly as possible,” Ms. Vallese said. “Their businesses will suffer if they don’t meet safety standards.”
Scott J. Wolfson, a second Consumer Product Safety Commission spokesman, would not say how long ago RC2 discovered the problem or when it first reported it to federal authorities.
In the last two years, the staff of the consumer product commission has been cut by more than 10 percent, leaving fewer regulators to monitor the safety of the growing flood of imports.
Some consumer advocates say that such staff cuts under the Bush administration have made the commission a lax regulator. The commission, for example, acknowledged in a recent budget document that “because of resource limitations,” it was planning next year to curtail its efforts aimed at preventing children from drowning in swimming pools and bathtubs.
The toy industry in the United States is largely self-policed. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has safety standards, but it has only about 100 field investigators and compliance personnel nationwide to conduct inspections at ports, warehouses and stores of $22 billion worth of toys and tens of billions of dollars’ worth of other consumer products sold in the country each year. “They don’t have the staff that they need to try to get ahead of this problem,” said Janell Mayo Duncan, senior counsel at the Consumers Union, which publishes Consumer Reports. “They need more money and resources to do more checks.”
Most recalls are done voluntarily, as was the case with Thomas & Friends, after companies discover problems or receive complaints.
Among the toy recalls, the problem is most acute with low-price, no-brand-name toys that are often sold at dollar stores and other deep discounters, which are manufactured and sent to the United States often without the involvement of major American toy importers. Last year, China also was the source of 81 percent of the counterfeit goods seized by Customs officials at ports of entry in the United States — products that typically are not made according to the standards on the labels they are copying.
At one of the RC2 factories in Dongguan, China, on Sunday, a pair of workers who were paid about $150 a month to spray paint on mostly metal toy trains six days a week said they did not know whether the paint they used contained lead. The factory produces metal toys as well as the wooden toys listed in the Thomas recall.
“We’re just doing the painting,” says Li Hong, a 22-year-old factory worker who was sitting out in front of the factory dormitories.
Exactly who operates the factories making the Thomas & Friends trains in Dongguan is unclear. While the zone is run by a group of Chinese or Hong Kong suppliers, it also houses an office building that bears the RC2 corporate logo.
China’s own government auditing agency reported last month that 20 percent of the toys made and sold in China had safety hazards such as small parts that could be swallowed or sharp edges that could cut a child, according to a report in China Daily. Officials in China, of course, are fighting back, insisting that its food and other exports are safe and valuable, that new regulations are being put into place and that problem goods account for a tiny portion of all exports.
The Toy Industry Association urges its members to routinely test products it is importing to make sure they comply with federal safety standards, which prohibit, for example, surface paint that contains lead in toys or items that could cause a choking hazard.
Other major retailers or toy industry companies hit by recalls for products made in China this year include Easy-Bake Ovens, made by Hasbro, which could trap children’s fingers in the oven and burn them, and Target stores, which the consumer product commission said was importing and selling Anima Bamboo collection games, some of which were coated with lead paint.
The 22 models of the Thomas & Friends toys that are being recalled include some of the most popular items in the line’s collection, such as the red James engine and the fire brigade truck. The toy line, based on the children’s book and television series, has an almost fanatical following among some families, who own dozens of models, which can cost $6.50 to $70 each.
The string of lead paint cases has drawn the most attention from consumer watchdogs and parenting advice columnists.
“Do I have to look at every toy that has paint on it that comes from China as perhaps suspect?” said Mr. Carlson, of Imperfect Parent.
Ms. Duncan, of Consumers Union, urged parents to sign up for the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s automated notification system at the commission’s Web site (www.cpsc.gov), so they can stay on top of which toys are being recalled.
Ms. Vallese, the spokeswoman for the product safety commission, said the agency’s acting chairwoman, Nancy A. Nord, went to China in May for a meeting with her counterparts there, focusing in particular on toys, lighters, electronics and fireworks.
“Is there a concern that there are more products coming in from China and making sure they live up to the standards we expect?” Ms. Vallese said. “Yes, there is, and we understand our authority and obligation and we will make sure we enforce it.”
But parents shopping at for toys in New York over the weekend said the whole episode left them uneasy.
“I think it’s terrible,” said Chris Gunster, 41, while perusing the Thomas & Friends display area in Toys “R” Us at Times Square with his wife and 4-year-old son, James, a big fan of the toy trains. “Lead paint in this day and age?”
Eric S. Lipton reported from Washington and David Barboza from Dongguan, China.
Thursday, May 31, 2007
Unspinning the FairTax
In the May 31, 2007 article Unspinning the FairTax the consumer advocacy group FactCheck.org analyzes the proposed FairTax:
We look at the numbers behind the numbers.
Summary
In our recent article on the second GOP debate, we called out Gov. Mike Huckabee as well as Reps. Tom Tancredo and Duncan Hunter for their support of the FairTax. We wrote that the bipartisan Advisory Panel on Tax Reform had “calculated that a sales tax would have to be set at 34 percent of retail sales prices to bring in the same revenue as the taxes it would replace, meaning that an automobile with a retail price of $10,000 would cost $13,400 including the new sales tax.” A number of readers pointed out that H.R. 25, the specific bill mentioned by Gov. Huckabee, calls for a 23 percent retail sales tax and not the 34 percent used by the Advisory Panel on Tax Reform. That 23 percent number, however, is misleading and based on some extremely optimistic assumptions. We found that while there are several good economic arguments for the FairTax, unless you earn more than $200,000 per year, fairness is not one of them.
Update June 14: In a letter, Americans for Fair Taxation wrote to say that it disagrees “very strongly” with FactCheck’s analysis of the FairTax. For their objections and our response, see the end of the “Analysis” section.
Analysis
How to Make 30 Look Like 23
Americans for Fair Taxation offers the following plain-language interpretation of H.R. 25:
It is the parenthetical that is important, for it hides the real truth of the tax rate.
First consider the way in which sales tax is normally figured. A consumer good that carries a $100 price tag might be subject to a 5 percent sales tax. That means that the final bill for the item is $105. The 5 percent figure is the amount of tax that is charged on the original purchase price. But now suppose that instead of pricing the item at $100, the shop owner simply priced the item at $105, then sent $5 directly to the state. The $105 price would be a tax-inclusive sales price. But $5 is just 4.8 percent of $105. That 4.8 percent number, however, is relatively meaningless. You are still paying exactly the same 5 percent tax on the item.
The 23 percent number in H.R. 25 is the equivalent of the 4.8 percent in the previous example. To calculate the real rate of the sales tax, we have to determine the original purchase price of an item. We can begin with the same $100 item, keeping in mind that a price tag that reads $100 has sales tax already built in. If our tax rate is 23 percent of the tax-inclusive sales price, then of the $100 final price, $23 of those dollars will be for taxes, meaning that the original pre-tax price of the item is $77. To get $23 in taxes on a $77 item, one must impose a 30 percent tax. In other words, a 23 percent sales tax on the tax-inclusive sales price is equivalent to a 30 percent tax on the actual price of the item.
FairTax proponents object to the 30 percent number, claiming that critics use the larger number to frighten people. Americans for Fair Taxation claims that it uses the tax-inclusive number to make it easier to compare the FairTax to the income tax that it will replace (since most of us think of income tax rates on an inclusive basis). But we are not accustomed to thinking of sales taxes inclusively. The result is that many FairTax supporters (about 15 percent of those who wrote to us, for example) do not understand that the 23 percent figure is tax inclusive.
Our analysis of the FairTax used a figure of 34 percent as the basic exclusive tax rate. One e-mailer complained that our number was at least 10 percentage points “higher than [the FairTax] is” because we calculated it as an addition to retail prices. But our 34 percent number is not 10 percentage points higher than the legislation. A 34 percent exclusive number is equivalent to a 25 percent tax inclusive rate – only 2 percentage points higher than the FairTax bill. We think that, intentional or not, the use of the tax-inclusive 23 percent rate has misled a lot of FairTax proponents.
But 30 Is Not 34 Either
Americans for Fair Taxation, however, has complained that H.R. 25 calls for a 23 percent inclusive (or 30 percent exclusive) rate, not a 34 percent rate. Our number came from the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (scroll to chapter 9 for the panel's discussion of the FairTax), which calculated that a 34 percent rate on the actual price of consumer goods would be necessary to make the program revenue-neutral. Americans for Fair Taxation has said that the Advisory Panel did not use the FairTax as detailed in the legislation but instead made up its own plan. This complaint is disingenuous. The Advisory Panel did in fact begin with the 30 percent figure that proponents of the FairTax submitted. But the panel rejected those figures, claiming that they were based, at least in part, on the unrealistic assumption that there would be full compliance with the FairTax. In other words, proponents assume that no one will cheat on taxes. However, the Treasury Department estimates that the evasion rate for the entire U.S. tax system under current law is approximately 15 percent. The Advisory Panel accordingly assumed a 15 percent evasion rate for the FairTax.
More significantly, however, the panel found that FairTax supporters were employing questionable accounting. In calculating federal revenue, proponents assumed that purchases made by the federal government would be taxed at the full 30 percent rate. But when calculating federal expenditures, FairTax proponents did not factor in the additional costs of the 30 percent sales tax. The Advisory Panel thus threw out the revenue from federal purchases, noting (correctly) that increased revenue from taxing federal purchases is exactly canceled by increased costs in the federal budget. Unfortunately, the Advisory Panel has thus far refused to release its methodology, making it difficult to reconcile its projections with those of Americans for Fair Taxation.
Using a formula that corrects for the faulty assumption about government spending, William Gale, director of the economic studies program at the Brookings Institute, calculates that a 39.3 percent exclusive rate would be necessary for revenue neutrality. (We used the lower Advisory Panel number). A more recent study by FairTax supporter and Boston University economist Laurence Kotlikoff – working from Gale’s formula and adopting the same basic assumptions – determines that a 31.2 percent exclusive (or 23.8 percent tax-inclusive) rate would be sufficient.
Even if Kotlikoff is correct that a 31.2 percent rate is revenue-neutral, there remains some reason to doubt that the rate actually would be that low. The FairTax proposal assumes a 100 percent tax base on consumption. By way of contrast, most states that have sales taxes have roughly a 50 percent tax base. With the FairTax’s 100 percent base, consumers would pay taxes on a great many things that may not intuitively seem like consumption. The list would include:
We look at the numbers behind the numbers.
Summary
In our recent article on the second GOP debate, we called out Gov. Mike Huckabee as well as Reps. Tom Tancredo and Duncan Hunter for their support of the FairTax. We wrote that the bipartisan Advisory Panel on Tax Reform had “calculated that a sales tax would have to be set at 34 percent of retail sales prices to bring in the same revenue as the taxes it would replace, meaning that an automobile with a retail price of $10,000 would cost $13,400 including the new sales tax.” A number of readers pointed out that H.R. 25, the specific bill mentioned by Gov. Huckabee, calls for a 23 percent retail sales tax and not the 34 percent used by the Advisory Panel on Tax Reform. That 23 percent number, however, is misleading and based on some extremely optimistic assumptions. We found that while there are several good economic arguments for the FairTax, unless you earn more than $200,000 per year, fairness is not one of them.
Update June 14: In a letter, Americans for Fair Taxation wrote to say that it disagrees “very strongly” with FactCheck’s analysis of the FairTax. For their objections and our response, see the end of the “Analysis” section.
Analysis
How to Make 30 Look Like 23
Americans for Fair Taxation offers the following plain-language interpretation of H.R. 25:
Americans for Fair Taxation: A 23-percent (of the tax-inclusive sales price) sales tax is imposed on all retail sales for personal consumption of new goods and services.
It is the parenthetical that is important, for it hides the real truth of the tax rate.
