Showing posts with label Sam Tanenhaus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sam Tanenhaus. Show all posts
Sunday, September 20, 2009
Bill Moyers' JOURNAL - Sam Tanenhaus (The Death of Conservatism), Bill Fletcher & Michael Zweig
The transcript of the September 18, 2009 episode of Bill Moyers' Journal:
September 18, 2009
BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the JOURNAL. And to an exploration of what's happening with two powerful movements in American life: unions on the Left, and conservatives on the Right.
CROWD: You work for us! You work for us!
BILL MOYERS: Conservatives were out in force in Washington over the weekend. They had come to express their opposition to big government, to taxes and wasteful spending, and health care reform they fear would lead to a nightmare of bureaucracy. Max Blumenthal, author of REPUBLICAN GOMORRAH waded into their midst to sample opinions.
MAX BLUMENTHAL: So you're saying if the government eliminates Social Security and Medicare then you'll get out of the program?
WOMAN: No, I said if they get out of my life.
MAX BLUMENTHAL: Out of your Social Security and-
WOMAN: No, out of everything.
BILL MOYERS: But they had also come to deplore and denounce President Obama- in their minds a tyrant akin to Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein.
MAN: I'm afraid he's going to do what Hitler could never do and that's destroy the United States of America.
MAX BLUMENTHAL: And what's the Obama revolution, what's going to happen?
MAN: Similar to Germany, like what Hitler did. He took over the auto industry, did he not? He took over the banking, did he not? And Hitler had his own personal secret service police, Acorn is an extension of that.
BILL MOYERS: They had found a new hero in Joe Wilson, the South Carolina Republican whose shout heard 'round the world was now the rallying cry of the weekend.
CROWD: You lie! You lie!
BILL MOYERS: Glenn Beck, their favorite pundit, had promoted this march and was reveling in its success.
GLENN BECK: This is a collection of Americans who but want both parties to stop with the corruption, stop with the spending and start listening to the people. Fox's Griff Jenkins is there now in Washington D.C., hey Griff.
GRIFF JENKINS: Glenn its unbelievable, thousands and thousands of people, look at this crowd right there. Do you guys have something you want to say to Glenn Beck?
BILL MOYERS: Watching those protestors you would have to say there's a lot of fight left on the Right, and you wouldn't be wrong. This rising tide of populist resistance to Obama, the anger over the massive government bailout of Wall Street and big failed corporations, have raised Republican hopes for a comeback And it has Democrats scratching their head wondering how to respond.
So what do we make of this new book titled THE DEATH OF CONSERVATISM? Has the author Sam Tanenhaus spent his time and considerable talent on a premature obituary?
Sam Tanenhaus edits two of the most influential sections of the Sunday NEW YORK TIMES - the Book Review and the Week in Review. He's has had a long fascination with conservatives and conservative ideas. He wrote this acclaimed biography of Whittaker Chambers, the journalist who spied for the Russians before he became fiercely anti-communist and a hero to conservatives. Now Tanenhaus is working on a biography of the conservative icon William F. Buckley JR.
BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the JOURNAL, Sam Tanenhaus.
SAM TANENHAUS: Oh my pleasure to be here, Bill.
BILL MOYERS: So, if you're right about the decline and death of conservatism, who are all those people we see on television?
SAM TANENHAUS: I'm afraid they're radicals. Conservatism has been divided for a long time -- this is what my book describes narratively -- between two strains. What I call realism and revanchism. We're seeing the revanchist side.
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean revanchism?
SAM TANENHAUS: I mean a politics that's based on the idea that America has been taken away from its true owners, and they have to restore and reclaim it. They have to conquer the territory that's been taken from them. Revanchism really comes from the French word for 'revenge.' It's a politics of vengeance.
And this is a strong strain in modern conservatism. Like the 19th Century nationalists who wanted to recover parts of their country that foreign nations had invaded and occupied, these radical people on the right, and they include intellectuals and the kinds of personalities we're seeing on television and radio, and also to some extent people marching in the streets, think America has gotten away from them. Theirs is a politics of reclamation and restoration. Give it back to us. What we sometimes forget is that the last five presidential elections Democrats won pluralities in four of them. The only time the Republicans have won, in recent memory, was when George Bush was re-elected by the narrowest margin in modern history, for a sitting president. So, what this means is that, yes, conservatism, what I think of, as a radical form of conservatism, is highly organized. We're seeing it now-- they are ideologically in lockstep. They agree about almost everything, and they have an orthodoxy that governs their worldview and their view of politics. So, they are able to make incursions. And at times when liberals, Democrats, and moderate Republicans are uncertain where to go, yes, this group will be out in front, very organized, and dominate our conversation.
BILL MOYERS: What gives them their certainty? You know, your hero of the 18th Century, Burke, Edmund Burke, warned against extremism and dogmatic orthodoxy.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, it's a very deep strain in our politics, Bill. Some of our great historians like Richard Hofstadter and Garry Wills have written about this. If you go back to the foundations of our Republic, first of all, we have two documents, "creedal documents" they're sometimes called, more or less at war with one another. The Declaration of Independence says one thing and the Constitution says another.
BILL MOYERS: The Declaration says--
SAM TANENHAUS: …says that we will be an egalitarian society in which all rights will be available to one and all, and the Constitution creates a complex political system that stops that change from happening. So, there's a clash right at the beginning. Now, what we've seen is that certain groups among us-- and sometimes it's been the left-- have been able to dominate the conversation and transform politics into a kind of theater. And that's what we're seeing now.
BILL MOYERS: When you see these people in the theater of television, you call them the insurrectionists, in your book, what do you think motivates them?
SAM TANENHAUS: One of the interesting developments in our politics, in just the past few months, although you could see signs of it earlier, is the emergence of the demographic we always overlook in our youth obsessed culture: the elderly. That was the group that did not support Barack Obama. They voted for John McCain. It was also the group that rose up and defied George W. Bush, when he wanted to add private Social Scurity accounts. It was a similar kind of protest.
BILL MOYERS: There's a paradox there, right? I mean, they say they're against government and yet the majority of Americans, according to all the polls, don't want their government touched. You know, there were people at these town hall meetings this summer, saying "Don't touch my Medicare." You know, keep the government out of my Social Security.
SAM TANENHAUS: Yes. This is an interesting argument. Because it's very easy to mock, and we see this a lot. "Oh, these fools. These old codgers say the government won't take my Medicare away. Don't know Medicare is a government program?" That's not really what's going on, I think. I think there's something different. A sense about how both the left and the right grew skeptical of Great Society programs under Lyndon Johnson, and the argument was everyone was becoming a kind of client or ward of the state. That we've become a nation of patron/client relationships. And a colleague of yours, Richard Goodwin, very brilliant political thinker, in 1967 warned, "We all expect too much from government." We expect it to create all the jobs. We expect it to rescue the economy. To fight the wars. To give us a good life". So, when people say, "Don't take my Medicare away," what they really mean is, "We're entirely dependent on this government and we're afraid they'll take one thing away that we've gotten used to and replace it with something that won't be so good. And there's nothing we can do about it. We're powerless before the very guardian that protects us."
BILL MOYERS: So, how do you see this contradiction playing out in the health care debate? Where what's the dominant force that's going to prevail here at the end? Is it going to be, "We want reform and we want the government involved?" Or are we going to privatize it the way people on the conservative side want to do? The insurance companies, the drug companies, all of that?
SAM TANENHAUS: I think what we'll see is a kind of incremental reform. Look, we know that health care has become the third rail of American politics, going back to Theodore Roosevelt. The greatest retail politician in modern history, Bill Clinton, could not sell it. But here's another thing to think about. In the book I discuss one of the most interesting political theories of the modern era, Samuel Lubell's theory of the solar system of politics. And what he says is what we think of as an equally balanced, two-party system, is really a rotating one-party system. Either the Republicans or Democrats have ruled since the Civil War for periods of some 30-36 years. And in those periods, all the great debates have occurred within a single party. So, if you go back to the 1980s, which some would say was the peak of the modern conservative period, the fight's about how to end the Cold War, how to unleash market forces-- were really Republican issues.
Today, when we look at the great questions -- how to stimulate the economy, how to provide and expand and improve a sustainable health care system, the fight is taking place among Democrats. So, in a sense what Republicans have done is to put themselves on the sidelines. They've vacated the field and left it to the other party, the Democratic Party, to resolve these issues among themselves. That's one reason I think conservatism is in trouble.
BILL MOYERS: You write in here that they're not simply in retreat, they're outmoded. They don't act like it, you know?
SAM TANENHAUS: They do and they don't. What I also say in the book is that the voices are louder than ever. And I wrote that back in March. Already we were hearing the furies on the right. Remember, there was a movement within the Republican Party, finally scotched, to actually rename the Democrats, "The Democrat Socialist Party." This started from the beginning. So, the noise is there. William Buckley has a wonderful expression. He says, "The pyrotechnicians and noise-makers have always been there on the right." I think we're hearing more of that than we are serious ideological, philosophical discussion about conservatism.
BILL MOYERS: How do you explain the fact that the news agenda today is driven by Fox News, talk radio, and the blogosphere. Why are those organs of information and/or propaganda so powerful?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, there's been a transformation of the conservative establishment. And this has been going on for some time. The foundations of modern conservatism, the great thinkers, were actually ex-communists, many of them. Whittaker Chambers, the subject of my biography. The great, brilliant thinker, James Burnham. A less known but equally brilliant figure, Willmoore Kendall, who was a mentor, oddly enough, to both William Buckley and Garry Wills. These were the original thinkers. And they were essentially philosophical in their outlook. Now, there are conservative intellectuals, but we don't think of them as conservative anymore-- Fareed Zakaria, Francis Fukayama, Andrew Sullivan, Michael Lind, the great Columbia professor, Mark Lilla-- they've all left the movement. And so, it's become dominated instead by very monotonic, theatrically impressive voices and faces.
BILL MOYERS: Well, what does it say that a tradition that begins with Edmund Burke, the great political thinker of his time, moves on over the years, the decades, to William Buckley, and now the icon is Rush Limbaugh?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, in my interpretation it means that it's ideologically depleted. That what we're seeing now and hearing are the noise-makers in Buckley's phrase. There's a very important incident described in this book that occurred in 1965, when the John Birch Society, an organization these new Americanist groups resemble -- the ones who are marching in Washington and holding tea parties. Essentially, very extremist revanchist groups that view politics in a conspiratorial way.
And the John Birch Society during the peak of the Cold War struggle was convinced, and you're well aware of this, that Dwight Eisenhower was a communist agent, who reported to his brother Milton, and 80 percent of the government was dominated by Communists. Communists were in charge of American education, American health care. They were fluoridating the water to weaken our brains. All of this happened. And at first, Buckley and his fellow intellectuals at NATIONAL REVIEW indulged this. They said, "You know what? Their arguments are absurd, but they believe in the right things. They're anti-communists. And they're helping our movement."