First consider the way in which sales tax is normally figured. A consumer good that carries a $100 price tag might be subject to a 5 percent sales tax. That means that the final bill for the item is $105. The 5 percent figure is the amount of tax that is charged on the original purchase price. But now suppose that instead of pricing the item at $100, the shop owner simply priced the item at $105, then sent $5 directly to the state. The $105 price would be a tax-inclusive sales price. But $5 is just 4.8 percent of $105. That 4.8 percent number, however, is relatively meaningless. You are still paying exactly the same 5 percent tax on the item.
The 23 percent number in H.R. 25 is the equivalent of the 4.8 percent in the previous example. To calculate the real rate of the sales tax, we have to determine the original purchase price of an item. We can begin with the same $100 item, keeping in mind that a price tag that reads $100 has sales tax already built in. If our tax rate is 23 percent of the tax-inclusive sales price, then of the $100 final price, $23 of those dollars will be for taxes, meaning that the original pre-tax price of the item is $77. To get $23 in taxes on a $77 item, one must impose a 30 percent tax. In other words, a 23 percent sales tax on the tax-inclusive sales price is equivalent to a 30 percent tax on the actual price of the item.
FairTax proponents object to the 30 percent number, claiming that critics use the larger number to frighten people. Americans for Fair Taxation claims that it uses the tax-inclusive number to make it easier to compare the FairTax to the income tax that it will replace (since most of us think of income tax rates on an inclusive basis). But we are not accustomed to thinking of sales taxes inclusively. The result is that many FairTax supporters (about 15 percent of those who wrote to us, for example) do not understand that the 23 percent figure is tax inclusive.
Our analysis of the FairTax used a figure of 34 percent as the basic exclusive tax rate. One e-mailer complained that our number was at least 10 percentage points “higher than [the FairTax] is” because we calculated it as an addition to retail prices. But our 34 percent number is not 10 percentage points higher than the legislation. A 34 percent exclusive number is equivalent to a 25 percent tax inclusive rate – only 2 percentage points higher than the FairTax bill. We think that, intentional or not, the use of the tax-inclusive 23 percent rate has misled a lot of FairTax proponents.
But 30 Is Not 34 Either
Americans for Fair Taxation, however, has complained that H.R. 25 calls for a 23 percent inclusive (or 30 percent exclusive) rate, not a 34 percent rate. Our number came from the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (scroll to chapter 9 for the panel's discussion of the FairTax), which calculated that a 34 percent rate on the actual price of consumer goods would be necessary to make the program revenue-neutral. Americans for Fair Taxation has said that the Advisory Panel did not use the FairTax as detailed in the legislation but instead made up its own plan. This complaint is disingenuous. The Advisory Panel did in fact begin with the 30 percent figure that proponents of the FairTax submitted. But the panel rejected those figures, claiming that they were based, at least in part, on the unrealistic assumption that there would be full compliance with the FairTax. In other words, proponents assume that no one will cheat on taxes. However, the Treasury Department estimates that the evasion rate for the entire U.S. tax system under current law is approximately 15 percent. The Advisory Panel accordingly assumed a 15 percent evasion rate for the FairTax.
More significantly, however, the panel found that FairTax supporters were employing questionable accounting. In calculating federal revenue, proponents assumed that purchases made by the federal government would be taxed at the full 30 percent rate. But when calculating federal expenditures, FairTax proponents did not factor in the additional costs of the 30 percent sales tax. The Advisory Panel thus threw out the revenue from federal purchases, noting (correctly) that increased revenue from taxing federal purchases is exactly canceled by increased costs in the federal budget. Unfortunately, the Advisory Panel has thus far refused to release its methodology, making it difficult to reconcile its projections with those of Americans for Fair Taxation.
Using a formula that corrects for the faulty assumption about government spending, William Gale, director of the economic studies program at the Brookings Institute, calculates that a 39.3 percent exclusive rate would be necessary for revenue neutrality. (We used the lower Advisory Panel number). A more recent study by FairTax supporter and Boston University economist Laurence Kotlikoff – working from Gale’s formula and adopting the same basic assumptions – determines that a 31.2 percent exclusive (or 23.8 percent tax-inclusive) rate would be sufficient.
Even if Kotlikoff is correct that a 31.2 percent rate is revenue-neutral, there remains some reason to doubt that the rate actually would be that low. The FairTax proposal assumes a 100 percent tax base on consumption. By way of contrast, most states that have sales taxes have roughly a 50 percent tax base. With the FairTax’s 100 percent base, consumers would pay taxes on a great many things that may not intuitively seem like consumption. The list would include:
- Purchases of new homes
- Rent
- Interest on credit cards, mortgages and car loans
- Doctor bills
- Utilities
- Gasoline (30 percent in addition to current taxes, which would not be repealed)
- Legal fees
At today’s prices, gasoline would cost almost $1 per gallon more. A $150,000 new home would run $195,000 – plus the 30 percent tax that the buyer would pay on the interest on the mortgage. In short, the FairTax taxes everything that one buys, with the one notable exception of education. Any exceptions to the tax base (for instance, eliminating rent or credit card interest from the tax base) would require an offsetting increase in the rate.
But the FairTax Will Lower Prices
Proponents of the FairTax point out that prices on consumer goods contain what are called “hidden taxes.” Under current law, corporations have to pay taxes on their earnings. Moreover, businesses have to pay social security taxes for each employee. The money to pay these taxes has to come from somewhere, and FairTax supporters argue that the cost is passed on to the consumer. In fact, the best-known proponent of the FairTax, talk-show host Neal Boortz, argues that 22 percent of the price of a consumer good is really a “hidden tax.” Get rid of corporate and social security taxes, Boortz argues, and consumer good prices would drop by 22 percent. Even with the 23 percent FairTax, prices stay the same, and with the elimination of income taxes, paychecks will get bigger. Everyone gets a raise and the federal government still gets its revenue. About 10 percent of the e-mail messages we received from FairTax proponents trumpeted this kind of magic act. It is easy to understand the confusion on the issue, as Boortz himself made similar assertions in the hardcover edition of his book. (He later issued a corrected version in paperback.)
A bit of critical analysis shows that this cannot be right. The FairTax is revenue-neutral. That means that for every tax dollar collected under the current system, the FairTax has to collect a dollar. If the FairTax exactly equaled embedded taxes, then it could not possibly be revenue-neutral, since embedded taxes do not take into account personal income or estate taxes. The FairTax rate would have to be high enough to replace embedded taxes plus income and estate taxes.
Chris Edwards, the Cato Institute's director of tax policy studies, points out that prices do not really matter; corporate, payroll, income and estate taxes currently generate approximately $2.4 trillion, and a revenue-neutral FairTax would still require that taxpayers pony up $2.4 trillion. Nor is it clear that the 22 percent embedded tax figure is particularly meaningful. David Burton, chief economist of the Americans for Fair Taxation, calls it "simplistic" to think that the entire cost of corporate taxes is borne by consumers. Cato's Edwards suggests that while consumers do pay at least part of the costs, producers also bear some of the burden. That is, employees pay part of the costs of hidden taxes (in the form of lower wages), and corporate shareholders pay another portion (in the form of lower returns on their investments).
The FairTax: Is It Regressive?
Sometimes sales taxes are called regressive, meaning that the poorest pay higher rates than the wealthy. Strictly speaking, sales taxes are flat, since everyone pays the same rate. But because the poor tend to spend a high percentage of their income on basic consumer goods such as food and clothing, sales taxes do require the poor to pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes.
The FairTax plan, however, helps to alleviate this difficulty by exempting sales taxes on all income up to the poverty level. Taxpayers would receive a "prebate," which Edwards calculates to be about $5,600 annually. The Treasury Department estimates that the prebate program would cost between $600 billion and $700 billion annually, making it the largest category of federal spending. Americans for Fair Taxation disputes the Treasury Department numbers, claiming that the actual cost would be closer to $485 billion per year. The Treasury Department has so far refused to release its methodology, making it difficult to determine whose estimate is correct.
Who Really Pays?
With the prebate program in effect, those earning less than $15,000 per year would see their share of the federal tax burden drop from -0.7 percent to -6.3 percent. Of course, if the poorest Americans are paying less under the FairTax plan, then someone else pays more. As it turns out, according to the Treasury Department, “someone else” is everybody earning between $15,000 and $200,000 per year. The chart below compares the share of the federal tax burden for different income groups under the current system and under the FairTax. Those in the highest and the lowest brackets will see their share decrease, while everyone else will see their share of taxes increase.

Americans for Fair Taxation rejects the Treasury Department analysis, objecting that Treasury considers only the income tax. By leaving out payroll taxes (which are actually regressive) Treasury’s chart makes the FairTax look worse by comparison. We found that including all the taxes that the FairTax would replace (income, payroll, corporate and estate taxes), those earning less than $24,156 per year would benefit. AFT’s Burton agreed that those earning more than $200,000 would see their share of the overall tax burden decrease, admitting that “probably those earning between $40[thousand] and $100,000” would see their percentage of the tax burden rise.

Why Be Progressive?
It is easy to look at charts like the one above and dismiss the FairTax as simply another way to help the rich get richer. But there is an economic argument for a less progressive tax system, though that argument is extremely technical. Kotlikoff has asserted that the FairTax will lower the marginal tax rate for all earners. (The marginal rate is the tax rate paid on the last dollar earned.) Because marginal rates are lower, each extra dollar of income will result in greater purchasing power. The decrease in marginal rates is progressive – that is, marginal rate reductions are greater for the working- and middle-classes than for the wealthy.
Moreover, even FairTax critics like Gale agree that consumption taxes increase the size of the economy. Many studies show that long-term incomes would rise under a consumption-based tax system. Optimistic accounts show a 10 percent rise in income over time, but even the more cautious studies show gains of 5 percent to 7 percent. Because the FairTax will grow the economy, workers will eventually see increases in their income. FairTax proponents claim that the growing economy, coupled with the reduction in marginal tax rates, will offset the increased tax burden. Burton argues that "the FairTax is a positive-sum game," one in which purchasing power will grow faster than the tax burden. The size of any such gains is disputed, however; Americans for Fair Taxation consistently chooses from among the most optimistic growth projections.
Upon Further Review
We stand behind our earlier analysis of the FairTax. The proposal to which Gov. Huckabee referred is not a 23 percent tax, but rather a 30 percent tax. And it is revenue-neutral only through an accounting trick. It will collect more money from those earning between $15,000 and $200,000 per year and less from those earning more than $200,000 per year. It is possible that the FairTax would make most people better off, but much of that gain would be a direct result of making the tax code less fair.
- by Joe Miller
Correction, May 31: In the Analysis portion of our original story we stated that "Taxpayers with very low incomes would receive a 'prebate'." In fact, all taxpayers would receive the prebate for sales taxes on purchases up to the poverty level.
Update June 14: Americans for Fair Taxation wrote us to say that the organization disagrees “very strongly” with FactCheck’s analysis and that we have “uncritically accepted many misleading arguments” made by FairTax critics. As a courtesy to AFT, and as a service to our readers, we are posting the letter in our “Supporting Documents” section. We stand by our article, and our comments on AFT’s letter are below.
Our mission at FactCheck.org is not to rule on issues of public policy but rather to reduce the level of deception and confusion in U.S. politics. We found that, whatever Americans for Fair Taxation’s intentions, there remains much confusion about the FairTax.
AFT disputes our conclusion that the 23 percent number is misleading. We stand behind it. Sales taxes, as AFT notes, “are almost always expressed in an ‘exclusive’ manner,” which in our view makes 30 percent the logical figure to use when describing the FairTax.
We don’t actually call the FairTax “regressive,” as AFT implies that we do. We reiterate, however, that those earning between $15,000 (or perhaps as much as about $24,000 – see our addition to the “Who Really Pays” portion of our article above) and $200,000 per year – virtually all middle-class Americans – would pay a higher share of the tax burden under this proposal. Those earning more would see their share drop, as even AFT economists admit.
We did not ignore Americans for Fair Taxation’s research. Much of that research is publicly available and is listed among our sources. We do, however, approach all evidence with a healthy skepticism – including research that is funded by the very group whose claims we are investigating. Where possible we rely upon neutral sources, such as the bipartisan President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, and on opinions from third-party scholars from think tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Cato Institute.
Sources
Bachman, Paul, et al. "Taxing Sales Under the FairTax: What Rate Works?." Tax Analysts 13 Nov. 2006: 663-682.
Boortz, Neal and John Linder. The FairTax Book. New York: Harper Collins, 2005.
Edwards, Chris. "Options for Tax Reform." Policy Analysis 536 (2005): 1-44.
FairTax. -1 2007. Americans for Fair Taxation. 22 May 2007.
The Fair Tax Act of 2007 -- H.R. 25 / S. 1025 Plain English Summary. -1 2007. Americans for Fair Taxation. 17 May 2007.
Gale, William. "Comments on 'Taxing Sales Under the Flat Tax'." American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC. 28 Feb. 2007.
Gale, William. "A Comparison of Income and Consumption Taxes." President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, Washington, DC. 16 Feb. 2005.
Gale, William G.. "The National Retail Sales Tax: What Would the Rate Have to Be?." Tax Analysts (2006): 889-911.
Kotlikoff, Laurence. "Taxing Sales Under the FairTax: What Rate Works?." American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC. 28 Feb. 2007.
Linder, John. “The Fair Tax Act of 2005.” H.R. 25. Introduced 4 Jan. 2005.
Office of Management and Budget. The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables. Washington: GPO, 2007.
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. Final Report. Washington: GPO, 2005.
Slemrod, Joel. "'The Fairtax Book' and 'Flat Tax Revolution': 1040EZ -- Really, Really EZ." New York Times. 13 Nov. 2005.
U.S. Retail Gasoline Prices. 21 May 2007. United States Department of Energy. 24 May 2007.
But the FairTax Will Lower Prices
Proponents of the FairTax point out that prices on consumer goods contain what are called “hidden taxes.” Under current law, corporations have to pay taxes on their earnings. Moreover, businesses have to pay social security taxes for each employee. The money to pay these taxes has to come from somewhere, and FairTax supporters argue that the cost is passed on to the consumer. In fact, the best-known proponent of the FairTax, talk-show host Neal Boortz, argues that 22 percent of the price of a consumer good is really a “hidden tax.” Get rid of corporate and social security taxes, Boortz argues, and consumer good prices would drop by 22 percent. Even with the 23 percent FairTax, prices stay the same, and with the elimination of income taxes, paychecks will get bigger. Everyone gets a raise and the federal government still gets its revenue. About 10 percent of the e-mail messages we received from FairTax proponents trumpeted this kind of magic act. It is easy to understand the confusion on the issue, as Boortz himself made similar assertions in the hardcover edition of his book. (He later issued a corrected version in paperback.)
A bit of critical analysis shows that this cannot be right. The FairTax is revenue-neutral. That means that for every tax dollar collected under the current system, the FairTax has to collect a dollar. If the FairTax exactly equaled embedded taxes, then it could not possibly be revenue-neutral, since embedded taxes do not take into account personal income or estate taxes. The FairTax rate would have to be high enough to replace embedded taxes plus income and estate taxes.
Chris Edwards, the Cato Institute's director of tax policy studies, points out that prices do not really matter; corporate, payroll, income and estate taxes currently generate approximately $2.4 trillion, and a revenue-neutral FairTax would still require that taxpayers pony up $2.4 trillion. Nor is it clear that the 22 percent embedded tax figure is particularly meaningful. David Burton, chief economist of the Americans for Fair Taxation, calls it "simplistic" to think that the entire cost of corporate taxes is borne by consumers. Cato's Edwards suggests that while consumers do pay at least part of the costs, producers also bear some of the burden. That is, employees pay part of the costs of hidden taxes (in the form of lower wages), and corporate shareholders pay another portion (in the form of lower returns on their investments).
The FairTax: Is It Regressive?
Sometimes sales taxes are called regressive, meaning that the poorest pay higher rates than the wealthy. Strictly speaking, sales taxes are flat, since everyone pays the same rate. But because the poor tend to spend a high percentage of their income on basic consumer goods such as food and clothing, sales taxes do require the poor to pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes.
The FairTax plan, however, helps to alleviate this difficulty by exempting sales taxes on all income up to the poverty level. Taxpayers would receive a "prebate," which Edwards calculates to be about $5,600 annually. The Treasury Department estimates that the prebate program would cost between $600 billion and $700 billion annually, making it the largest category of federal spending. Americans for Fair Taxation disputes the Treasury Department numbers, claiming that the actual cost would be closer to $485 billion per year. The Treasury Department has so far refused to release its methodology, making it difficult to determine whose estimate is correct.
Who Really Pays?
With the prebate program in effect, those earning less than $15,000 per year would see their share of the federal tax burden drop from -0.7 percent to -6.3 percent. Of course, if the poorest Americans are paying less under the FairTax plan, then someone else pays more. As it turns out, according to the Treasury Department, “someone else” is everybody earning between $15,000 and $200,000 per year. The chart below compares the share of the federal tax burden for different income groups under the current system and under the FairTax. Those in the highest and the lowest brackets will see their share decrease, while everyone else will see their share of taxes increase.

Americans for Fair Taxation rejects the Treasury Department analysis, objecting that Treasury considers only the income tax. By leaving out payroll taxes (which are actually regressive) Treasury’s chart makes the FairTax look worse by comparison. We found that including all the taxes that the FairTax would replace (income, payroll, corporate and estate taxes), those earning less than $24,156 per year would benefit. AFT’s Burton agreed that those earning more than $200,000 would see their share of the overall tax burden decrease, admitting that “probably those earning between $40[thousand] and $100,000” would see their percentage of the tax burden rise.

Why Be Progressive?
It is easy to look at charts like the one above and dismiss the FairTax as simply another way to help the rich get richer. But there is an economic argument for a less progressive tax system, though that argument is extremely technical. Kotlikoff has asserted that the FairTax will lower the marginal tax rate for all earners. (The marginal rate is the tax rate paid on the last dollar earned.) Because marginal rates are lower, each extra dollar of income will result in greater purchasing power. The decrease in marginal rates is progressive – that is, marginal rate reductions are greater for the working- and middle-classes than for the wealthy.
Moreover, even FairTax critics like Gale agree that consumption taxes increase the size of the economy. Many studies show that long-term incomes would rise under a consumption-based tax system. Optimistic accounts show a 10 percent rise in income over time, but even the more cautious studies show gains of 5 percent to 7 percent. Because the FairTax will grow the economy, workers will eventually see increases in their income. FairTax proponents claim that the growing economy, coupled with the reduction in marginal tax rates, will offset the increased tax burden. Burton argues that "the FairTax is a positive-sum game," one in which purchasing power will grow faster than the tax burden. The size of any such gains is disputed, however; Americans for Fair Taxation consistently chooses from among the most optimistic growth projections.
Upon Further Review
We stand behind our earlier analysis of the FairTax. The proposal to which Gov. Huckabee referred is not a 23 percent tax, but rather a 30 percent tax. And it is revenue-neutral only through an accounting trick. It will collect more money from those earning between $15,000 and $200,000 per year and less from those earning more than $200,000 per year. It is possible that the FairTax would make most people better off, but much of that gain would be a direct result of making the tax code less fair.
- by Joe Miller
Correction, May 31: In the Analysis portion of our original story we stated that "Taxpayers with very low incomes would receive a 'prebate'." In fact, all taxpayers would receive the prebate for sales taxes on purchases up to the poverty level.
Update June 14: Americans for Fair Taxation wrote us to say that the organization disagrees “very strongly” with FactCheck’s analysis and that we have “uncritically accepted many misleading arguments” made by FairTax critics. As a courtesy to AFT, and as a service to our readers, we are posting the letter in our “Supporting Documents” section. We stand by our article, and our comments on AFT’s letter are below.
Our mission at FactCheck.org is not to rule on issues of public policy but rather to reduce the level of deception and confusion in U.S. politics. We found that, whatever Americans for Fair Taxation’s intentions, there remains much confusion about the FairTax.
AFT disputes our conclusion that the 23 percent number is misleading. We stand behind it. Sales taxes, as AFT notes, “are almost always expressed in an ‘exclusive’ manner,” which in our view makes 30 percent the logical figure to use when describing the FairTax.
We don’t actually call the FairTax “regressive,” as AFT implies that we do. We reiterate, however, that those earning between $15,000 (or perhaps as much as about $24,000 – see our addition to the “Who Really Pays” portion of our article above) and $200,000 per year – virtually all middle-class Americans – would pay a higher share of the tax burden under this proposal. Those earning more would see their share drop, as even AFT economists admit.
We did not ignore Americans for Fair Taxation’s research. Much of that research is publicly available and is listed among our sources. We do, however, approach all evidence with a healthy skepticism – including research that is funded by the very group whose claims we are investigating. Where possible we rely upon neutral sources, such as the bipartisan President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, and on opinions from third-party scholars from think tanks like the Brookings Institution and the Cato Institute.
Sources
Bachman, Paul, et al. "Taxing Sales Under the FairTax: What Rate Works?." Tax Analysts 13 Nov. 2006: 663-682.
Boortz, Neal and John Linder. The FairTax Book. New York: Harper Collins, 2005.
Edwards, Chris. "Options for Tax Reform." Policy Analysis 536 (2005): 1-44.
FairTax. -1 2007. Americans for Fair Taxation. 22 May 2007.
The Fair Tax Act of 2007 -- H.R. 25 / S. 1025 Plain English Summary. -1 2007. Americans for Fair Taxation. 17 May 2007.
Gale, William. "Comments on 'Taxing Sales Under the Flat Tax'." American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC. 28 Feb. 2007.
Gale, William. "A Comparison of Income and Consumption Taxes." President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, Washington, DC. 16 Feb. 2005.
Gale, William G.. "The National Retail Sales Tax: What Would the Rate Have to Be?." Tax Analysts (2006): 889-911.
Kotlikoff, Laurence. "Taxing Sales Under the FairTax: What Rate Works?." American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC. 28 Feb. 2007.
Linder, John. “The Fair Tax Act of 2005.” H.R. 25. Introduced 4 Jan. 2005.
Office of Management and Budget. The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables. Washington: GPO, 2007.
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. Final Report. Washington: GPO, 2005.
Slemrod, Joel. "'The Fairtax Book' and 'Flat Tax Revolution': 1040EZ -- Really, Really EZ." New York Times. 13 Nov. 2005.
U.S. Retail Gasoline Prices. 21 May 2007. United States Department of Energy. 24 May 2007.
Sunday, May 6, 2007
Free Trade's Great, but Offshoring Rattles Me
In the May 6, 2007 Washington Post article "Free Trade's Great, but Offshoring Rattles Me," Alan S. Blinder writes:I'm a free trader down to my toes. Always have been. Yet lately, I'm being treated as a heretic by many of my fellow economists. Why? Because I have stuck my neck out and predicted that the offshoring of service jobs from rich countries such as the United States to poor countries such as India may pose major problems for tens of millions of American workers over the coming decades. In fact, I think offshoring may be the biggest political issue in economics for a generation.
When I say this, many of my fellow free-traders react with a mixture of disbelief, pity and hostility. Blinder, have you lost your mind? (Answer: I think not.) Have you forgotten about the basic economic gains from international trade? (Answer: No.) Are you advocating some form of protectionism? (Answer: No !) Aren't you giving aid and comfort to the enemies of free trade? (Answer: No, I'm trying to save free trade from itself.)