Cause many of them helped Barry Goldwater get nominated in 1964. And then in 1965, Buckley said, "Enough." Buckley himself had matured politically. He'd run for Mayor of New York. He'd seen how politics really worked. And he said, "We can't allow ourselves to be discredited by our own fringe." So, he turned over his own magazine to a denunciation of the John Birch Society. More important, the columns he wrote denouncing what he called its "drivel" were circulated in advance to three of the great conservative Republicans of the day, Ronald Reagan, Barry Goldwater, Senator John Tower, from your home state of Texas, and Tower read them on the floor of Congress into the Congressional record. In other words, the intellectual and political leaders of the right drew a line. And that's what we may not see if we don't have that kind of leadership on the right now.
BILL MOYERS: To what extent is race an irritant here? Because, you know, I was in that era of the '60s, I was deeply troubled as we moved on to try to pass the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by William Buckley's seeming embrace of white supremacy. It seemed to me to taint-- to leave something in the DNA of the modern conservative movement that is still there.
SAM TANENHAUS: It is. And one of the few regrets Bill Buckley ever expressed was that his magazine had not supported the Civil Rights Act--
BILL MOYERS: Really?
SAM TANENHAUS: …but you may remember that in the late '70s, he supported a national holiday for Martin Luther King--
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, I remember that.
SAM TANENHAUS: …where someone like John McCain did not. I once heard Buckley give a lecture -- brilliant lecture in New York City -- about the late '90s in which he talked about the importance of religion in American civil life. And it was Martin Luther King who was the object.
BILL MOYERS: What changed him? I mean, because he was writing in the National Review about, endorsing the White Supremacy scheme of the country at that time.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, he actually did that, Bill, a little bit earlier.
BILL MOYERS: '50s?
SAM TANENHAUS: '50s. He did more of it. In the early '60s, even a great thinker and writer like Garry Wills, who was still a part of the "National Review," though he supported the civil rights movement, thought it might weaken the institutional structures of society, if it became too fervent a protest. Now, what the Republican Party did was to make a very shrewd political calculation. A kind of Faustian bargain with the South. That the southern whites who resisted civil rights legislation-- Aand as you know, Lyndon Johnson knew, when he signed those bills into law, he might lose the solid south as it had been called, the Democrats might lose them for a generation or more. And yes, the Republicans moved right in, and they did it on the basis of a state's rights argument. Now, however convincing or unconvincing that was, it's important to acknowledge that Republicans never-- conservatives, I should say, northern Republicans are different-- but conservatives within the Republican Party, because the two were once not, you know, identical-- thought that a hierarchical society and a kind of racial difference-- a sense of racial difference, established institutionally, was not so bad a thing. They were wrong. They were dead wrong. But that sense of animus is absolutely strong today. Look who some of the great protestors are against Barack Obama. Three of them come from South Carolina, the state that led the secession. Joe Wilson and Senator DeMint, Mark Sanford who got in trouble. These are South Carolinians. And there's no question that that side of the insurrectionist South remains in our politics.
BILL MOYERS: When you heard Joe Wilson shout out, "You lie," and you saw who it was, did you think "the voice of conservatism today"?
SAM TANENHAUS: No. I thought "This man needs to read his Edmund Burke." Edmund Burke gave us the phrase "civil society." Now, people can be confused about that. It doesn't mean we have to be nice to each other all the time. Bill Buckley was not nice to his political opponents. What it means is one has to recognize that we're all part of what should be our harmonious culture, and that we respect the political institutions that bind it together. Edmund Burke, a very interesting passage in his great book, the "Reflections on the Revolution in France," uses the words "government" and "society" almost interchangeably. He sees each reinforcing the other. It is our institutional patrimony. When someone in the floor of Congress dishonors, disrespects, the office of the President, he's actually striking-- however briefly, however slightingly-- a blow against the institutions that our society is founded on. And I think Edmund Burke might have some trouble with that.
BILL MOYERS: There's long been a fundamental contradiction at the heart of this coalition that we call "conservative." I mean, you had the Edmund Burke kind of conservatism that yearns for a sacred, ordered society, bound by tradition, that protects both rich and poor, against what one of my friends calls the "Libertarian, robber baron, capitalist, cowboy America." I mean, that marriage was doomed to fail, right?
SAM TANENHAUS: It was. First of all, this is absolutely right, in the terms of a classical conservatism. And here is the figure I emphasize in my book is Benjamin Disraeli. What he feared-- the revolution of his time, this is the French Revolution that concerned Edmund Burke-- half a century later what concerned Disraeli and other conservatives was the Industrial Revolution. That Dickens wrote his novels about-- that children, the very poor becoming virtual slaves in work houses, that the search for money, for capital, for capital accumulation, seemed to drown out all other values. That's what modern conservatism is partly anchored in. So, how do we get this contradiction?
BILL MOYERS: Why isn't it standing up against turbo-capitalism?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, one reason is that America very early on in its history reached a kind of pact, in the Jacksonian era, between the government on the one hand and private capital on the other. That the government would actually subsidize capitalism in America. That's what the Right doesn't often acknowledge. A lot of what we think of as the unleashed, unfettered market is, in fact, a government supported market. Some will remember the famous debate between Dick Cheney and Joe Lieberman, and Dick Cheney said that his company, Halliburton, had made millions of dollars without any help from the government. It all came from the government! They were defense contracts! So, what's happened is the American ethos, which is a different thing from our political order-- that's the rugged individualism, the cowboy, the frontiersman, the robber baron, the great explorer, the conqueror of the continent. For that aspect of our myth, the market has been the engine of it. So, what brought them together, is what we've seen in the right is what I call a politics of organized cultural enmity. Everybody--
BILL MOYERS: Accusatory protest, you call it.
SAM TANENHAUS: Accusatory protest. With liberals as the enemy. So, if you are a free-marketeer, or you're an evangelical, or a social conservative, or even an authoritarian conservative, you can all agree about one thing: you hate the liberals that are out to destroy us. And that's a very useful form of political organization. I'm not sure it contributes much to our government and society, but it's politically useful, and we're seeing it again today.
BILL MOYERS: It wasn't long ago that Karl Rove was saying this coalition was going to deliver a new Republican majority. What happened? It finally came apart. Why?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, I believe it had come apart earlier than that. I really think Bill Clinton's victory in 1992 sealed the end of serious conservative counterrevolution. We forget that election. It seems like an anomaly, but consider, Bill Clinton won more electoral votes than Barack Obama, despite the presence of one of the most successful third party candidates, H. Ross Perot, another Texan, in American history. But that's not the most important fact. The most important fact is that George H. W. Bush got less of the popular vote in 1992 than Herbert Hoover got in 1932. That was really the end. But what happened was the right was so institutionally successful that it controlled many of the levers, as you say. So, what happened in the year 2000? Well, the conservatives on the Supreme Court stopped the democratic process, put their guy into office. Then September 11th came. And the right got its full first blank slate. They could do really whatever they wanted. And what we saw were those eight years. And that is the end of ideological conservatism as a vital formative and contributive aspect of our politics.
BILL MOYERS: Why?
SAM TANENHAUS: Because it failed so badly. It wasn't conservative. It was radical. It's interesting. Many on the right say, "George Bush betrayed us." They weren't saying that in 2002 and 2003. He was seen as someone who would complete the Reagan revolution. I think a lot of it was Iraq. Now, I quote in the book a remarkably prescient thing. The very young, almost painfully, 31-year-old, Benjamin Disraeli wrote in 1835, he said you cannot export democracy, even then, to lands ruled by despotic priests. And he happened to mean Catholic, not Islamic priests. But he said you actually have to have a civil society established in advance. He said that's why the United States had become a great republic so shortly after the Revolution. We had the law of English custom here. You see? So, we were prepared to become a democracy. There were conservatives who tried to make that argument before the war in Iraq. Francis Fukayama was one, Fareed Zakaria was another-- they're both well outside that movement. There were people in the Bush Administration who tried to argue this -- they were marginalized or stripped of power. What America saw was an ideological revanchism with all the knobs turned to the highest volume. The imperial presidency of a Dick Cheney and all the rest. And we saw where we got.
BILL MOYERS: Here's another puzzle. Back to what we were talking about earlier. You say in "The Death of Conservatism" that, "Even as the financial collapse drove us to the brink, conservatives remained strangely apart, trapped in the irrelevant causes of another day, deaf to the actual conversation unfolding across the land." And the paradox is, it seems to me, they are driving the conversation that you say they don't hear.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, you know, they have many mouths, Bill, but they don't have many ears. The great political philosopher, Hannah Arendt once said, in one of her great essays on Socrates, whom she wrote about a lot -- that the sign of a true statesmen, maybe particularly in a democracy, is the capacity to listen. And that doesn't simply mean to politely grow mute while your adversary talks. It means, in fact, to try to inhabit the thoughts and ideas of the other side. Barack Obama is perhaps a genius at this. For anyone who has not heard the audio version of "Dreams from My Father," it's a revelation. He does all the voices. He does the white Kansas voices, he does the Kenyan voices. He has an extraordinary ear. There's an auditory side to politics. And that capacity to listen is what enables you to absorb the arguments made by the other side and to have a kind of debate with yourself. That's the way our deliberative process is supposed to work. Right now, at a time of confusion and uncertainty, the ideological right is very good at shouting at us, and rallying the troops. But, you know, one of the real contributions conservatism made in its peak years, the 1950s and '60s, I think as an intellectual movement, is that it repudiated the politics of public demonstration. It was the left that was marching in the streets, and carrying guns, and threatening to take the society down, or calling President Johnson a murderer. Remember it was William Buckley, who said, "We're calling this man a murderer in the name of humanity?" It was the conservatives who used political institutions, political campaigns, who rallied behind traditional candidates produced by the party apparatus. They revitalized the traditions and the instruments and vehicles of our democracy.
But now we've reached a point, quite like one Richard Hofstadter described some 40 years ago, where ideologues don't trust politicians anymore. Remember during the big march in Washington, many of the protestors or demonstrators insisted they were not demonstrating just against Barack Obama, but against all the politicians-- that's why some Republicans wouldn't support it. They don't believe in politics as the medium whereby our society negotiates its issues.
BILL MOYERS: What do they believe in?
SAM TANENHAUS: They believe in a kind of revolution, a cultural revolution. They think the system can be-- what some would say hijacked. They would say maneuvered, controlled, that they can get their hands back on the levers. An important thing about the right in America is it always considers itself a minority position and an embattled position. No matter how many of the branches of government they dominate. So, what they believe in is, as Willmoore Kendall, this early philosopher said, is a politics of battle lines, of war.
BILL MOYERS: So, here, at this very critical moment, when so much is hanging in the balance, what is the paradox of conservatism as you see it?