The reason for my alleged apostasy is that the nature of international trade is changing before our eyes. We used to think, roughly, that an item was tradable only if it could be put in a box and shipped. That's no longer true. Nowadays, a growing list of services can be zapped across international borders electronically. It's electrons that move, not boxes. We're all familiar with call centers, but electronic service delivery has already extended to computer programming, a variety of engineering services, accounting, security analysis and a lot else. And much more is on the way.
Why do I say much more? Because two powerful, historical forces are driving these changes, and both are virtually certain to grow stronger over time.
The first is technology, especially information and communications technology, which has been improving at an astonishing pace in recent decades. As the technology advances, the quality of now-familiar modes of communication (such as telephones, videoconferencing and the Internet) will improve, and entirely new forms of communication may be invented. One clear implication of the upward march of technology is that a widening array of services will become deliverable electronically from afar. And it's not just low-skill services such as key punching, transcription and telemarketing. It's also high-skill services such as radiology, architecture and engineering -- maybe even college teaching.
The second driver is the entry of about 1.5 billion "new" workers into the world economy. These folks aren't new to the world, of course. But they live in places such as China, India and the former Soviet bloc -- countries that used to stand outside the world economy. For those who say, "Sure, but most of them are low-skilled workers," I have two answers. First, even a small percentage of 1.5 billion people is a lot of folks. And second, India and China will certainly educate hundreds of millions more in the coming decades. So there will be a lot of willing and able people available to do the jobs that technology will move offshore.
Looking at these two historic forces from the perspective of the world as a whole, one can only get a warm feeling. Improvements in technology will raise living standards, just as they have since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. And the availability of millions of new electronically deliverable service jobs in, say, India and China will help alleviate poverty on a mass scale. Offshoring will also reduce costs and boost productivity in the United States. So repeat after me: Globalization is good for the world. Which is where economists usually stop.
And where my alleged apostasy starts.
For these same forces don't look so benign from the viewpoint of an American computer programmer or accountant. They've done what they were told to do: They went to college and prepared for well-paid careers with bountiful employment opportunities. But now their bosses are eyeing legions of well-qualified, English-speaking programmers and accountants in India, for example, who will happily work for a fraction of what Americans earn. Such prospective competition puts a damper on wage increases. And if the jobs do move offshore, displaced American workers may lose not only their jobs but also their pensions and health insurance. These people can be forgiven if they have doubts about the virtues of globalization.
We economists assure folks that things will be all right in the end. Both Americans and Indians will be better off. I think that's right. The basic principles of free trade that Adam Smith and David Ricardo taught us two centuries ago remain valid today: Just like people, nations benefit by specializing in the tasks they do best and trading with other nations for the rest. There's nothing new here theoretically.
But I would argue that there's something new about the coming transition to service offshoring. Those two powerful forces mentioned earlier -- technological advancement and the rise of China and India -- suggest that this particular transition will be large, lengthy and painful.
It's going to be lengthy because the technology for moving information across the world will continue to improve for decades, if not forever. So, for those who earn their living performing tasks that are (or will become) deliverable electronically, this is no fleeting problem.
It's also going to be large. How large? In some recent research, I estimated that 30 million to 40 million U.S. jobs are potentially offshorable. These include scientists, mathematicians and editors on the high end and telephone operators, clerks and typists on the low end. Obviously, not all of these jobs are going to India, China or elsewhere. But many will.
It's going to be painful because our country offers such a poor social safety net to cushion the blow for displaced workers. Our unemployment insurance program is stingy by first-world standards. American workers who lose their jobs often lose their health insurance and pension rights as well. And even though many displaced workers will have to change occupations -- a difficult task for anyone -- only a fortunate few will be offered opportunities for retraining. All this needs to change.
What else is to be done? Trade protection won't work. You can't block electrons from crossing national borders. Because U.S. labor cannot compete on price, we must reemphasize the things that have kept us on top of the economic food chain for so long: technology, innovation, entrepreneurship, adaptability and the like. That means more science and engineering, more spending on R&D, keeping our capital markets big and vibrant, and not letting ourselves get locked into "sunset" industries.
In addition, we need to rethink our education system so that it turns out more people who are trained for the jobs that will remain in the United States and fewer for the jobs that will migrate overseas. We cannot, of course, foresee exactly which jobs will go and which will stay. But one good bet is that many electronic service jobs will move offshore, whereas personal service jobs will not. Here are a few examples. Tax accounting is easily offshorable; onsite auditing is not. Computer programming is offshorable; computer repair is not. Architects could be endangered, but builders aren't. Were it not for stiff regulations, radiology would be offshorable; but pediatrics and geriatrics aren't. Lawyers who write contracts can do so at a distance and deliver them electronically; litigators who argue cases in court cannot.
But even if we do everything I've suggested -- which we won't -- American workers will still face a troublesome transition as tens of millions of old jobs are replaced by new ones. There will also be great political strains on the open trading system as millions of white-collar workers who thought their jobs were immune to foreign competition suddenly find that the game has changed -- and not to their liking.
That is why I am going public with my concerns now. If we economists stubbornly insist on chanting "Free trade is good for you" to people who know that it is not, we will quickly become irrelevant to the public debate. Compared with that, a little apostasy should be welcome.
Alan S. Blinder is a professor of economics at Princeton University, vice chairman of Promontory Interfinancial Network and vice chairman of the G7 Group.
Sunday, March 11, 2007
Curse of the Lottery Winners
According to the March 11, 2007 ABC News story "Curse of the Lottery Winners," winning the lottery might not turn out as expected:
The record setting $390 million lottery jackpot shared by two American winners this week has put stars and dollar signs in the eyes of millions of would-be millionaires. But a sudden cash windfall hasn't always resulted in a happy ending for past lottery winners.
Psychologist Steve Danish, a professor of psychology at Virginia Commonwealth University, has studied the impact instant wealth has on lottery winners.
"The dream you have about winning may be better than the actuality of winning," he said. "There have been families that have just -- just been torn apart by this process."
Kenneth and Connie Parker were winners of a $25 million jackpot. Their 16-year marriage disintegrated just months after they became rich beyond their wildest dreams.
Jeffrey Dampier, a $20 million winner, was kidnapped and murdered by his own sister-in-law.
In 2002, Jack Whittaker won the largest individual payout in U.S. lottery history.
"I can take the money," Whittaker said at the time. "I can take this much money and do a lot of good with this much money right now."
But it didn't work out like that. Whittaker's life was consumed by hardship, including the death of his beloved granddaughter Brandi, who was a victim of a drug overdose, and the breakup of his marriage.
"If I knew what was going to transpire, honestly, I would have torn the ticket up," said Jewell Whittaker, Jack Whittaker's ex-wife.
For Eddie Nabors, the 52-year-old truck driver from Georgia turned recent mega millionaire, Danish offers this advice.
"I think you can probably fish for a couple days … but I'm not sure you can fish for 10 or 20 or 30 years," Danish said. "Without that goal or plan about what you expect to happen for yourself … it could be your worst nightmare."
Friday, March 9, 2007
Monday, January 29, 2007
Ten Myths About the Bush Tax Cuts
In the January 29, 2007 Heritage Foundation article "Ten Myths About the Bush Tax Cuts," Brian M. Riedl attempts to justify and defend the Bush tax cuts:
Backgrounder #2001
The Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Rep resentatives must decide whether to write a budget extending, expiring, or repealing the Bush tax cuts. These tax cuts have provided a convenient scapegoat for the nation's budget and economic challenges. Despite a 42 percent spending increase in 2001, critics charge that the tax cuts have starved popular pro grams. Despite surging economic growth and 5 million new jobs since 2003, critics also charge that the tax cuts have not helped the economy. Finally, despite making the income tax code more progressive, critics charge that the tax cuts have widened inequality.
Nearly all of the conventional wisdom about the Bush tax cuts is wrong. In reality:
* The tax cuts have not substantially reduced cur rent tax revenues, which were in fact not far from the 2000 pre–tax cut baseline and over the 2003 pre–tax cut baseline in 2006;
* The increased child tax credit, 10 percent tax bracket, and fix of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) reduced tax revenues much more than most of the "tax cuts for the rich";
* Economic growth rates have more than doubled since the 2003 tax cuts; and
* The tax cuts shifted even more of the income tax burden toward the rich.
Setting optimal tax policy requires governing with facts rather than popular mythology, which is why it is important to set the record straight by debunking 10 myths about the Bush tax cuts.
Ten Myths About the Bush Tax Cuts—and the Facts
Myth #1: Tax revenues remain low.
Fact: Tax revenues are above the historical average, even after the tax cuts.
Myth #2: The Bush tax cuts substantially reduced 2006 revenues and expanded the budget deficit.
Fact: Nearly all of the 2006 budget deficit resulted from additional spending above the baseline.
Myth #3: Supply-side economics assumes that all tax cuts immediately pay for themselves.
Fact: It assumes replenishment of some but not necessarily all lost revenues.
Myth #4: Capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves.
Fact: Capital gains tax revenues doubled following the 2003 tax cut.
Myth #5: The Bush tax cuts are to blame for the projected long-term budget deficits.
Fact: Projections show that entitlement costs will dwarf the projected large revenue increases.
Myth #6: Raising tax rates is the best way to raise revenue.
Fact: Tax revenues correlate with economic growth, not tax rates.
Myth #7: Reversing the upper-income tax cuts would raise substantial revenues.
Fact: The low-income tax cuts reduced revenues the most.
Myth #8: Tax cuts help the economy by "putting money in people's pockets."
Fact: Pro-growth tax cuts support incentives for productive behavior.
Myth #9: The Bush tax cuts have not helped the economy.
Fact: The economy responded strongly to the 2003 tax cuts.
Myth #10: The Bush tax cuts were tilted toward the rich.
Fact: The rich are now shouldering even more of the income tax burden.
..................................................
Myth #1: Tax revenues remain low.
Fact: Tax revenues are above the historical average, even after the tax cuts.
Tax revenues in 2006 were 18.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which is actually above the 20-year, 40-year, and 60-year historical aver ages.[1] The inflation-adjusted 20 percent tax revenue increase between 2004 and 2006 represents the largest two-year revenue surge since 1965–1967.[2] Claims that Americans are undertaxed by historical standards are patently false.
Some critics of President George W. Bush's tax policies concede that tax revenues exceed the his torical average yet assert that revenues are historically low for economies in the fourth year of an expansion. Setting aside that some of these tax pol icies are partly responsible for that economic expan sion, the numbers simply do not support this claim. Comparing tax revenues in the fourth fiscal year after the end of each of the past three recessions shows nearly equal tax revenues of:
* 18.4 percent of GDP in 1987,
* 18.5 percent of GDP in 1995, and
* 18.4 percent of GDP in 2006.[3]
While revenues as a percentage of GDP have not fully returned to pre-recession levels (20.9 percent in 2000), it is now clear that the pre-recession level was a major historical anomaly caused by a tempo rary stock market bubble.
Myth #2: The Bush tax cuts substantially reduced 2006 revenues and expanded the budget deficit.
Fact: Nearly all of the 2006 budget deficit resulted from additional spending above the baseline.
Critics tirelessly contend that America's swing from budget surpluses in 1998–2001 to a $247 bil lion budget deficit in 2006 resulted chiefly from the "irresponsible" Bush tax cuts. This argument ignores the historic spending increases that pushed federal spending up from 18.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 20.2 percent in 2006.[4]
The best way to measure the swing from surplus to deficit is by comparing the pre–tax cut budget baseline of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) with what actually happened. While the January 2000 baseline projected a 2006 budget surplus of $325 billion, the final 2006 numbers showed a $247 billion deficit—a net drop of $572 billion. This drop occurred because spending was $514 bil lion above projected levels, and revenues were $58 billion below (even after $188 billion in tax cuts). In other words, 90 percent of the swing from surplus to deficit resulted from higher-than-projected spending, and only 10 percent resulted from lower-than-projected revenues.[5] (See Chart 1.)
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
Furthermore, tax revenues in 2006 were actually above the levels projected before the 2003 tax cuts. Immediately before the 2003 tax cuts, the CBO pro jected a 2006 budget deficit of $57 billion, yet the final 2006 budget deficit was $247 billion. The $190 billion deficit increase resulted from federal spend ing that was $237 billion more than projected. Rev enues were actually $47 billion above the projection, even after $75 billion in tax cuts enacted after the baseline was calculated.[6] By that standard, new spending was responsible for 125 percent of the higher 2006 budget deficit, and expanding revenues actually offset 25 percent of the new spending.
The 2006 tax revenues were not substantially far from levels projected before the Bush tax cuts. Despite estimates that the tax cuts would reduce 2006 revenues by $188 billion, they came in just $58 billion below the pre–tax cut revenue level pro jected in January 2000.[7]
The difference is even more dramatic with the pro-growth 2003 tax cuts. The CBO calculated that the post-March 2003 tax cuts would lower 2006 revenues by $75 billion, yet 2006 revenues came in $47 billion above the pre–tax cut baseline released in March 2003. This is not a coincidence. Tax cuts clearly played a significant role in the economy's performing better than expected and recovering much of the lost revenue.
Myth #3: Supply-side economics assumes that all tax cuts immediately pay for themselves.
Fact: It assumes replenishment of some but not necessarily all lost revenues.
Attempts to debunk solid theories often involve first mischaracterizing them as straw men. Critics often erroneously define supply-side economics as the belief that all tax cuts pay for themselves. They then cite tax cuts that have not fully paid for them selves as conclusive proof that supply-side econom ics has failed.
However, supply-side economics never con tended that all tax cuts pay for themselves. Rather the Laffer Curve[8] (upon which much of the supply-side theory is based) merely formalizes the com mon-sense observations that:
1. Tax revenues depend on the tax base as well as the tax rate;
2. Raising tax rates discourages the taxed behavior and therefore shrinks the tax base, offsetting some of the revenue gains; and
3. Lowering tax rates encourages the taxed behav ior and expands the tax base, offsetting some of the revenue loss.
If policymakers intend cigarette taxes to discour age smoking, they should also expect high invest ment taxes to discourage investment and income taxes to discourage work. Lowering taxes encour ages people to engage in the given behavior, which expands the base and replenishes some of the lost revenue. This is the "feedback effect" of a tax cut.
Whether or not a tax cut recovers 100 percent of the lost revenue depends on the tax rate's location on the Laffer Curve. Each tax has a revenue-maxi mizing rate at which future tax increases will reduce revenue. (This is the peak of the Laffer Curve.) Only when tax rates are above that level will reducing the tax rate actually increase revenue. Otherwise, it will replenish only a portion of the lost revenue.
How much feedback revenue a given tax cut will generate depends on the degree to which tax payers adjust their behavior. Cutting sales and property tax rates generally induces smaller feed back effects because taxpayers do not respond by substantially expanding their purchases or home-buying. Income taxes have a higher feedback effect. Nobel Prize-winning economist Ed Prescott has shown a strong cross-national link between lower income tax rates and higher work hours.[9] Investment taxes have the highest feedback effects because investors quickly move to avoid higher-taxed investments. Not surprisingly, history shows that higher investment taxes deeply curtail investment and consequently raise little (if any) new revenue.
Yet, using the standard set by some, even a hypothetical tax cut that provides real tax relief to millions of families and entrepreneurs and creates enough new income to recover 95 percent of the estimated revenue loss would be considered a "failure" of supply-side economics and thus merit a full repeal.
Myth #4: Capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves.
Fact: Capital gains tax revenues doubled following the 2003 tax cut.
As previously stated, whether a tax cut pays for itself depends on how much people alter their behavior in response to the policy. Investors have been shown to be the most sensitive to tax policy, because capital gains tax cuts encourage enough new investment to more than offset the lower tax rate.
In 2003, capital gains tax rates were reduced from 20 percent and 10 percent (depending on income) to 15 percent and 5 percent. Rather than expand by 36 percent from the current $50 billion level to $68 billion in 2006 as the CBO projected before the tax cut, capital gains revenues more than doubled to $103 billion.[10] (See Chart 2.) Past cap ital gains tax cuts have shown similar results.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
By encouraging investment, lower capital gains taxes increase funding for the technologies, busi nesses, ideas, and projects that make workers and the economy more productive. Such investment is vital for long-term economic growth.
Because investors are tax-sensitive, high capital gains tax rates are not only bad economic policy, but also bad budget policy.
Myth #5: The Bush tax cuts are to blame for the projected long-term budget deficits.
Fact: Projections show that entitlement costs will dwarf the projected large revenue increases.
The unsustainability of America's long-term bud get path is well known. However, a common mis perception blames the massive future budget deficits on the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. In reality, revenues will continue to increase above the histor ical average yet be dwarfed by historic entitlement spending increases. (See Chart 3.)
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
For the past half-century, tax revenues have generally stayed within 1 percentage point of 18 per cent of GDP. The CBO projects that, even if all 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent, revenues will stillincrease from 18.4 percent of GDP today to 22.8 percent by 2050, not counting any feedback revenues from their positive economic impact. It is projected that repealing the Bush tax cuts would nudge 2050 revenues up to 23.7 percent of GDP, not counting any revenue losses from the negative economic impact of the tax hikes.[11] In effect, the Bush tax cut debate is whether revenues should increase by 4.4 percent or 5.3 percent of GDP.
Spending has remained around 20 percent of GDP for the past half-century. However, the coming retirement of the baby boomers will increase Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending by a combined 10.5 percent of GDP. Assuming that this causes large budget deficits and increased net spending on interest, federal spending could surge to 38 percent of GDP and possibly much higher.[12]
Overall, revenues are projected to increase from 18 percent of GDP to almost 23 percent. Spending is projected to increase from 20 percent of GDP to at least 38 percent. Even repealing all of the 2001 and 2003 cuts would merely shave the projected budget deficit of 15 percent of GDP by less than 1 percentage point, and that assumes no negative feedback from raising taxes. Clearly, the French-style spending increases, not tax policy, are the problem. Lawmakers should focus on getting entitlements under control.
Myth #6: Raising tax rates is the best way to raise revenue.
Fact: Tax revenues correlate with economic growth, not tax rates.
Many of those who desire additional tax revenues regularly call on Congress to raise tax rates, but tax revenues are a function of two variables: tax rates and the tax base. The tax base typically moves in the opposite direction of the tax rate, partially negating the revenue impact of tax rate changes. Accordingly, Chart 4 shows little correlation between tax rates and tax revenues. Since 1952, the highest marginal income tax rate has dropped from 92 percent to 35 percent, and tax revenues have grown in inflation-adjusted terms while remaining constant as a per cent of GDP.
Chart 5 shows the nearly perfect correlation between GDP and tax revenues. Despite major fluc tuations in income tax rates, long-term tax revenues have grown at almost exactly the same rate as GDP, remaining between 17 percent and 20 percent of GDP for 46 of the past 50 years. Table 1 shows that the top marginal income tax rate topped 90 percent during the 1950s and that revenues averaged 17.2 percent of GDP. By the 1990s, the top marginal income tax rate averaged just 36 per cent, and tax revenues averaged 18.3 percent of GDP. Regardless of the tax rate, tax revenues have almost always come in at approximately 18 percent of GDP.[13]
.Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
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Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
Since revenues move with GDP, the common-sense way to increase tax revenues is to expand the GDP. This means that pro-growth policies such as low marginal tax rates (especially on work, savings, and investment), restrained federal spending, minimal regulation, and free trade would raise more tax revenues than would be raised by self-defeating tax increases. America cannot substantially increase tax revenue with policies that reduce national income.
Myth #7: Reversing the upper-income tax cuts would raise substantial revenues.
Fact: The low-income tax cuts reduced revenues the most.
Many critics of tax cuts nonetheless support extending the increased child tax credit, marriage penalty relief, and the 10 percent income tax bracket because these policies strongly benefit low-income tax families. They also support annually adjusting the alternative minimum tax exemption for inflation to prevent a massive broad-based tax increase. These critics assert that repealing the tax cuts for upper-income individuals and investors and bringing back the pre-2001 estate tax levels can raise substantial revenue. Once again, the numbers fail to support this claim.
In 2007, according to CBO and Joint Committee on Taxation data, the increased child tax credit, mar riage penalty relief, 10 percent bracket, and AMT fix will have a combined budgetary effect of $114 bil lion.[14] (See Table 2.) These policies do not have strong supply-side effects to minimize that effect.
By comparison, the more maligned capital gains, dividends, and estate tax cuts are projected to reduce 2007 revenues by just $36 billion even before the large and positive supply-side effects are incorporated. Thus, repealing these tax cuts would raise very little revenue and could possibly even reduce federal tax revenue. Such tax increases would certainly reduce the savings and investment vital to economic growth.
The individual income tax rate reductions come to $59 billion in 2007 and are not really a tax cut for the rich. All families with taxable incomes over $62,000 (and single filers over $31,000) benefit. Repealing this tax cut would reduce work incentives and raise taxes on millions of families and small businesses, thereby harming the economy and min imizing any new revenues.
Myth #8: Tax cuts help the economy by "putting money in people's pockets."
Fact: Pro-growth tax cuts support incentives for productive behavior.
Government spending does not "pump new money into the economy" because government must first tax or borrow that money out of the economy. Claims that tax cuts benefit the econ omy by "putting money in people's pockets" rep resent the flip side of the pump-priming fallacy. Instead, the right tax cuts help the economy by reducing government's influence on economic decisions and allowing people to respond more to market mechanisms, thereby encouraging more productive behavior.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
The Keynesian fallacy is that government spend ing injects new money into the economy, but the money that government spends must come from somewhere. Government must first tax or borrow that money out of the economy, so all the new spending just redistributes existing income. Similarly, the money for tax rebates—which are also touted as a way to inject money into the economy— must also come from somewhere, with government either spending less or borrowing more. In both cases, no new spending is added to the economy. Rather, the government has just transferred it from one group (e.g., investors) in the economy to another (e.g., consumers).
Some argue that certain tax cuts, such as tax rebates, can transfer money from savers to spenders and therefore increase demand. This argument assumes that the savers have been storing their sav ings in their mattresses, thereby removing it from the economy. In reality, nearly all Americans either invest their savings, thereby financing businesses investment, or deposit the money in banks, which quickly lend it to others to spend or invest. There fore, the money is spent by someone whether it is initially consumed or saved. Thus, tax rebates create no additional economic activity and cannot "prime the pump."
This does not mean tax policy cannot affect eco nomic growth. The right tax cuts can add substan tially to the economy's supply side of productive resources: capital and labor. Economic growth requires that businesses efficiently produce increas ing amounts of goods and services, and increased production requires consistent business investment and a motivated, productive workforce. Yet high marginal tax rates—defined as the tax on the next dollar earned—serve as a disincentive to engage in such activities. Reducing marginal tax rates on busi nesses and workers increases the return on work ing, saving, and investing, thereby creating more business investment and a more productive work force, both of which add to the economy's long-term capacity for growth.
Yet some propose demand-side tax cuts to "put money in people's pockets" and "get people to spend money." The 2001 tax rebates serve as an example: Washington borrowed billions from investors and then mailed that money to families in the form of $600 checks. Predictably, this simple transfer of existing wealth caused a temporary increase in consumer spending and a corresponding decrease in investment but led to no new economic growth. No new wealth was created because the tax rebate was unrelated to productive behavior. No one had to work, save, or invest more to receive a rebate. Simply redistributing existing wealth does not create new wealth.
In contrast, marginal tax rates were reduced throughout the 1920s, 1960s, and 1980s. In all three decades, investment increased, and higher economic growth followed. Real GDP increased by 59 percent from 1921 to 1929, by 42 percent from 1961 to 1968, and by 31 percent from 1982 to 1989.[15] More recently, the 2003 tax cuts helped to bring about strong economic growth for the past three years.