SAM TANENHAUS: The paradox of conservatism is that it gives the signs, the overt signs of energy and vitality, but the rigor mortis I described is still there. As a philosophy, as a system of government, as a way all of us can learn from, as a means of evaluating ourselves, our social responsibilities, our personal obligations and responsibilities. It has, right now, nothing to offer.
BILL MOYERS: Now, they disagree with you. They think you have issued a call for unilateral disarmament on their part-- that brass knuckles and sharp elbows are part of fighting for what you believe in, and therefore, you're calling for a unilateral disarmament.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, you know, that's what Richard Hofstadter called the paranoid style, is when it's always living on the verge of apocalypse. That defeat is staring you in the face, and the only victories are total victories. Because even the slightest victory, if it's not complete, means the other side may come back and get you again. This is not serious responsible argument. Much of my book is actually about the failures of liberalism in that noontime period of the 1960s. And many of the conservatives simply ignore that part of the argument.
BILL MOYERS: How to explain this long fascination you've had with conservative ideas, and the conservative movement. Why this fascination?
BILL MOYERS: Well, I think it has been the dominant philosophy, political philosophy in our culture, in America, for some half-century. What particularly drew me first to Chambers and then Buckley is the idea that these were serious intellectuals, who were also men of action. Conservatives have kind of supplied us in their best periods-- the days when NATIONAL REVIEW and COMMENTARY and THE PUBLIC INTEREST were tremendously vital publications, self-examining, developing new vocabularies and idioms, teaching us all how to think about politics and culture in a different way, with a different set of tools. They were contributing so enormously to who we were as Americans. And yet, many liberals were not paying attention. Many liberals today don't know that a great thinker like Garry Wills was a product of the conservative movement. It's astonishing to them to learn it. They just assume, because they agree with him now, he was always a liberal. In fact, he remains a kind of conservative. This is the richness in the philosophy that attracted me, and that I wanted to learn more about, to educate myself.
BILL MOYERS: The book is THE DEATH OF CONSERVATISM. Sam Tanenhaus, I thoroughly enjoyed this conversation. Thank you for joining me.
SAM TANENHAUS: Oh, it's my great pleasure to be here.
MAN: And yet we are being told that a government bureaucrat is going to tell us whether we need to get the blue pill or the red pill.
WOMAN #1: You guys are absolutely incredible, do you think congress can hear us?
WOMAN #2: We need to stand up as a nation and uphold the principles of freedom, liberty and justice for all our people.
BILL MOYERS: As those conservative protesters were leaving Washington, members of the country's largest body of unions, the AFL-CIO were arriving in Pittsburg for their annual convention. They elected the former coal miner Richard Trumka to be their new President and heard from the man they had worked hard last year to send to the White House.
BARACK OBAMA: Thank you AFL-CIO!
BILL MOYERS: But all is not well with organized labor. Midway through the last century unions represented more than a quarter of America's workforce. That's fallen to about 12 percent today, when earning a living wage couldn't be harder. Just last week the Census Bureau reported that Americans are getting poorer, their median household income suffering the biggest decline since 1991. About 40 million people now live below the poverty line, with the poverty rate at an eleven-year high.
Where is organized labor? Why are unions so impotent when workers are so exploited? That's what I want to know from my next two guests. Bill Fletcher is a long-time labor and community organizer who was once an official of the AFL-CIO He now works for the American Federation of Government Employees, although he is here speaking for himself and not his organization. He is also the co-author of this new book SOLIDARITY DIVIDED: THE CRISIS IN ORGANIZED LABOR AND A NEW PATH TOWARD SOCIAL JUSTICE.
Michael Zweig has been at this table before. He is active in his own union, the United University Professions. He teaches at the state University of New York at Stony Brook, where he also runs the center for study of working class life. His most recent book is this one, WHAT'S CLASS GOT TO DO WITH IT: AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY. Welcome to both of you.
Bill Fletcher, we just heard in the earlier part of this broadcast, Sam Tanenhaus talk about the death of conservatism. Is it time to write the obituary of organized labor?
BILL FLETCHER: No. Not by no stretch. But organized labor remains in a crisis. And a low point very much of a low point right now. And the question for organized labor is whether or not it actually can become a class movement. A movement of workers. And not simply unions representing people in different workplaces.
Because I think that that speaks to some of the anger that's out there among workers who feel that they're unrepresented. That the society's crushing them. And they're looking for a vehicle. They're looking for someone to be their champion. Someone to channel their anger and if it's not unions, my fear is that these right wing populists are going to just grab onto this.
BILL MOYERS: Well, much of the anger we saw last week in that march on Washington were was came from ordinary people who are upset with what's happening in their own lives. But they're going toward the conservative movement and the Republican Party, not toward the unions.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, who's leading them to the unions? Who's calling them to the labor movement? The problem is that I don't think that the labor movement can successfully organize in particular places without a context of a broad social movement that addresses the power of capital. Not just in the particular workplace, but in the society as a whole. And if there isn't that context of a social workers movement I don't think it's possible to go shop by shop and recover the strength of the labor movement.
BILL MOYERS: So, what's a union for if it can't improve the living standards of ordinary people?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, it's for improving the living standards of ordinary people. It's certainly for that. But in order to do that, it has to have a broader agenda.
BILL FLETCHER: One of the things that struck me when I interviewed people that were active in the 1930's and '40s is that even if you if you were progressive, even if you weren't in the unions, you had a sense that the union movement or at least a good section of it was supporting progressive causes. That it was there. It was not just about organizing workers at a particular workplace. But that the unions were part of this broad effort of progress.
And the problem that's happened, and it's reflected in the these interesting polls. Where workers will say nonunion workers will say on occasion that the unions are good for their members, but they're not necessarily good for other people. And I feel like when I hear when I hear that, it's an incredible indictment on the kind of unionism that we have.
We have leaders now that are paying more attention to getting access to political leaders or holding hands with the head of Walmart. Rather than actually getting and inspiring workers, irrespective of whether they're our members right now. To engage in a struggle for justice.
BILL MOYERS: Those conservative protestors we saw are not afraid of confrontation. They're willing to use sharp elbows and brass knuckles in fighting for what they believe in. Why isn't labor more confrontational in behalf of those very people, the working people of this country?
BILL FLETCHER: Well, part of it is that there's I know people won't appreciate my saying this. But among many of the leaders, there's really a fear of losing respectability. I mean, you have leaders that have now gained these positions and they're really afraid that if they shake the table too much, that they will be excluded.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: What has happened is that the corporations and the corporate elite have structured what this country is, what's valuable, what's important, how we organize our lives. And labor has not come forth with an alternative set of values.
BILL MOYERS: But why haven't they? Now, that's
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, there I think because we used to have that. And all the labor movement did have that.
BILL MOYERS: Solidarity forever, right?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, and the labor movement had a very militant, very aggressive stance in the '30s, '40s, '50s that challenged capital. That got tremendous benefits. You know, the labor movement is the people who gave us the weekend. Let's not forget. The labor movement is what…
BILL MOYERS: The eight hour day.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Got us the eight hour day, and the social security, and all the other things that we think are so very important, but are just natural. That came out of a labor movement, but a labor movement that was led by people and was fueled by people who understood that there was antagonism. That there was a battle that they were involved in. This was not just, 'Let's sit down and have lunch and figure out what's the best thing to do for America.' This was, 'Here's a group of people who run the country and run businesses. And they have a certain set of interests. And they do not have our interests at mind at heart. They are not for us.'
BILL MOYERS: For the working people.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: For the working people. We have to be organized and be a contrary force, a counterforce that's a real force. That isn't just a debating society. That doesn't just have resolutions that it passes.
BILL MOYERS: A real force to take on capital
MICHAEL ZWEIG: To take on capital.
BILL MOYERS: And power.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: And power.
BILL MOYERS: And why have they lost that?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, because they got crushed.
BILL MOYERS: No one.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Because the people who tried to do that. And the people who did do that were leftist. They were people who had a class analysis of society. Many of them were socialists and some of them were communists, but not all. But that sentiment, that understanding of the basic structure of society as divided by class interest. That there's a working class that's a majority of the population in this country. And they have interests. And they have a set of values that that convey those interests. That are very different from the corporations. They're very different from capital.
And if the people who held those views and mobilized the labor movement at an earlier point in our history. Those people were pushed out. And they were pushed out by the labor movement, internally, because there was great division and splits. And so then the labor movement got drawn into an era of cooperation. An era of, "Well, let's all sit down. And we'll all be reasonable. We'll all figure out what to do that's best for America." And it turns out America is not one thing. America is divided by these deep class antagonisms that we are now living with.
BILL MOYERS: And yet, working class has disappeared from the language. I mean, there..
BILL FLETCHER: We're all working.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah?
BILL FLETCHER: See, that's the thing. Palin used working class.
BILL MOYERS: Sarah Palin.
BILL FLETCHER: Sarah Palin used the term working class more than Obama did in the 2008 election. But her notion and those the notion of many other conservatives, when they use the term working class. They're not really talking about the same working class that we're talking about. They're not really talking about Latinos, African Americans, Whites, Asians. They have a certain sort of stereotypical idea of the White worker. But so, they will use that term. And that's the irony of our times. But I want to go back to one thing.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah.
BILL FLETCHER: I realized this waking up this morning. This is the 60th anniversary of when the Congress of Industrial Organization began a process of purging, wholesale, unions that were led by people on the left. And it is exactly what Mike was talking about. That these purges are came they followed the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. Led to this incredible Cold War witch hunt against anyone to the left of the Attila the Hun.
So that the people that were the most militant, that had the most advanced views on organizing. Who were anti-racist, ended up being pushed out of organ the official organized labor. And were put pushed to the margins in many cases. And in some cases the unions were actually destroyed. The unions that remained in the CIO and then merged with AFL. adopted the view that Michael was describing. They adopted the sense that we had somehow come to peace in our time with capital. That we did have a place at the table. And that if we rocked the boat, outside of an occasional strike, that we will be excluded. We will be no longer relevant. And this purge, we are living with the legacy of that purge of the left.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But see, this is a process that takes a long time to do. When this began in the 1940s and 1950s with this anti-communist witch hunt. And with this redirection of what labor should be about. There was the nice cop and the nasty cop in that. The nasty cop was the McCarthyite investigations. And the purging of the Left. But the nice cop was the invitation to come in and sit at the table and be reasonable.
BILL MOYERS: Lyndon Johnson. Come now, let us feast together.
BILL MOYERS: He'd say to the President of the National Association of Manufacturing. He would say that to the head of the AFL-CIO
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Over
BILL MOYERS: Under George Meany
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Over when George Meany was proud that he never walked a picket line. And he said so. And then when Lane Kirkland died, who was the President of the AFL-CIO. then you the Wall Street Journal had an obit for him. And under his little picture it said, "Lane Kirkland, anti-communist." That's what the labor movement was known for. It because they were able to push out a certain segment. But then to come in with another kind of leadership. An affirmative statement that "We are going to be cooperating now with the corporations and with the corporate elite. We are going to be like a junior partner at the table."