Policies which best support work, saving, and investment are much more effective at expanding the economy's long-term capacity for growth than those that aim to put money in consumers' pockets.
Myth #9: The Bush tax cuts have not helped the economy.
Fact: The economy responded strongly to the 2003 tax cuts.
The 2003 tax cuts lowered income, capital gains, and dividend tax rates. These policies were designed to increase market incentives to work, save, and invest, thus creating jobs and increas ing economic growth. An analysis of the six quarters before and after the 2003 tax cuts (a short enough time frame to exclude the 2001 re cession) shows that this is exactly what hap pened (see Table 3):
* GDP grew at an annual rate of just 1.7 percent in the six quarters before the 2003 tax cuts. In the six quarters following the tax cuts, the growth rate was 4.1 percent.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
* Non-residential fixed investment declined for 13 consecutive quarters before the 2003 tax cuts. Since then, it has expanded for 13 consec utive quarters.
* The S&P 500 dropped 18 percent in the six quarters before the 2003 tax cuts but increased by 32 percent over the next six quarters. Dividend payouts increased as well.
* The economy lost 267,000 jobs in the six quarters before the 2003 tax cuts. In the next six quarters, it added 307,000 jobs, followed by 5 million jobs in the next seven quarters.
* The economy lost 267,000 jobs in the six quar ters before the 2003 tax cuts. In the next six quarters, it added 307,000 jobs, followed by 5 million jobs in the next seven quarters.[16]
Critics contend that the economy was already recovering and that this strong expansion would have occurred even without the tax cuts. While some growth was naturally occurring, critics do not explain why such a sudden and dramatic turn around began at the exact moment that these pro-growth policies were enacted. They do not explain why business investment, the stock market, and job numbers suddenly turned around in spring 2003. It is no coincidence that the expansion was powered by strong investment growth, exactly as the tax cuts intended.
The 2003 tax cuts succeeded because of the sup ply-side policies that critics most oppose: cuts in mar ginal income tax rates and tax cuts on capital gains and dividends. The 2001 tax cuts that were based more on demand-side tax rebates and redistribution did not significantly increase economic growth.
Myth #10: The Bush tax cuts were tilted toward the rich.
Fact: The rich are now shouldering even more of the income tax burden.
Popular mythology also suggests that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts shifted more of the tax burden toward the poor. While high-income households did save more in actual dollars than low-income households, they did so because low-income house holds pay so little in income taxes in the first place. The same 1 percent tax cut will save more dollars for a millionaire than it will for a middle-class worker simply because the millionaire paid more taxes before the tax cut.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
In 2000, the top 60 percent of taxpayers paid 100 percent of all income taxes. The bottom 40 percent collectively paid no income taxes. Lawmakers writing the 2001 tax cuts faced quite a challenge in giving the bulk of the income tax savings to a population that was already paying no income taxes.
Rather than exclude these Americans, lawmak ers used the tax code to subsidize them. (Some economists would say this made that group's col lective tax burden negative.)First, lawmakers low ered the initial tax brackets from 15 percent to 10 percent and then expanded the refundable child tax credit, which, along with the refundable earned income tax credit (EITC), reduced the typical low-income tax burden to well below zero. As a result, the U.S. Treasury now mails tax "refunds" to a large proportion of these Americans that exceed the amounts of tax that they actually paid. All in all, the number of tax filers with zero or negative income tax liability rose from 30 million to 40 million, or about 30 percent of all tax filers.[17] The remaining 70 percent of tax filers received lower income tax rates, lower investment taxes, and lower estate taxes from the 2001 legislation.
Consequently, from 2000 to 2004, the share of all individual income taxes paid by the bottom 40 per cent dropped from zero percent to –4 percent, mean ing that the average family in those quintiles received a subsidy from the IRS. (See Chart 6.) By contrast, the share paid by the top quintile of households (by income) increased from 81 percent to 85 percent.
Expanding the data to include all federal taxes, the share paid by the top quintile edged up from 66.6 percent in 2000 to 67.1 percent in 2004, while the bottom 40 percent's share dipped from 5.9 per cent to 5.4 percent. Clearly, the tax cuts have led to the rich shouldering more of the income tax burden and the poor shouldering less.[18]
Conclusion
The 110th Congress will be serving when the first of 77 million baby boomers receive their first Social Security checks in 2008. The subsequent avalanche of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid costs for these baby boomers will be the greatest economic challenge of this era.
This should be the budgetary focus of the 110th Congress rather than repealing Bush tax cuts or allowing them to expire. Repealing the tax cuts would not significantly increase revenues. It would, however, decrease investment, reduce work incen tives, stifle entrepreneurialism, and reduce eco nomic growth. Lawmakers should remember that America cannot tax itself to prosperity.
Brian M. Riedl is Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
[1] The historical averages range between 17.9 percent and 18.3 percent of GDP, depending on the time horizon.
[2] Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), pp. 25–26, Table 1.3, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/hist.pdf (January 16, 2007), with final 2006 revenue figures added in.
[3] According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the 1980s recession ended in fiscal year (FY) 1983 (November 1982), the 1990s recession ended in FY 1991 (March 1991), and the early 2000s recession ended in FY 2002 (November 2001). National Bureau of Economic Research, "US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions," at www.nber.org/cycles.html (January 16, 2007).
[4] See Brian M. Riedl, "Federal Spending: By the Numbers," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 989, February 6, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/wm989.cfm.
[5] See Congressional Budget Office, "The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2001–2010," January 2000, p. xvi, Summary Table 2, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/18xx/doc1820/e&b0100.pdf (January 16, 2007). The January 2000 baseline pro jected that 2006 tax revenues would reach $2,465 billion, and they instead reached $2,407 billion. The same baseline projected that 2006 spending would reach $2,140 billion, and it actually totaled $2,654 billion.
[6] See Congressional Budget Office, "An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004," March 2003, p. 36, Table 4, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/41xx/doc4129/03-31-AnalysisPresidentBudget-Final.pdf (January 16, 2007). The March 2003 baseline projected that 2006 tax revenues would reach $2,360 billion, and they instead reached $2,407 billion. That same baseline projected that 2006 spending would reach $2,417 billion, and it actually totaled $2,654 billion.
[7] While the March 2001 baseline was the last created before the tax cuts, it does not provide a realistic baseline for measuring subsequent policies. This baseline assumed that the stock market bubble would continue, and the CBO consequently pro jected that revenues would stay above 20.2 percent of GDP indefinitely, even though that level had been reached only once since World War II. The January 2000 baseline more accurately reflected future economic performance.
[8] See Arthur B. Laffer, "The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1765, June 1, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/bg1765.cfm.
[9] Edward C. Prescott, "Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?" Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (July 2004), at www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2811.pdf (January 16, 2007).
[10] For early projections, see Congressional Budget Office, "An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004." For actual figures, see Congressional Budget Office, "The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008–2017," January 2007, p. 86, Table 4-3, at www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=7731&sequence=0 (January 25, 2007).
[11] Daniel J. Mitchell, Ph.D., and Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D., "What Is Really Happening to Government Revenues: Long-Run Forecasts Show Sharp Rise in Tax Burden," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1957,July 28, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/upload/bg_1957.pdf. This is based on data from Congressional Budget Office, "The Long-Term Budget Outlook," December 2005, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/69xx/doc6982/12-15-LongTermOutlook.pdf (January 16, 2007). These baselines do not assume that lawmakers will adjust the AMT threshold. If the Bush tax cuts are made permanent and the AMT is adjusted annually, the CBO's 2050 revenue projections are 19.8 percent of GDP, which is still well above the historical average.
[12] Congressional Budget Office, "The Long-Term Budget Outlook." The CBO's "low tax and intermediate spending" scenario projects that federal spending will reach 37.7 percent of GDP by 2050. Even that may be a large underestimate. See Brian M. Riedl, "Entitlement-Driven Long-Term Budget Substantially Worse Than Previously Projected," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1897, November 30, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/upload/86356_1.pdf.
[13] Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, pp. 25–26, Table 1.3, and Internal Revenue Service, "U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemptions and Lowest and Highest Bracket Tax Rates, and Tax Base for Regular Tax, Tax Years 1913– 2005," at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histaba.pdf (January 16, 2007).
[14] Figures include child credit outlays. Heritage Foundation calculations using Joint Committee on Taxation scores of the Eco nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, and Tax Increase Prevention and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2005.
[15]See Daniel J. Mitchell, Ph.D., "Lowering Marginal Tax Rates: The Key to Pro-Growth Tax Relief," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1443, May 22, 2001, at www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/BG1443.cfm.
[16] U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Tables, Table 1.1.1, revised December 21, 2006, at www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp (January 16, 2007); Yahoo Finance, "S&P 500 Index," at www.finance.yahoo.com/ q/hp?s=%5EGSPC (January 16, 2007); and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics survey (National)," at www.data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_
numbers&series_id=CES0000000001&output_view=net_1mth (January 16, 2007).
[17] Scott A. Hodge, "40 Million Filers Pay No Income Taxes, Many Get Generous Refunds," Tax Foundation Fiscal Facts No. 6, June 5, 2003, at www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/207.html (January 16, 2007).
[18] Congressional Budget Office, "Historical Effective Federal Tax Rates: 1979 to 2004," December 2006, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=7718&type=1 (January 17, 2007).
Backgrounder #2001
The Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Rep resentatives must decide whether to write a budget extending, expiring, or repealing the Bush tax cuts. These tax cuts have provided a convenient scapegoat for the nation's budget and economic challenges. Despite a 42 percent spending increase in 2001, critics charge that the tax cuts have starved popular pro grams. Despite surging economic growth and 5 million new jobs since 2003, critics also charge that the tax cuts have not helped the economy. Finally, despite making the income tax code more progressive, critics charge that the tax cuts have widened inequality.
Nearly all of the conventional wisdom about the Bush tax cuts is wrong. In reality:
* The tax cuts have not substantially reduced cur rent tax revenues, which were in fact not far from the 2000 pre–tax cut baseline and over the 2003 pre–tax cut baseline in 2006;
* The increased child tax credit, 10 percent tax bracket, and fix of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) reduced tax revenues much more than most of the "tax cuts for the rich";
* Economic growth rates have more than doubled since the 2003 tax cuts; and
* The tax cuts shifted even more of the income tax burden toward the rich.
Setting optimal tax policy requires governing with facts rather than popular mythology, which is why it is important to set the record straight by debunking 10 myths about the Bush tax cuts.
Ten Myths About the Bush Tax Cuts—and the Facts
Myth #1: Tax revenues remain low.
Fact: Tax revenues are above the historical average, even after the tax cuts.
Myth #2: The Bush tax cuts substantially reduced 2006 revenues and expanded the budget deficit.
Fact: Nearly all of the 2006 budget deficit resulted from additional spending above the baseline.
Myth #3: Supply-side economics assumes that all tax cuts immediately pay for themselves.
Fact: It assumes replenishment of some but not necessarily all lost revenues.
Myth #4: Capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves.
Fact: Capital gains tax revenues doubled following the 2003 tax cut.
Myth #5: The Bush tax cuts are to blame for the projected long-term budget deficits.
Fact: Projections show that entitlement costs will dwarf the projected large revenue increases.
Myth #6: Raising tax rates is the best way to raise revenue.
Fact: Tax revenues correlate with economic growth, not tax rates.
Myth #7: Reversing the upper-income tax cuts would raise substantial revenues.
Fact: The low-income tax cuts reduced revenues the most.
Myth #8: Tax cuts help the economy by "putting money in people's pockets."
Fact: Pro-growth tax cuts support incentives for productive behavior.
Myth #9: The Bush tax cuts have not helped the economy.
Fact: The economy responded strongly to the 2003 tax cuts.
Myth #10: The Bush tax cuts were tilted toward the rich.
Fact: The rich are now shouldering even more of the income tax burden.
..................................................
Myth #1: Tax revenues remain low.
Fact: Tax revenues are above the historical average, even after the tax cuts.
Tax revenues in 2006 were 18.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which is actually above the 20-year, 40-year, and 60-year historical aver ages.[1] The inflation-adjusted 20 percent tax revenue increase between 2004 and 2006 represents the largest two-year revenue surge since 1965–1967.[2] Claims that Americans are undertaxed by historical standards are patently false.
Some critics of President George W. Bush's tax policies concede that tax revenues exceed the his torical average yet assert that revenues are historically low for economies in the fourth year of an expansion. Setting aside that some of these tax pol icies are partly responsible for that economic expan sion, the numbers simply do not support this claim. Comparing tax revenues in the fourth fiscal year after the end of each of the past three recessions shows nearly equal tax revenues of:
* 18.4 percent of GDP in 1987,
* 18.5 percent of GDP in 1995, and
* 18.4 percent of GDP in 2006.[3]
While revenues as a percentage of GDP have not fully returned to pre-recession levels (20.9 percent in 2000), it is now clear that the pre-recession level was a major historical anomaly caused by a tempo rary stock market bubble.
Myth #2: The Bush tax cuts substantially reduced 2006 revenues and expanded the budget deficit.
Fact: Nearly all of the 2006 budget deficit resulted from additional spending above the baseline.
Critics tirelessly contend that America's swing from budget surpluses in 1998–2001 to a $247 bil lion budget deficit in 2006 resulted chiefly from the "irresponsible" Bush tax cuts. This argument ignores the historic spending increases that pushed federal spending up from 18.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 20.2 percent in 2006.[4]
The best way to measure the swing from surplus to deficit is by comparing the pre–tax cut budget baseline of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) with what actually happened. While the January 2000 baseline projected a 2006 budget surplus of $325 billion, the final 2006 numbers showed a $247 billion deficit—a net drop of $572 billion. This drop occurred because spending was $514 bil lion above projected levels, and revenues were $58 billion below (even after $188 billion in tax cuts). In other words, 90 percent of the swing from surplus to deficit resulted from higher-than-projected spending, and only 10 percent resulted from lower-than-projected revenues.[5] (See Chart 1.)
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.Furthermore, tax revenues in 2006 were actually above the levels projected before the 2003 tax cuts. Immediately before the 2003 tax cuts, the CBO pro jected a 2006 budget deficit of $57 billion, yet the final 2006 budget deficit was $247 billion. The $190 billion deficit increase resulted from federal spend ing that was $237 billion more than projected. Rev enues were actually $47 billion above the projection, even after $75 billion in tax cuts enacted after the baseline was calculated.[6] By that standard, new spending was responsible for 125 percent of the higher 2006 budget deficit, and expanding revenues actually offset 25 percent of the new spending.
The 2006 tax revenues were not substantially far from levels projected before the Bush tax cuts. Despite estimates that the tax cuts would reduce 2006 revenues by $188 billion, they came in just $58 billion below the pre–tax cut revenue level pro jected in January 2000.[7]
The difference is even more dramatic with the pro-growth 2003 tax cuts. The CBO calculated that the post-March 2003 tax cuts would lower 2006 revenues by $75 billion, yet 2006 revenues came in $47 billion above the pre–tax cut baseline released in March 2003. This is not a coincidence. Tax cuts clearly played a significant role in the economy's performing better than expected and recovering much of the lost revenue.
Myth #3: Supply-side economics assumes that all tax cuts immediately pay for themselves.
Fact: It assumes replenishment of some but not necessarily all lost revenues.
Attempts to debunk solid theories often involve first mischaracterizing them as straw men. Critics often erroneously define supply-side economics as the belief that all tax cuts pay for themselves. They then cite tax cuts that have not fully paid for them selves as conclusive proof that supply-side econom ics has failed.
However, supply-side economics never con tended that all tax cuts pay for themselves. Rather the Laffer Curve[8] (upon which much of the supply-side theory is based) merely formalizes the com mon-sense observations that:
1. Tax revenues depend on the tax base as well as the tax rate;
2. Raising tax rates discourages the taxed behavior and therefore shrinks the tax base, offsetting some of the revenue gains; and
3. Lowering tax rates encourages the taxed behav ior and expands the tax base, offsetting some of the revenue loss.
If policymakers intend cigarette taxes to discour age smoking, they should also expect high invest ment taxes to discourage investment and income taxes to discourage work. Lowering taxes encour ages people to engage in the given behavior, which expands the base and replenishes some of the lost revenue. This is the "feedback effect" of a tax cut.
Whether or not a tax cut recovers 100 percent of the lost revenue depends on the tax rate's location on the Laffer Curve. Each tax has a revenue-maxi mizing rate at which future tax increases will reduce revenue. (This is the peak of the Laffer Curve.) Only when tax rates are above that level will reducing the tax rate actually increase revenue. Otherwise, it will replenish only a portion of the lost revenue.
How much feedback revenue a given tax cut will generate depends on the degree to which tax payers adjust their behavior. Cutting sales and property tax rates generally induces smaller feed back effects because taxpayers do not respond by substantially expanding their purchases or home-buying. Income taxes have a higher feedback effect. Nobel Prize-winning economist Ed Prescott has shown a strong cross-national link between lower income tax rates and higher work hours.[9] Investment taxes have the highest feedback effects because investors quickly move to avoid higher-taxed investments. Not surprisingly, history shows that higher investment taxes deeply curtail investment and consequently raise little (if any) new revenue.
Yet, using the standard set by some, even a hypothetical tax cut that provides real tax relief to millions of families and entrepreneurs and creates enough new income to recover 95 percent of the estimated revenue loss would be considered a "failure" of supply-side economics and thus merit a full repeal.
Myth #4: Capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves.
Fact: Capital gains tax revenues doubled following the 2003 tax cut.
As previously stated, whether a tax cut pays for itself depends on how much people alter their behavior in response to the policy. Investors have been shown to be the most sensitive to tax policy, because capital gains tax cuts encourage enough new investment to more than offset the lower tax rate.
In 2003, capital gains tax rates were reduced from 20 percent and 10 percent (depending on income) to 15 percent and 5 percent. Rather than expand by 36 percent from the current $50 billion level to $68 billion in 2006 as the CBO projected before the tax cut, capital gains revenues more than doubled to $103 billion.[10] (See Chart 2.) Past cap ital gains tax cuts have shown similar results.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.By encouraging investment, lower capital gains taxes increase funding for the technologies, busi nesses, ideas, and projects that make workers and the economy more productive. Such investment is vital for long-term economic growth.
Because investors are tax-sensitive, high capital gains tax rates are not only bad economic policy, but also bad budget policy.
Myth #5: The Bush tax cuts are to blame for the projected long-term budget deficits.
Fact: Projections show that entitlement costs will dwarf the projected large revenue increases.
The unsustainability of America's long-term bud get path is well known. However, a common mis perception blames the massive future budget deficits on the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. In reality, revenues will continue to increase above the histor ical average yet be dwarfed by historic entitlement spending increases. (See Chart 3.)
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.For the past half-century, tax revenues have generally stayed within 1 percentage point of 18 per cent of GDP. The CBO projects that, even if all 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent, revenues will stillincrease from 18.4 percent of GDP today to 22.8 percent by 2050, not counting any feedback revenues from their positive economic impact. It is projected that repealing the Bush tax cuts would nudge 2050 revenues up to 23.7 percent of GDP, not counting any revenue losses from the negative economic impact of the tax hikes.[11] In effect, the Bush tax cut debate is whether revenues should increase by 4.4 percent or 5.3 percent of GDP.
Spending has remained around 20 percent of GDP for the past half-century. However, the coming retirement of the baby boomers will increase Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending by a combined 10.5 percent of GDP. Assuming that this causes large budget deficits and increased net spending on interest, federal spending could surge to 38 percent of GDP and possibly much higher.[12]
Overall, revenues are projected to increase from 18 percent of GDP to almost 23 percent. Spending is projected to increase from 20 percent of GDP to at least 38 percent. Even repealing all of the 2001 and 2003 cuts would merely shave the projected budget deficit of 15 percent of GDP by less than 1 percentage point, and that assumes no negative feedback from raising taxes. Clearly, the French-style spending increases, not tax policy, are the problem. Lawmakers should focus on getting entitlements under control.
Myth #6: Raising tax rates is the best way to raise revenue.
Fact: Tax revenues correlate with economic growth, not tax rates.
Many of those who desire additional tax revenues regularly call on Congress to raise tax rates, but tax revenues are a function of two variables: tax rates and the tax base. The tax base typically moves in the opposite direction of the tax rate, partially negating the revenue impact of tax rate changes. Accordingly, Chart 4 shows little correlation between tax rates and tax revenues. Since 1952, the highest marginal income tax rate has dropped from 92 percent to 35 percent, and tax revenues have grown in inflation-adjusted terms while remaining constant as a per cent of GDP.
Chart 5 shows the nearly perfect correlation between GDP and tax revenues. Despite major fluc tuations in income tax rates, long-term tax revenues have grown at almost exactly the same rate as GDP, remaining between 17 percent and 20 percent of GDP for 46 of the past 50 years. Table 1 shows that the top marginal income tax rate topped 90 percent during the 1950s and that revenues averaged 17.2 percent of GDP. By the 1990s, the top marginal income tax rate averaged just 36 per cent, and tax revenues averaged 18.3 percent of GDP. Regardless of the tax rate, tax revenues have almost always come in at approximately 18 percent of GDP.[13]
.Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.Since revenues move with GDP, the common-sense way to increase tax revenues is to expand the GDP. This means that pro-growth policies such as low marginal tax rates (especially on work, savings, and investment), restrained federal spending, minimal regulation, and free trade would raise more tax revenues than would be raised by self-defeating tax increases. America cannot substantially increase tax revenue with policies that reduce national income.
Myth #7: Reversing the upper-income tax cuts would raise substantial revenues.
Fact: The low-income tax cuts reduced revenues the most.
Many critics of tax cuts nonetheless support extending the increased child tax credit, marriage penalty relief, and the 10 percent income tax bracket because these policies strongly benefit low-income tax families. They also support annually adjusting the alternative minimum tax exemption for inflation to prevent a massive broad-based tax increase. These critics assert that repealing the tax cuts for upper-income individuals and investors and bringing back the pre-2001 estate tax levels can raise substantial revenue. Once again, the numbers fail to support this claim.
In 2007, according to CBO and Joint Committee on Taxation data, the increased child tax credit, mar riage penalty relief, 10 percent bracket, and AMT fix will have a combined budgetary effect of $114 bil lion.[14] (See Table 2.) These policies do not have strong supply-side effects to minimize that effect.
By comparison, the more maligned capital gains, dividends, and estate tax cuts are projected to reduce 2007 revenues by just $36 billion even before the large and positive supply-side effects are incorporated. Thus, repealing these tax cuts would raise very little revenue and could possibly even reduce federal tax revenue. Such tax increases would certainly reduce the savings and investment vital to economic growth.
The individual income tax rate reductions come to $59 billion in 2007 and are not really a tax cut for the rich. All families with taxable incomes over $62,000 (and single filers over $31,000) benefit. Repealing this tax cut would reduce work incentives and raise taxes on millions of families and small businesses, thereby harming the economy and min imizing any new revenues.
Myth #8: Tax cuts help the economy by "putting money in people's pockets."
Fact: Pro-growth tax cuts support incentives for productive behavior.