BILL MOYERS: But do you see any green spouts of confrontation, militancy, defiance growing on the Left, among unions, that we see on the Right?
BILL FLETCHER: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: Where?
BILL FLETCHER: Well, first of all, I think that the election of Richard Trumka has a great deal of potential. Because
BILL MOYERS: The new president of the AFL-CIO.
BILL FLETCHER: The new president of the
BILL MOYERS: Why?
BILL FLETCHER: Because Trumka comes out of a history of militancy. He you know, in terms of his vision of the United Mine Workers that he led. His emphasis on organizing. His clarity on the nature of the economic crisis that we've been facing. And what he has articulated so far. And all I can say, this is a hope, is the notion that we have to engage in that confrontation that you're describing.
We have to do much more massive organizing. Particularly of the poor, the increasingly poor sections of the working class. So, I think that there's a vision here. And I can't overstate this issue of vision. Because it's not simply the technique of unions putting resources into organizing. People have to feel compelled that there's a vision of success, but a vision of a different kind of country. And indeed, a different kind of world.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It's also a different understanding of how you do politics and how you exert power. It's one thing to say, "I'm the leader of an organization of eight and a half million workers. I'm the head of the AFL-CIO. We have eight and a half million members in our affiliates." And I'm going to sit down at a table. And I'm going to say, "I have eight and a half million members out there." It's another thing to have eight and a half million members out there, who are in the streets, who are not just sending in letters and not just signing petitions. But who are actively engaged in exercising power, in building power in the streets, in the communities, in the schools.
BILL MOYERS: And we don't see that happening. Why? Why isn't that happening?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But see, I think that Rich Trumka understands something about the need to do this. And we'll see where this goes now. But, you know, it's hard to change culture.
BILL FLETCHER: Right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It's hard to change the way we understand how things should happen.
BILL MOYERS: You began by talking about class. The fact of the matter is there has been a class war for the last 30 years in this country.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: And the working class lost.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: So, if you've been defeated, where do you how do you come back?
BILL FLETCHER: Well, let me give two answers to that. One is that that in large part because of the Cold War witch hunts, actually even using the term class within organized labor.
BILL MOYERS: That's right.
BILL FLETCHER: For up until the mid-1990s led to people being condemned of being communist. I mean, it was absolutely absurd. So, it's the culture and the psyche that Mike is talking about, still infects many of the leaders, unfortunately. But I want to say that people are struggling. But you have the great--
BILL MOYERS: You mean that-- I know people are struggling just to make meet their daily needs. You mean--
BILL FLETCHER: Struggling and succeeding. Workers are fighting back.
BILL MOYERS: Where?
BILL FLETCHER: For example in the Smithfield Plant in…
MICHAEL ZWEIG: In North Carolina.
BILL FLETCHER: In North Carolina.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Tar Heel, North Carolina.
BILL FLETCHER: Right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Was the biggest pork processing plant in the country.
BILL MOYERS: Mostly Hispanics. They were--
BILL FLETCHER: Black and Latino. And the United Food and Commercial Workers put resources. They had a brilliant strategist who was directing it. And they succeeded. It doesn't get a great deal of attention. The Communication Workers of America--
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It succeeded after 14 years.
BILL FLETCHER: Right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But the workers that were fighting for 14 years at Smithfield. Or the Communication Workers of America members in Texas or Mississippi that have been fighting for-- in the public sector for years. These fights are going on. What's missing though is this sense of coherence. That this is not simply a victory at Smithfield. Or a fight that's going on in Knoxville. But that this is a fight for social justice. And that is what--
BILL MOYERS: Meaning a fight for…
BILL FLETCHER: A fight for health care reform. A fight against a racial differentials and health care and education. A fight for housing. The policy towards the cities!
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But see, I think it's more than just a policy list. It's a fight for a different way of being a country. A fight to care for one another.
BILL MOYERS: Well, it used to be a fight--
MICHAEL ZWEIG: A fight to take care of one another.
BILL MOYERS: It used to be a fight to take on capital, right? Labor was a real force in trying to bring to tame the wildness of capital.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Of capital. That's right.
BILL MOYERS: And we've seen what happened over the last few years when capital went wild.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: Without any kind of--
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: Without labor, can the battle for social justice be fought and won in this country?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: I don't think so. You know, there's this story about the cat that goes and eats the mice at night. You know? And the mice get together and say, "What are we going to do? We have to save ourselves from this evil cat that's eating us up. And one night one mouse says, "I know what we're going to do. We're going to put a bell around the neck of that cat. Right. And when the cat comes, we'll hear the bell, and then we'll all run away and be safe." Great idea. Who will bell the cat? Right? Who's going to put that bell on that cat? Who's going to put the bell on capital in the United States? There's only one force. There's only one set of people who can do that. That's working people. That's the majority of the people in this country.
BILL FLETCHER: And unfortunately, many workers really do believe that they're in this fight alone. That they're being crushed not because of some the larger dynamic of capitalism. They're being crushed because they're not working hard enough. That they have overspent. That they are in too much debt. They're not understanding that the problem is not them. Even if they have problems. The problem is systemic. And this vision needs to be articulated. And it needs to come out of organized labor. To remind people the problem is not them.
We are in a system that is walking over working people. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of working people. And the working people need a voice. And they need a mechanism, as Mike is saying in order to say, "Yes, I'm part of this fight. And I'm prepared to fight for social justice."
BILL MOYERS: So, where are we? Martin Luther King talked about the arc of history bending toward justice. Is the arc of this present moment, bending toward justice?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, you know President Obama in his campaign talked about the arc of history is long, but it bends towards justice. And it's long. It takes a long time. The emphasis there, you know, is seven-- what is it? From Seneca Falls in 1848 to the 19th Amendment in 1920 to get women the right to vote. The women's movement was 72 years. So, it takes a long time to get the eight hour day from 1886 in Hay Market to 1938. It's a long time.
So, is it bending towards justice? That's up to us to do. We have to go out there and bend that arc. It doesn't just happen. And the way to bend it is now to understand the importance of class. We have an African American president. That's a great advance for this country. We have an African American on the United States Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas. That's also a great advance for this country. Now the question is: which African American? And that question is a question of class.
Are they going to be an African American that's there to advance the interests of working people? Or are they going to be there to advance the interests of corporations? Which woman is going to be in the White House? Is it going to be Hillary Clinton? Or is it going to be Sarah Palin? Two women, just because they're a woman, that's great that they're there. And a representative of the success of the feminist and the women's movement to get to a position where a country can have that.
But that's not the-now, that's not the full question. Now we have a new question. What woman is going to represent what interest? Is it going to be the interests of working people or the interests of the corporations? And that test is a test of cap-of class?
BILL MOYERS: Do we know where Obama comes down on this?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It depends where the working class is--
BILL FLETCHER: That's right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: As an organized force. And Obama himself said, "I can't do this alone." He was campaigning on this progressive agenda and he said, "I cannot do this alone. I need a social movement." You know, that's what we have to push. And if corporate elites are we know they're pushing. And if there isn't any pushback, that's where he's going to go.
BILL FLETCHER: I think that his heart lies with working people. But I think that he believes fundamentally that he has to make sure that capitalism is functioning in a certain way. And that means that he has to pay attention to the corporate elites. And for that reason, what Mike raised is absolutely on the money. That we have to push him and point out to him that an economy should be serving working people.
An economy where you have an announcement that the recession is ending, but we have more than ten percent unemployment, probably between 10 and 20 percent unemployment. And you in addition, you have this structural unemployment in places like Camden or Flint. Where people are never going to work permanent jobs. That's no kind of economy. You know? And we don't need a president that is simply going to pay attention to making sure that the stock market is going up, while the rest of us are going down.
But I want to go back to one thing. I want to say about this arc. I sometimes get attacked, Bill, for being a prophet of doom or something. But which I think is an unfair criticism. But I'm worried. I really am. I think that we really are at one of those critical moments, when that arc could move towards barbarism. Not simply moving in a conservative direction.
When I see people bringing AR-15s to rallies with the President. When I see this insanity behind the Birther Movement. And questions about the President's citizenship. I realize that the strength of the irrationalist right is something that we have to contend with. And that these are people that could bring everything down in ways that could be quite catastrophic. So, I put it more in a different way. My hope is that the arc is moving towards justice. But I think that it will only successfully move there if we push it.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL FLETCHER: And that really does come down to what Mike was raising. That we cannot sit back and believe fatalistically in the inevitability of progress. The only thing inevitable is death. What we do will make the fundamental difference. If we push that arc in a certain way, we will have social justice. But we cannot that means among other things with the union movement, breaking with old ways of thinking, old ways of operating. And recognizing that there are people out there that are literally and figuratively dying for leadership, that wish a vehicle to speak for them. That really-- where the message resonates. That's our job.
BILL MOYERS: Bill Fletcher and Michael Zweig, thank you very much for joining me. This has been a very interesting discussion.
BILL FLETCHER: Thank you very much.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Thank you very much.
BILL FLETCHER: It was a pleasure.
BILL MOYERS: That's it for the Journal this week. Remember to log onto our Web site at pbs.org, click on BILL MOYERS JOURNAL. There you can see a web-exclusive essay prompted by those protests in Washington, and you can hear more from the next generation of conservatives, as well as from some of the movement's stalwarts. You'll also be able to find out about the challenges facing the youngest American workers. That's all at pbs.org. I'm Bill Moyers, until next time.
September 18, 2009
BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the JOURNAL. And to an exploration of what's happening with two powerful movements in American life: unions on the Left, and conservatives on the Right.
CROWD: You work for us! You work for us!
BILL MOYERS: Conservatives were out in force in Washington over the weekend. They had come to express their opposition to big government, to taxes and wasteful spending, and health care reform they fear would lead to a nightmare of bureaucracy. Max Blumenthal, author of REPUBLICAN GOMORRAH waded into their midst to sample opinions.
MAX BLUMENTHAL: So you're saying if the government eliminates Social Security and Medicare then you'll get out of the program?
WOMAN: No, I said if they get out of my life.
MAX BLUMENTHAL: Out of your Social Security and-
WOMAN: No, out of everything.
BILL MOYERS: But they had also come to deplore and denounce President Obama- in their minds a tyrant akin to Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein.
MAN: I'm afraid he's going to do what Hitler could never do and that's destroy the United States of America.
MAX BLUMENTHAL: And what's the Obama revolution, what's going to happen?
MAN: Similar to Germany, like what Hitler did. He took over the auto industry, did he not? He took over the banking, did he not? And Hitler had his own personal secret service police, Acorn is an extension of that.
BILL MOYERS: They had found a new hero in Joe Wilson, the South Carolina Republican whose shout heard 'round the world was now the rallying cry of the weekend.
CROWD: You lie! You lie!
BILL MOYERS: Glenn Beck, their favorite pundit, had promoted this march and was reveling in its success.
GLENN BECK: This is a collection of Americans who but want both parties to stop with the corruption, stop with the spending and start listening to the people. Fox's Griff Jenkins is there now in Washington D.C., hey Griff.
GRIFF JENKINS: Glenn its unbelievable, thousands and thousands of people, look at this crowd right there. Do you guys have something you want to say to Glenn Beck?
BILL MOYERS: Watching those protestors you would have to say there's a lot of fight left on the Right, and you wouldn't be wrong. This rising tide of populist resistance to Obama, the anger over the massive government bailout of Wall Street and big failed corporations, have raised Republican hopes for a comeback And it has Democrats scratching their head wondering how to respond.
So what do we make of this new book titled THE DEATH OF CONSERVATISM? Has the author Sam Tanenhaus spent his time and considerable talent on a premature obituary?
Sam Tanenhaus edits two of the most influential sections of the Sunday NEW YORK TIMES - the Book Review and the Week in Review. He's has had a long fascination with conservatives and conservative ideas. He wrote this acclaimed biography of Whittaker Chambers, the journalist who spied for the Russians before he became fiercely anti-communist and a hero to conservatives. Now Tanenhaus is working on a biography of the conservative icon William F. Buckley JR.
BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the JOURNAL, Sam Tanenhaus.
SAM TANENHAUS: Oh my pleasure to be here, Bill.
BILL MOYERS: So, if you're right about the decline and death of conservatism, who are all those people we see on television?
SAM TANENHAUS: I'm afraid they're radicals. Conservatism has been divided for a long time -- this is what my book describes narratively -- between two strains. What I call realism and revanchism. We're seeing the revanchist side.
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean revanchism?
SAM TANENHAUS: I mean a politics that's based on the idea that America has been taken away from its true owners, and they have to restore and reclaim it. They have to conquer the territory that's been taken from them. Revanchism really comes from the French word for 'revenge.' It's a politics of vengeance.
And this is a strong strain in modern conservatism. Like the 19th Century nationalists who wanted to recover parts of their country that foreign nations had invaded and occupied, these radical people on the right, and they include intellectuals and the kinds of personalities we're seeing on television and radio, and also to some extent people marching in the streets, think America has gotten away from them. Theirs is a politics of reclamation and restoration. Give it back to us. What we sometimes forget is that the last five presidential elections Democrats won pluralities in four of them. The only time the Republicans have won, in recent memory, was when George Bush was re-elected by the narrowest margin in modern history, for a sitting president. So, what this means is that, yes, conservatism, what I think of, as a radical form of conservatism, is highly organized. We're seeing it now-- they are ideologically in lockstep. They agree about almost everything, and they have an orthodoxy that governs their worldview and their view of politics. So, they are able to make incursions. And at times when liberals, Democrats, and moderate Republicans are uncertain where to go, yes, this group will be out in front, very organized, and dominate our conversation.
BILL MOYERS: What gives them their certainty? You know, your hero of the 18th Century, Burke, Edmund Burke, warned against extremism and dogmatic orthodoxy.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, it's a very deep strain in our politics, Bill. Some of our great historians like Richard Hofstadter and Garry Wills have written about this. If you go back to the foundations of our Republic, first of all, we have two documents, "creedal documents" they're sometimes called, more or less at war with one another. The Declaration of Independence says one thing and the Constitution says another.
BILL MOYERS: The Declaration says--
SAM TANENHAUS: …says that we will be an egalitarian society in which all rights will be available to one and all, and the Constitution creates a complex political system that stops that change from happening. So, there's a clash right at the beginning. Now, what we've seen is that certain groups among us-- and sometimes it's been the left-- have been able to dominate the conversation and transform politics into a kind of theater. And that's what we're seeing now.
BILL MOYERS: When you see these people in the theater of television, you call them the insurrectionists, in your book, what do you think motivates them?
SAM TANENHAUS: One of the interesting developments in our politics, in just the past few months, although you could see signs of it earlier, is the emergence of the demographic we always overlook in our youth obsessed culture: the elderly. That was the group that did not support Barack Obama. They voted for John McCain. It was also the group that rose up and defied George W. Bush, when he wanted to add private Social Scurity accounts. It was a similar kind of protest.
BILL MOYERS: There's a paradox there, right? I mean, they say they're against government and yet the majority of Americans, according to all the polls, don't want their government touched. You know, there were people at these town hall meetings this summer, saying "Don't touch my Medicare." You know, keep the government out of my Social Security.
SAM TANENHAUS: Yes. This is an interesting argument. Because it's very easy to mock, and we see this a lot. "Oh, these fools. These old codgers say the government won't take my Medicare away. Don't know Medicare is a government program?" That's not really what's going on, I think. I think there's something different. A sense about how both the left and the right grew skeptical of Great Society programs under Lyndon Johnson, and the argument was everyone was becoming a kind of client or ward of the state. That we've become a nation of patron/client relationships. And a colleague of yours, Richard Goodwin, very brilliant political thinker, in 1967 warned, "We all expect too much from government." We expect it to create all the jobs. We expect it to rescue the economy. To fight the wars. To give us a good life". So, when people say, "Don't take my Medicare away," what they really mean is, "We're entirely dependent on this government and we're afraid they'll take one thing away that we've gotten used to and replace it with something that won't be so good. And there's nothing we can do about it. We're powerless before the very guardian that protects us."
BILL MOYERS: So, how do you see this contradiction playing out in the health care debate? Where what's the dominant force that's going to prevail here at the end? Is it going to be, "We want reform and we want the government involved?" Or are we going to privatize it the way people on the conservative side want to do? The insurance companies, the drug companies, all of that?
SAM TANENHAUS: I think what we'll see is a kind of incremental reform. Look, we know that health care has become the third rail of American politics, going back to Theodore Roosevelt. The greatest retail politician in modern history, Bill Clinton, could not sell it. But here's another thing to think about. In the book I discuss one of the most interesting political theories of the modern era, Samuel Lubell's theory of the solar system of politics. And what he says is what we think of as an equally balanced, two-party system, is really a rotating one-party system. Either the Republicans or Democrats have ruled since the Civil War for periods of some 30-36 years. And in those periods, all the great debates have occurred within a single party. So, if you go back to the 1980s, which some would say was the peak of the modern conservative period, the fight's about how to end the Cold War, how to unleash market forces-- were really Republican issues.
Today, when we look at the great questions -- how to stimulate the economy, how to provide and expand and improve a sustainable health care system, the fight is taking place among Democrats. So, in a sense what Republicans have done is to put themselves on the sidelines. They've vacated the field and left it to the other party, the Democratic Party, to resolve these issues among themselves. That's one reason I think conservatism is in trouble.
BILL MOYERS: You write in here that they're not simply in retreat, they're outmoded. They don't act like it, you know?
SAM TANENHAUS: They do and they don't. What I also say in the book is that the voices are louder than ever. And I wrote that back in March. Already we were hearing the furies on the right. Remember, there was a movement within the Republican Party, finally scotched, to actually rename the Democrats, "The Democrat Socialist Party." This started from the beginning. So, the noise is there. William Buckley has a wonderful expression. He says, "The pyrotechnicians and noise-makers have always been there on the right." I think we're hearing more of that than we are serious ideological, philosophical discussion about conservatism.
BILL MOYERS: How do you explain the fact that the news agenda today is driven by Fox News, talk radio, and the blogosphere. Why are those organs of information and/or propaganda so powerful?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, there's been a transformation of the conservative establishment. And this has been going on for some time. The foundations of modern conservatism, the great thinkers, were actually ex-communists, many of them. Whittaker Chambers, the subject of my biography. The great, brilliant thinker, James Burnham. A less known but equally brilliant figure, Willmoore Kendall, who was a mentor, oddly enough, to both William Buckley and Garry Wills. These were the original thinkers. And they were essentially philosophical in their outlook. Now, there are conservative intellectuals, but we don't think of them as conservative anymore-- Fareed Zakaria, Francis Fukayama, Andrew Sullivan, Michael Lind, the great Columbia professor, Mark Lilla-- they've all left the movement. And so, it's become dominated instead by very monotonic, theatrically impressive voices and faces.
BILL MOYERS: Well, what does it say that a tradition that begins with Edmund Burke, the great political thinker of his time, moves on over the years, the decades, to William Buckley, and now the icon is Rush Limbaugh?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, in my interpretation it means that it's ideologically depleted. That what we're seeing now and hearing are the noise-makers in Buckley's phrase. There's a very important incident described in this book that occurred in 1965, when the John Birch Society, an organization these new Americanist groups resemble -- the ones who are marching in Washington and holding tea parties. Essentially, very extremist revanchist groups that view politics in a conspiratorial way.
And the John Birch Society during the peak of the Cold War struggle was convinced, and you're well aware of this, that Dwight Eisenhower was a communist agent, who reported to his brother Milton, and 80 percent of the government was dominated by Communists. Communists were in charge of American education, American health care. They were fluoridating the water to weaken our brains. All of this happened. And at first, Buckley and his fellow intellectuals at NATIONAL REVIEW indulged this. They said, "You know what? Their arguments are absurd, but they believe in the right things. They're anti-communists. And they're helping our movement."
Cause many of them helped Barry Goldwater get nominated in 1964. And then in 1965, Buckley said, "Enough." Buckley himself had matured politically. He'd run for Mayor of New York. He'd seen how politics really worked. And he said, "We can't allow ourselves to be discredited by our own fringe." So, he turned over his own magazine to a denunciation of the John Birch Society. More important, the columns he wrote denouncing what he called its "drivel" were circulated in advance to three of the great conservative Republicans of the day, Ronald Reagan, Barry Goldwater, Senator John Tower, from your home state of Texas, and Tower read them on the floor of Congress into the Congressional record. In other words, the intellectual and political leaders of the right drew a line. And that's what we may not see if we don't have that kind of leadership on the right now.
BILL MOYERS: To what extent is race an irritant here? Because, you know, I was in that era of the '60s, I was deeply troubled as we moved on to try to pass the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by William Buckley's seeming embrace of white supremacy. It seemed to me to taint-- to leave something in the DNA of the modern conservative movement that is still there.
SAM TANENHAUS: It is. And one of the few regrets Bill Buckley ever expressed was that his magazine had not supported the Civil Rights Act--
BILL MOYERS: Really?
SAM TANENHAUS: …but you may remember that in the late '70s, he supported a national holiday for Martin Luther King--
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, I remember that.
SAM TANENHAUS: …where someone like John McCain did not. I once heard Buckley give a lecture -- brilliant lecture in New York City -- about the late '90s in which he talked about the importance of religion in American civil life. And it was Martin Luther King who was the object.