Government spending does not "pump new money into the economy" because government must first tax or borrow that money out of the economy. Claims that tax cuts benefit the econ omy by "putting money in people's pockets" rep resent the flip side of the pump-priming fallacy. Instead, the right tax cuts help the economy by reducing government's influence on economic decisions and allowing people to respond more to market mechanisms, thereby encouraging more productive behavior.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.The Keynesian fallacy is that government spend ing injects new money into the economy, but the money that government spends must come from somewhere. Government must first tax or borrow that money out of the economy, so all the new spending just redistributes existing income. Similarly, the money for tax rebates—which are also touted as a way to inject money into the economy— must also come from somewhere, with government either spending less or borrowing more. In both cases, no new spending is added to the economy. Rather, the government has just transferred it from one group (e.g., investors) in the economy to another (e.g., consumers).
Some argue that certain tax cuts, such as tax rebates, can transfer money from savers to spenders and therefore increase demand. This argument assumes that the savers have been storing their sav ings in their mattresses, thereby removing it from the economy. In reality, nearly all Americans either invest their savings, thereby financing businesses investment, or deposit the money in banks, which quickly lend it to others to spend or invest. There fore, the money is spent by someone whether it is initially consumed or saved. Thus, tax rebates create no additional economic activity and cannot "prime the pump."
This does not mean tax policy cannot affect eco nomic growth. The right tax cuts can add substan tially to the economy's supply side of productive resources: capital and labor. Economic growth requires that businesses efficiently produce increas ing amounts of goods and services, and increased production requires consistent business investment and a motivated, productive workforce. Yet high marginal tax rates—defined as the tax on the next dollar earned—serve as a disincentive to engage in such activities. Reducing marginal tax rates on busi nesses and workers increases the return on work ing, saving, and investing, thereby creating more business investment and a more productive work force, both of which add to the economy's long-term capacity for growth.
Yet some propose demand-side tax cuts to "put money in people's pockets" and "get people to spend money." The 2001 tax rebates serve as an example: Washington borrowed billions from investors and then mailed that money to families in the form of $600 checks. Predictably, this simple transfer of existing wealth caused a temporary increase in consumer spending and a corresponding decrease in investment but led to no new economic growth. No new wealth was created because the tax rebate was unrelated to productive behavior. No one had to work, save, or invest more to receive a rebate. Simply redistributing existing wealth does not create new wealth.
In contrast, marginal tax rates were reduced throughout the 1920s, 1960s, and 1980s. In all three decades, investment increased, and higher economic growth followed. Real GDP increased by 59 percent from 1921 to 1929, by 42 percent from 1961 to 1968, and by 31 percent from 1982 to 1989.[15] More recently, the 2003 tax cuts helped to bring about strong economic growth for the past three years.
Policies which best support work, saving, and investment are much more effective at expanding the economy's long-term capacity for growth than those that aim to put money in consumers' pockets.
Myth #9: The Bush tax cuts have not helped the economy.
Fact: The economy responded strongly to the 2003 tax cuts.
The 2003 tax cuts lowered income, capital gains, and dividend tax rates. These policies were designed to increase market incentives to work, save, and invest, thus creating jobs and increas ing economic growth. An analysis of the six quarters before and after the 2003 tax cuts (a short enough time frame to exclude the 2001 re cession) shows that this is exactly what hap pened (see Table 3):
* GDP grew at an annual rate of just 1.7 percent in the six quarters before the 2003 tax cuts. In the six quarters following the tax cuts, the growth rate was 4.1 percent.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.* Non-residential fixed investment declined for 13 consecutive quarters before the 2003 tax cuts. Since then, it has expanded for 13 consec utive quarters.
* The S&P 500 dropped 18 percent in the six quarters before the 2003 tax cuts but increased by 32 percent over the next six quarters. Dividend payouts increased as well.
* The economy lost 267,000 jobs in the six quarters before the 2003 tax cuts. In the next six quarters, it added 307,000 jobs, followed by 5 million jobs in the next seven quarters.
* The economy lost 267,000 jobs in the six quar ters before the 2003 tax cuts. In the next six quarters, it added 307,000 jobs, followed by 5 million jobs in the next seven quarters.[16]
Critics contend that the economy was already recovering and that this strong expansion would have occurred even without the tax cuts. While some growth was naturally occurring, critics do not explain why such a sudden and dramatic turn around began at the exact moment that these pro-growth policies were enacted. They do not explain why business investment, the stock market, and job numbers suddenly turned around in spring 2003. It is no coincidence that the expansion was powered by strong investment growth, exactly as the tax cuts intended.
The 2003 tax cuts succeeded because of the sup ply-side policies that critics most oppose: cuts in mar ginal income tax rates and tax cuts on capital gains and dividends. The 2001 tax cuts that were based more on demand-side tax rebates and redistribution did not significantly increase economic growth.
Myth #10: The Bush tax cuts were tilted toward the rich.
Fact: The rich are now shouldering even more of the income tax burden.
Popular mythology also suggests that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts shifted more of the tax burden toward the poor. While high-income households did save more in actual dollars than low-income households, they did so because low-income house holds pay so little in income taxes in the first place. The same 1 percent tax cut will save more dollars for a millionaire than it will for a middle-class worker simply because the millionaire paid more taxes before the tax cut.
Click on the diagram to enlarge it.In 2000, the top 60 percent of taxpayers paid 100 percent of all income taxes. The bottom 40 percent collectively paid no income taxes. Lawmakers writing the 2001 tax cuts faced quite a challenge in giving the bulk of the income tax savings to a population that was already paying no income taxes.
Rather than exclude these Americans, lawmak ers used the tax code to subsidize them. (Some economists would say this made that group's col lective tax burden negative.)First, lawmakers low ered the initial tax brackets from 15 percent to 10 percent and then expanded the refundable child tax credit, which, along with the refundable earned income tax credit (EITC), reduced the typical low-income tax burden to well below zero. As a result, the U.S. Treasury now mails tax "refunds" to a large proportion of these Americans that exceed the amounts of tax that they actually paid. All in all, the number of tax filers with zero or negative income tax liability rose from 30 million to 40 million, or about 30 percent of all tax filers.[17] The remaining 70 percent of tax filers received lower income tax rates, lower investment taxes, and lower estate taxes from the 2001 legislation.
Consequently, from 2000 to 2004, the share of all individual income taxes paid by the bottom 40 per cent dropped from zero percent to –4 percent, mean ing that the average family in those quintiles received a subsidy from the IRS. (See Chart 6.) By contrast, the share paid by the top quintile of households (by income) increased from 81 percent to 85 percent.
Expanding the data to include all federal taxes, the share paid by the top quintile edged up from 66.6 percent in 2000 to 67.1 percent in 2004, while the bottom 40 percent's share dipped from 5.9 per cent to 5.4 percent. Clearly, the tax cuts have led to the rich shouldering more of the income tax burden and the poor shouldering less.[18]
Conclusion
The 110th Congress will be serving when the first of 77 million baby boomers receive their first Social Security checks in 2008. The subsequent avalanche of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid costs for these baby boomers will be the greatest economic challenge of this era.
This should be the budgetary focus of the 110th Congress rather than repealing Bush tax cuts or allowing them to expire. Repealing the tax cuts would not significantly increase revenues. It would, however, decrease investment, reduce work incen tives, stifle entrepreneurialism, and reduce eco nomic growth. Lawmakers should remember that America cannot tax itself to prosperity.
Brian M. Riedl is Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
[1] The historical averages range between 17.9 percent and 18.3 percent of GDP, depending on the time horizon.
[2] Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), pp. 25–26, Table 1.3, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/hist.pdf (January 16, 2007), with final 2006 revenue figures added in.
[3] According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the 1980s recession ended in fiscal year (FY) 1983 (November 1982), the 1990s recession ended in FY 1991 (March 1991), and the early 2000s recession ended in FY 2002 (November 2001). National Bureau of Economic Research, "US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions," at www.nber.org/cycles.html (January 16, 2007).
[4] See Brian M. Riedl, "Federal Spending: By the Numbers," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 989, February 6, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/wm989.cfm.
[5] See Congressional Budget Office, "The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2001–2010," January 2000, p. xvi, Summary Table 2, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/18xx/doc1820/e&b0100.pdf (January 16, 2007). The January 2000 baseline pro jected that 2006 tax revenues would reach $2,465 billion, and they instead reached $2,407 billion. The same baseline projected that 2006 spending would reach $2,140 billion, and it actually totaled $2,654 billion.
[6] See Congressional Budget Office, "An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004," March 2003, p. 36, Table 4, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/41xx/doc4129/03-31-AnalysisPresidentBudget-Final.pdf (January 16, 2007). The March 2003 baseline projected that 2006 tax revenues would reach $2,360 billion, and they instead reached $2,407 billion. That same baseline projected that 2006 spending would reach $2,417 billion, and it actually totaled $2,654 billion.
[7] While the March 2001 baseline was the last created before the tax cuts, it does not provide a realistic baseline for measuring subsequent policies. This baseline assumed that the stock market bubble would continue, and the CBO consequently pro jected that revenues would stay above 20.2 percent of GDP indefinitely, even though that level had been reached only once since World War II. The January 2000 baseline more accurately reflected future economic performance.
[8] See Arthur B. Laffer, "The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1765, June 1, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/bg1765.cfm.
[9] Edward C. Prescott, "Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?" Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 (July 2004), at www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2811.pdf (January 16, 2007).
[10] For early projections, see Congressional Budget Office, "An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004." For actual figures, see Congressional Budget Office, "The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008–2017," January 2007, p. 86, Table 4-3, at www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=7731&sequence=0 (January 25, 2007).
[11] Daniel J. Mitchell, Ph.D., and Stuart M. Butler, Ph.D., "What Is Really Happening to Government Revenues: Long-Run Forecasts Show Sharp Rise in Tax Burden," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1957,July 28, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/upload/bg_1957.pdf. This is based on data from Congressional Budget Office, "The Long-Term Budget Outlook," December 2005, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/69xx/doc6982/12-15-LongTermOutlook.pdf (January 16, 2007). These baselines do not assume that lawmakers will adjust the AMT threshold. If the Bush tax cuts are made permanent and the AMT is adjusted annually, the CBO's 2050 revenue projections are 19.8 percent of GDP, which is still well above the historical average.
[12] Congressional Budget Office, "The Long-Term Budget Outlook." The CBO's "low tax and intermediate spending" scenario projects that federal spending will reach 37.7 percent of GDP by 2050. Even that may be a large underestimate. See Brian M. Riedl, "Entitlement-Driven Long-Term Budget Substantially Worse Than Previously Projected," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1897, November 30, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/upload/86356_1.pdf.
[13] Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, pp. 25–26, Table 1.3, and Internal Revenue Service, "U.S. Individual Income Tax: Personal Exemptions and Lowest and Highest Bracket Tax Rates, and Tax Base for Regular Tax, Tax Years 1913– 2005," at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histaba.pdf (January 16, 2007).
[14] Figures include child credit outlays. Heritage Foundation calculations using Joint Committee on Taxation scores of the Eco nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, and Tax Increase Prevention and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2005.
[15]See Daniel J. Mitchell, Ph.D., "Lowering Marginal Tax Rates: The Key to Pro-Growth Tax Relief," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1443, May 22, 2001, at www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/BG1443.cfm.
[16] U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Tables, Table 1.1.1, revised December 21, 2006, at www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp (January 16, 2007); Yahoo Finance, "S&P 500 Index," at www.finance.yahoo.com/ q/hp?s=%5EGSPC (January 16, 2007); and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics survey (National)," at www.data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_
numbers&series_id=CES0000000001&output_view=net_1mth (January 16, 2007).
[17] Scott A. Hodge, "40 Million Filers Pay No Income Taxes, Many Get Generous Refunds," Tax Foundation Fiscal Facts No. 6, June 5, 2003, at www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/207.html (January 16, 2007).
[18] Congressional Budget Office, "Historical Effective Federal Tax Rates: 1979 to 2004," December 2006, at www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=7718&type=1 (January 17, 2007).
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