BILL MOYERS: What changed him? I mean, because he was writing in the National Review about, endorsing the White Supremacy scheme of the country at that time.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, he actually did that, Bill, a little bit earlier.
BILL MOYERS: '50s?
SAM TANENHAUS: '50s. He did more of it. In the early '60s, even a great thinker and writer like Garry Wills, who was still a part of the "National Review," though he supported the civil rights movement, thought it might weaken the institutional structures of society, if it became too fervent a protest. Now, what the Republican Party did was to make a very shrewd political calculation. A kind of Faustian bargain with the South. That the southern whites who resisted civil rights legislation-- Aand as you know, Lyndon Johnson knew, when he signed those bills into law, he might lose the solid south as it had been called, the Democrats might lose them for a generation or more. And yes, the Republicans moved right in, and they did it on the basis of a state's rights argument. Now, however convincing or unconvincing that was, it's important to acknowledge that Republicans never-- conservatives, I should say, northern Republicans are different-- but conservatives within the Republican Party, because the two were once not, you know, identical-- thought that a hierarchical society and a kind of racial difference-- a sense of racial difference, established institutionally, was not so bad a thing. They were wrong. They were dead wrong. But that sense of animus is absolutely strong today. Look who some of the great protestors are against Barack Obama. Three of them come from South Carolina, the state that led the secession. Joe Wilson and Senator DeMint, Mark Sanford who got in trouble. These are South Carolinians. And there's no question that that side of the insurrectionist South remains in our politics.
BILL MOYERS: When you heard Joe Wilson shout out, "You lie," and you saw who it was, did you think "the voice of conservatism today"?
SAM TANENHAUS: No. I thought "This man needs to read his Edmund Burke." Edmund Burke gave us the phrase "civil society." Now, people can be confused about that. It doesn't mean we have to be nice to each other all the time. Bill Buckley was not nice to his political opponents. What it means is one has to recognize that we're all part of what should be our harmonious culture, and that we respect the political institutions that bind it together. Edmund Burke, a very interesting passage in his great book, the "Reflections on the Revolution in France," uses the words "government" and "society" almost interchangeably. He sees each reinforcing the other. It is our institutional patrimony. When someone in the floor of Congress dishonors, disrespects, the office of the President, he's actually striking-- however briefly, however slightingly-- a blow against the institutions that our society is founded on. And I think Edmund Burke might have some trouble with that.
BILL MOYERS: There's long been a fundamental contradiction at the heart of this coalition that we call "conservative." I mean, you had the Edmund Burke kind of conservatism that yearns for a sacred, ordered society, bound by tradition, that protects both rich and poor, against what one of my friends calls the "Libertarian, robber baron, capitalist, cowboy America." I mean, that marriage was doomed to fail, right?
SAM TANENHAUS: It was. First of all, this is absolutely right, in the terms of a classical conservatism. And here is the figure I emphasize in my book is Benjamin Disraeli. What he feared-- the revolution of his time, this is the French Revolution that concerned Edmund Burke-- half a century later what concerned Disraeli and other conservatives was the Industrial Revolution. That Dickens wrote his novels about-- that children, the very poor becoming virtual slaves in work houses, that the search for money, for capital, for capital accumulation, seemed to drown out all other values. That's what modern conservatism is partly anchored in. So, how do we get this contradiction?
BILL MOYERS: Why isn't it standing up against turbo-capitalism?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, one reason is that America very early on in its history reached a kind of pact, in the Jacksonian era, between the government on the one hand and private capital on the other. That the government would actually subsidize capitalism in America. That's what the Right doesn't often acknowledge. A lot of what we think of as the unleashed, unfettered market is, in fact, a government supported market. Some will remember the famous debate between Dick Cheney and Joe Lieberman, and Dick Cheney said that his company, Halliburton, had made millions of dollars without any help from the government. It all came from the government! They were defense contracts! So, what's happened is the American ethos, which is a different thing from our political order-- that's the rugged individualism, the cowboy, the frontiersman, the robber baron, the great explorer, the conqueror of the continent. For that aspect of our myth, the market has been the engine of it. So, what brought them together, is what we've seen in the right is what I call a politics of organized cultural enmity. Everybody--
BILL MOYERS: Accusatory protest, you call it.
SAM TANENHAUS: Accusatory protest. With liberals as the enemy. So, if you are a free-marketeer, or you're an evangelical, or a social conservative, or even an authoritarian conservative, you can all agree about one thing: you hate the liberals that are out to destroy us. And that's a very useful form of political organization. I'm not sure it contributes much to our government and society, but it's politically useful, and we're seeing it again today.
BILL MOYERS: It wasn't long ago that Karl Rove was saying this coalition was going to deliver a new Republican majority. What happened? It finally came apart. Why?
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, I believe it had come apart earlier than that. I really think Bill Clinton's victory in 1992 sealed the end of serious conservative counterrevolution. We forget that election. It seems like an anomaly, but consider, Bill Clinton won more electoral votes than Barack Obama, despite the presence of one of the most successful third party candidates, H. Ross Perot, another Texan, in American history. But that's not the most important fact. The most important fact is that George H. W. Bush got less of the popular vote in 1992 than Herbert Hoover got in 1932. That was really the end. But what happened was the right was so institutionally successful that it controlled many of the levers, as you say. So, what happened in the year 2000? Well, the conservatives on the Supreme Court stopped the democratic process, put their guy into office. Then September 11th came. And the right got its full first blank slate. They could do really whatever they wanted. And what we saw were those eight years. And that is the end of ideological conservatism as a vital formative and contributive aspect of our politics.
BILL MOYERS: Why?
SAM TANENHAUS: Because it failed so badly. It wasn't conservative. It was radical. It's interesting. Many on the right say, "George Bush betrayed us." They weren't saying that in 2002 and 2003. He was seen as someone who would complete the Reagan revolution. I think a lot of it was Iraq. Now, I quote in the book a remarkably prescient thing. The very young, almost painfully, 31-year-old, Benjamin Disraeli wrote in 1835, he said you cannot export democracy, even then, to lands ruled by despotic priests. And he happened to mean Catholic, not Islamic priests. But he said you actually have to have a civil society established in advance. He said that's why the United States had become a great republic so shortly after the Revolution. We had the law of English custom here. You see? So, we were prepared to become a democracy. There were conservatives who tried to make that argument before the war in Iraq. Francis Fukayama was one, Fareed Zakaria was another-- they're both well outside that movement. There were people in the Bush Administration who tried to argue this -- they were marginalized or stripped of power. What America saw was an ideological revanchism with all the knobs turned to the highest volume. The imperial presidency of a Dick Cheney and all the rest. And we saw where we got.
BILL MOYERS: Here's another puzzle. Back to what we were talking about earlier. You say in "The Death of Conservatism" that, "Even as the financial collapse drove us to the brink, conservatives remained strangely apart, trapped in the irrelevant causes of another day, deaf to the actual conversation unfolding across the land." And the paradox is, it seems to me, they are driving the conversation that you say they don't hear.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, you know, they have many mouths, Bill, but they don't have many ears. The great political philosopher, Hannah Arendt once said, in one of her great essays on Socrates, whom she wrote about a lot -- that the sign of a true statesmen, maybe particularly in a democracy, is the capacity to listen. And that doesn't simply mean to politely grow mute while your adversary talks. It means, in fact, to try to inhabit the thoughts and ideas of the other side. Barack Obama is perhaps a genius at this. For anyone who has not heard the audio version of "Dreams from My Father," it's a revelation. He does all the voices. He does the white Kansas voices, he does the Kenyan voices. He has an extraordinary ear. There's an auditory side to politics. And that capacity to listen is what enables you to absorb the arguments made by the other side and to have a kind of debate with yourself. That's the way our deliberative process is supposed to work. Right now, at a time of confusion and uncertainty, the ideological right is very good at shouting at us, and rallying the troops. But, you know, one of the real contributions conservatism made in its peak years, the 1950s and '60s, I think as an intellectual movement, is that it repudiated the politics of public demonstration. It was the left that was marching in the streets, and carrying guns, and threatening to take the society down, or calling President Johnson a murderer. Remember it was William Buckley, who said, "We're calling this man a murderer in the name of humanity?" It was the conservatives who used political institutions, political campaigns, who rallied behind traditional candidates produced by the party apparatus. They revitalized the traditions and the instruments and vehicles of our democracy.
But now we've reached a point, quite like one Richard Hofstadter described some 40 years ago, where ideologues don't trust politicians anymore. Remember during the big march in Washington, many of the protestors or demonstrators insisted they were not demonstrating just against Barack Obama, but against all the politicians-- that's why some Republicans wouldn't support it. They don't believe in politics as the medium whereby our society negotiates its issues.
BILL MOYERS: What do they believe in?
SAM TANENHAUS: They believe in a kind of revolution, a cultural revolution. They think the system can be-- what some would say hijacked. They would say maneuvered, controlled, that they can get their hands back on the levers. An important thing about the right in America is it always considers itself a minority position and an embattled position. No matter how many of the branches of government they dominate. So, what they believe in is, as Willmoore Kendall, this early philosopher said, is a politics of battle lines, of war.
BILL MOYERS: So, here, at this very critical moment, when so much is hanging in the balance, what is the paradox of conservatism as you see it?
SAM TANENHAUS: The paradox of conservatism is that it gives the signs, the overt signs of energy and vitality, but the rigor mortis I described is still there. As a philosophy, as a system of government, as a way all of us can learn from, as a means of evaluating ourselves, our social responsibilities, our personal obligations and responsibilities. It has, right now, nothing to offer.
BILL MOYERS: Now, they disagree with you. They think you have issued a call for unilateral disarmament on their part-- that brass knuckles and sharp elbows are part of fighting for what you believe in, and therefore, you're calling for a unilateral disarmament.
SAM TANENHAUS: Well, you know, that's what Richard Hofstadter called the paranoid style, is when it's always living on the verge of apocalypse. That defeat is staring you in the face, and the only victories are total victories. Because even the slightest victory, if it's not complete, means the other side may come back and get you again. This is not serious responsible argument. Much of my book is actually about the failures of liberalism in that noontime period of the 1960s. And many of the conservatives simply ignore that part of the argument.
BILL MOYERS: How to explain this long fascination you've had with conservative ideas, and the conservative movement. Why this fascination?
BILL MOYERS: Well, I think it has been the dominant philosophy, political philosophy in our culture, in America, for some half-century. What particularly drew me first to Chambers and then Buckley is the idea that these were serious intellectuals, who were also men of action. Conservatives have kind of supplied us in their best periods-- the days when NATIONAL REVIEW and COMMENTARY and THE PUBLIC INTEREST were tremendously vital publications, self-examining, developing new vocabularies and idioms, teaching us all how to think about politics and culture in a different way, with a different set of tools. They were contributing so enormously to who we were as Americans. And yet, many liberals were not paying attention. Many liberals today don't know that a great thinker like Garry Wills was a product of the conservative movement. It's astonishing to them to learn it. They just assume, because they agree with him now, he was always a liberal. In fact, he remains a kind of conservative. This is the richness in the philosophy that attracted me, and that I wanted to learn more about, to educate myself.
BILL MOYERS: The book is THE DEATH OF CONSERVATISM. Sam Tanenhaus, I thoroughly enjoyed this conversation. Thank you for joining me.
SAM TANENHAUS: Oh, it's my great pleasure to be here.
MAN: And yet we are being told that a government bureaucrat is going to tell us whether we need to get the blue pill or the red pill.
WOMAN #1: You guys are absolutely incredible, do you think congress can hear us?
WOMAN #2: We need to stand up as a nation and uphold the principles of freedom, liberty and justice for all our people.
BILL MOYERS: As those conservative protesters were leaving Washington, members of the country's largest body of unions, the AFL-CIO were arriving in Pittsburg for their annual convention. They elected the former coal miner Richard Trumka to be their new President and heard from the man they had worked hard last year to send to the White House.
BARACK OBAMA: Thank you AFL-CIO!
BILL MOYERS: But all is not well with organized labor. Midway through the last century unions represented more than a quarter of America's workforce. That's fallen to about 12 percent today, when earning a living wage couldn't be harder. Just last week the Census Bureau reported that Americans are getting poorer, their median household income suffering the biggest decline since 1991. About 40 million people now live below the poverty line, with the poverty rate at an eleven-year high.
Where is organized labor? Why are unions so impotent when workers are so exploited? That's what I want to know from my next two guests. Bill Fletcher is a long-time labor and community organizer who was once an official of the AFL-CIO He now works for the American Federation of Government Employees, although he is here speaking for himself and not his organization. He is also the co-author of this new book SOLIDARITY DIVIDED: THE CRISIS IN ORGANIZED LABOR AND A NEW PATH TOWARD SOCIAL JUSTICE.
Michael Zweig has been at this table before. He is active in his own union, the United University Professions. He teaches at the state University of New York at Stony Brook, where he also runs the center for study of working class life. His most recent book is this one, WHAT'S CLASS GOT TO DO WITH IT: AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY. Welcome to both of you.
Bill Fletcher, we just heard in the earlier part of this broadcast, Sam Tanenhaus talk about the death of conservatism. Is it time to write the obituary of organized labor?
BILL FLETCHER: No. Not by no stretch. But organized labor remains in a crisis. And a low point very much of a low point right now. And the question for organized labor is whether or not it actually can become a class movement. A movement of workers. And not simply unions representing people in different workplaces.
Because I think that that speaks to some of the anger that's out there among workers who feel that they're unrepresented. That the society's crushing them. And they're looking for a vehicle. They're looking for someone to be their champion. Someone to channel their anger and if it's not unions, my fear is that these right wing populists are going to just grab onto this.
BILL MOYERS: Well, much of the anger we saw last week in that march on Washington were was came from ordinary people who are upset with what's happening in their own lives. But they're going toward the conservative movement and the Republican Party, not toward the unions.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, who's leading them to the unions? Who's calling them to the labor movement? The problem is that I don't think that the labor movement can successfully organize in particular places without a context of a broad social movement that addresses the power of capital. Not just in the particular workplace, but in the society as a whole. And if there isn't that context of a social workers movement I don't think it's possible to go shop by shop and recover the strength of the labor movement.
BILL MOYERS: So, what's a union for if it can't improve the living standards of ordinary people?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, it's for improving the living standards of ordinary people. It's certainly for that. But in order to do that, it has to have a broader agenda.
BILL FLETCHER: One of the things that struck me when I interviewed people that were active in the 1930's and '40s is that even if you if you were progressive, even if you weren't in the unions, you had a sense that the union movement or at least a good section of it was supporting progressive causes. That it was there. It was not just about organizing workers at a particular workplace. But that the unions were part of this broad effort of progress.
And the problem that's happened, and it's reflected in the these interesting polls. Where workers will say nonunion workers will say on occasion that the unions are good for their members, but they're not necessarily good for other people. And I feel like when I hear when I hear that, it's an incredible indictment on the kind of unionism that we have.
We have leaders now that are paying more attention to getting access to political leaders or holding hands with the head of Walmart. Rather than actually getting and inspiring workers, irrespective of whether they're our members right now. To engage in a struggle for justice.
BILL MOYERS: Those conservative protestors we saw are not afraid of confrontation. They're willing to use sharp elbows and brass knuckles in fighting for what they believe in. Why isn't labor more confrontational in behalf of those very people, the working people of this country?
BILL FLETCHER: Well, part of it is that there's I know people won't appreciate my saying this. But among many of the leaders, there's really a fear of losing respectability. I mean, you have leaders that have now gained these positions and they're really afraid that if they shake the table too much, that they will be excluded.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: What has happened is that the corporations and the corporate elite have structured what this country is, what's valuable, what's important, how we organize our lives. And labor has not come forth with an alternative set of values.
BILL MOYERS: But why haven't they? Now, that's
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, there I think because we used to have that. And all the labor movement did have that.
BILL MOYERS: Solidarity forever, right?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, and the labor movement had a very militant, very aggressive stance in the '30s, '40s, '50s that challenged capital. That got tremendous benefits. You know, the labor movement is the people who gave us the weekend. Let's not forget. The labor movement is what…
BILL MOYERS: The eight hour day.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Got us the eight hour day, and the social security, and all the other things that we think are so very important, but are just natural. That came out of a labor movement, but a labor movement that was led by people and was fueled by people who understood that there was antagonism. That there was a battle that they were involved in. This was not just, 'Let's sit down and have lunch and figure out what's the best thing to do for America.' This was, 'Here's a group of people who run the country and run businesses. And they have a certain set of interests. And they do not have our interests at mind at heart. They are not for us.'
BILL MOYERS: For the working people.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: For the working people. We have to be organized and be a contrary force, a counterforce that's a real force. That isn't just a debating society. That doesn't just have resolutions that it passes.
BILL MOYERS: A real force to take on capital
MICHAEL ZWEIG: To take on capital.
BILL MOYERS: And power.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: And power.
BILL MOYERS: And why have they lost that?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, because they got crushed.
BILL MOYERS: No one.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Because the people who tried to do that. And the people who did do that were leftist. They were people who had a class analysis of society. Many of them were socialists and some of them were communists, but not all. But that sentiment, that understanding of the basic structure of society as divided by class interest. That there's a working class that's a majority of the population in this country. And they have interests. And they have a set of values that that convey those interests. That are very different from the corporations. They're very different from capital.
And if the people who held those views and mobilized the labor movement at an earlier point in our history. Those people were pushed out. And they were pushed out by the labor movement, internally, because there was great division and splits. And so then the labor movement got drawn into an era of cooperation. An era of, "Well, let's all sit down. And we'll all be reasonable. We'll all figure out what to do that's best for America." And it turns out America is not one thing. America is divided by these deep class antagonisms that we are now living with.
BILL MOYERS: And yet, working class has disappeared from the language. I mean, there..
BILL FLETCHER: We're all working.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah?
BILL FLETCHER: See, that's the thing. Palin used working class.
BILL MOYERS: Sarah Palin.
BILL FLETCHER: Sarah Palin used the term working class more than Obama did in the 2008 election. But her notion and those the notion of many other conservatives, when they use the term working class. They're not really talking about the same working class that we're talking about. They're not really talking about Latinos, African Americans, Whites, Asians. They have a certain sort of stereotypical idea of the White worker. But so, they will use that term. And that's the irony of our times. But I want to go back to one thing.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah.
BILL FLETCHER: I realized this waking up this morning. This is the 60th anniversary of when the Congress of Industrial Organization began a process of purging, wholesale, unions that were led by people on the left. And it is exactly what Mike was talking about. That these purges are came they followed the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. Led to this incredible Cold War witch hunt against anyone to the left of the Attila the Hun.
So that the people that were the most militant, that had the most advanced views on organizing. Who were anti-racist, ended up being pushed out of organ the official organized labor. And were put pushed to the margins in many cases. And in some cases the unions were actually destroyed. The unions that remained in the CIO and then merged with AFL. adopted the view that Michael was describing. They adopted the sense that we had somehow come to peace in our time with capital. That we did have a place at the table. And that if we rocked the boat, outside of an occasional strike, that we will be excluded. We will be no longer relevant. And this purge, we are living with the legacy of that purge of the left.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But see, this is a process that takes a long time to do. When this began in the 1940s and 1950s with this anti-communist witch hunt. And with this redirection of what labor should be about. There was the nice cop and the nasty cop in that. The nasty cop was the McCarthyite investigations. And the purging of the Left. But the nice cop was the invitation to come in and sit at the table and be reasonable.
BILL MOYERS: Lyndon Johnson. Come now, let us feast together.
BILL MOYERS: He'd say to the President of the National Association of Manufacturing. He would say that to the head of the AFL-CIO
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Over
BILL MOYERS: Under George Meany
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Over when George Meany was proud that he never walked a picket line. And he said so. And then when Lane Kirkland died, who was the President of the AFL-CIO. then you the Wall Street Journal had an obit for him. And under his little picture it said, "Lane Kirkland, anti-communist." That's what the labor movement was known for. It because they were able to push out a certain segment. But then to come in with another kind of leadership. An affirmative statement that "We are going to be cooperating now with the corporations and with the corporate elite. We are going to be like a junior partner at the table."
BILL MOYERS: But do you see any green spouts of confrontation, militancy, defiance growing on the Left, among unions, that we see on the Right?
BILL FLETCHER: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: Where?
BILL FLETCHER: Well, first of all, I think that the election of Richard Trumka has a great deal of potential. Because
BILL MOYERS: The new president of the AFL-CIO.
BILL FLETCHER: The new president of the
BILL MOYERS: Why?
BILL FLETCHER: Because Trumka comes out of a history of militancy. He you know, in terms of his vision of the United Mine Workers that he led. His emphasis on organizing. His clarity on the nature of the economic crisis that we've been facing. And what he has articulated so far. And all I can say, this is a hope, is the notion that we have to engage in that confrontation that you're describing.
We have to do much more massive organizing. Particularly of the poor, the increasingly poor sections of the working class. So, I think that there's a vision here. And I can't overstate this issue of vision. Because it's not simply the technique of unions putting resources into organizing. People have to feel compelled that there's a vision of success, but a vision of a different kind of country. And indeed, a different kind of world.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It's also a different understanding of how you do politics and how you exert power. It's one thing to say, "I'm the leader of an organization of eight and a half million workers. I'm the head of the AFL-CIO. We have eight and a half million members in our affiliates." And I'm going to sit down at a table. And I'm going to say, "I have eight and a half million members out there." It's another thing to have eight and a half million members out there, who are in the streets, who are not just sending in letters and not just signing petitions. But who are actively engaged in exercising power, in building power in the streets, in the communities, in the schools.
BILL MOYERS: And we don't see that happening. Why? Why isn't that happening?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But see, I think that Rich Trumka understands something about the need to do this. And we'll see where this goes now. But, you know, it's hard to change culture.
BILL FLETCHER: Right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It's hard to change the way we understand how things should happen.
BILL MOYERS: You began by talking about class. The fact of the matter is there has been a class war for the last 30 years in this country.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: And the working class lost.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: So, if you've been defeated, where do you how do you come back?
BILL FLETCHER: Well, let me give two answers to that. One is that that in large part because of the Cold War witch hunts, actually even using the term class within organized labor.
BILL MOYERS: That's right.
BILL FLETCHER: For up until the mid-1990s led to people being condemned of being communist. I mean, it was absolutely absurd. So, it's the culture and the psyche that Mike is talking about, still infects many of the leaders, unfortunately. But I want to say that people are struggling. But you have the great--
BILL MOYERS: You mean that-- I know people are struggling just to make meet their daily needs. You mean--
BILL FLETCHER: Struggling and succeeding. Workers are fighting back.
BILL MOYERS: Where?
BILL FLETCHER: For example in the Smithfield Plant in…
MICHAEL ZWEIG: In North Carolina.
BILL FLETCHER: In North Carolina.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Tar Heel, North Carolina.
BILL FLETCHER: Right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Was the biggest pork processing plant in the country.
BILL MOYERS: Mostly Hispanics. They were--
BILL FLETCHER: Black and Latino. And the United Food and Commercial Workers put resources. They had a brilliant strategist who was directing it. And they succeeded. It doesn't get a great deal of attention. The Communication Workers of America--
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It succeeded after 14 years.
BILL FLETCHER: Right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But the workers that were fighting for 14 years at Smithfield. Or the Communication Workers of America members in Texas or Mississippi that have been fighting for-- in the public sector for years. These fights are going on. What's missing though is this sense of coherence. That this is not simply a victory at Smithfield. Or a fight that's going on in Knoxville. But that this is a fight for social justice. And that is what--
BILL MOYERS: Meaning a fight for…
BILL FLETCHER: A fight for health care reform. A fight against a racial differentials and health care and education. A fight for housing. The policy towards the cities!
MICHAEL ZWEIG: But see, I think it's more than just a policy list. It's a fight for a different way of being a country. A fight to care for one another.
BILL MOYERS: Well, it used to be a fight--
MICHAEL ZWEIG: A fight to take care of one another.
BILL MOYERS: It used to be a fight to take on capital, right? Labor was a real force in trying to bring to tame the wildness of capital.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Of capital. That's right.
BILL MOYERS: And we've seen what happened over the last few years when capital went wild.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: Without any kind of--
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL MOYERS: Without labor, can the battle for social justice be fought and won in this country?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: I don't think so. You know, there's this story about the cat that goes and eats the mice at night. You know? And the mice get together and say, "What are we going to do? We have to save ourselves from this evil cat that's eating us up. And one night one mouse says, "I know what we're going to do. We're going to put a bell around the neck of that cat. Right. And when the cat comes, we'll hear the bell, and then we'll all run away and be safe." Great idea. Who will bell the cat? Right? Who's going to put that bell on that cat? Who's going to put the bell on capital in the United States? There's only one force. There's only one set of people who can do that. That's working people. That's the majority of the people in this country.
BILL FLETCHER: And unfortunately, many workers really do believe that they're in this fight alone. That they're being crushed not because of some the larger dynamic of capitalism. They're being crushed because they're not working hard enough. That they have overspent. That they are in too much debt. They're not understanding that the problem is not them. Even if they have problems. The problem is systemic. And this vision needs to be articulated. And it needs to come out of organized labor. To remind people the problem is not them.
We are in a system that is walking over working people. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of working people. And the working people need a voice. And they need a mechanism, as Mike is saying in order to say, "Yes, I'm part of this fight. And I'm prepared to fight for social justice."
BILL MOYERS: So, where are we? Martin Luther King talked about the arc of history bending toward justice. Is the arc of this present moment, bending toward justice?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Well, you know President Obama in his campaign talked about the arc of history is long, but it bends towards justice. And it's long. It takes a long time. The emphasis there, you know, is seven-- what is it? From Seneca Falls in 1848 to the 19th Amendment in 1920 to get women the right to vote. The women's movement was 72 years. So, it takes a long time to get the eight hour day from 1886 in Hay Market to 1938. It's a long time.
So, is it bending towards justice? That's up to us to do. We have to go out there and bend that arc. It doesn't just happen. And the way to bend it is now to understand the importance of class. We have an African American president. That's a great advance for this country. We have an African American on the United States Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas. That's also a great advance for this country. Now the question is: which African American? And that question is a question of class.
Are they going to be an African American that's there to advance the interests of working people? Or are they going to be there to advance the interests of corporations? Which woman is going to be in the White House? Is it going to be Hillary Clinton? Or is it going to be Sarah Palin? Two women, just because they're a woman, that's great that they're there. And a representative of the success of the feminist and the women's movement to get to a position where a country can have that.
But that's not the-now, that's not the full question. Now we have a new question. What woman is going to represent what interest? Is it going to be the interests of working people or the interests of the corporations? And that test is a test of cap-of class?
BILL MOYERS: Do we know where Obama comes down on this?
MICHAEL ZWEIG: It depends where the working class is--
BILL FLETCHER: That's right.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: As an organized force. And Obama himself said, "I can't do this alone." He was campaigning on this progressive agenda and he said, "I cannot do this alone. I need a social movement." You know, that's what we have to push. And if corporate elites are we know they're pushing. And if there isn't any pushback, that's where he's going to go.
BILL FLETCHER: I think that his heart lies with working people. But I think that he believes fundamentally that he has to make sure that capitalism is functioning in a certain way. And that means that he has to pay attention to the corporate elites. And for that reason, what Mike raised is absolutely on the money. That we have to push him and point out to him that an economy should be serving working people.
An economy where you have an announcement that the recession is ending, but we have more than ten percent unemployment, probably between 10 and 20 percent unemployment. And you in addition, you have this structural unemployment in places like Camden or Flint. Where people are never going to work permanent jobs. That's no kind of economy. You know? And we don't need a president that is simply going to pay attention to making sure that the stock market is going up, while the rest of us are going down.
But I want to go back to one thing. I want to say about this arc. I sometimes get attacked, Bill, for being a prophet of doom or something. But which I think is an unfair criticism. But I'm worried. I really am. I think that we really are at one of those critical moments, when that arc could move towards barbarism. Not simply moving in a conservative direction.
When I see people bringing AR-15s to rallies with the President. When I see this insanity behind the Birther Movement. And questions about the President's citizenship. I realize that the strength of the irrationalist right is something that we have to contend with. And that these are people that could bring everything down in ways that could be quite catastrophic. So, I put it more in a different way. My hope is that the arc is moving towards justice. But I think that it will only successfully move there if we push it.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: That's right.
BILL FLETCHER: And that really does come down to what Mike was raising. That we cannot sit back and believe fatalistically in the inevitability of progress. The only thing inevitable is death. What we do will make the fundamental difference. If we push that arc in a certain way, we will have social justice. But we cannot that means among other things with the union movement, breaking with old ways of thinking, old ways of operating. And recognizing that there are people out there that are literally and figuratively dying for leadership, that wish a vehicle to speak for them. That really-- where the message resonates. That's our job.
BILL MOYERS: Bill Fletcher and Michael Zweig, thank you very much for joining me. This has been a very interesting discussion.
BILL FLETCHER: Thank you very much.
MICHAEL ZWEIG: Thank you very much.
BILL FLETCHER: It was a pleasure.
BILL MOYERS: That's it for the Journal this week. Remember to log onto our Web site at pbs.org, click on BILL MOYERS JOURNAL. There you can see a web-exclusive essay prompted by those protests in Washington, and you can hear more from the next generation of conservatives, as well as from some of the movement's stalwarts. You'll also be able to find out about the challenges facing the youngest American workers. That's all at pbs.org. I'm Bill Moyers, until next time.
Is conservatism dead?
The September 2009 New Criterion article, "Is conservatism dead?", is James Piereson's response to Sam Tanenhaus's book, The Death of Conservatism.
According to Piereson:
James Piereson is a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
According to Piereson:
When in 1962 Clinton Rossiter published a revised edition of Conservatism in America, he gave it the subtitle The Thankless Persuasion. A decade earlier, Raymond English had touched upon a similar theme in an article in The American Scholar titled “Conservatism: The Forbidden Faith.” Their point was that conservatism as a political philosophy runs against the American grain and thus will always play something of an incongruous and subordinate role in a revolutionary nation dedicated to equality, democracy, and restless change. While the conservative case for order, tradition, and authority may be useful as a corrective for the excesses of democracy, it can never hope to supplant liberalism as the nation’s official governing philosophy. As Rossiter put it, “Our commitment to democracy means that Liberalism will maintain its historic dominance over our minds, and that conservative thinkers will continue as well-kept but increasingly restless hostages to the American tradition.” Liberals will always set the tone for public life, he argued, leaving conservatives with the thankless task of fighting liberal reforms and then adjusting to them after they have been adopted.
Rossiter, like other liberal observers of the post-war scene, such as Richard Hofstadter, Lionel Trilling, Louis Hartz, and Daniel Bell, lamented the fact that an authentic conservative movement was difficult to locate in the United States. To be sure, there were some thoughtful conservatives to be found, such as the author Russell Kirk and Senator Robert Taft, but they were eccentrics, who had little in the way of a popular following, and whose views on policy were hardly distinguishable from those of the business community. On the other hand, the new American right that arose in the 1950s to challenge the New Deal and the Cold War policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations did not seem to fit into the conservative tradition at all. Populist in tone and suspicious of leaders from both parties, the new right seemed to have more in common with extremist movements than with conservative parties that traditionally distrusted democracy and defended elites. The radical right, as the liberals called it, was especially frightening because it mobilized huge popular followings behind figures like Joseph McCarthy, Richard Nixon, and the various fundamentalist ministers who spread their messages through the radio waves. The very idea of a President McCarthy or, more realistically, a President Nixon, was enough to send chills down the spine of any right-thinking liberal. Naturally, those liberals preferred to deal with “real” conservatives like Sen. Taft than with populist figures like McCarthy and Nixon who, because of their popular appeal, actually threatened to topple them from power.
The liberal analysis of conservatism that was passed down from the 1950s and 1960s has caused endless confusion about what conservatism in America is and is not. It is never a good thing for any philosophical movement to permit itself to be defined by its adversaries, but this is more or less what happened to conservatism in the post-war period, as liberals sought to define it in such a way as to guarantee its failure or ineffectiveness. For one thing, they created a combination of traps and paradoxes for conservatives that gave added meaning to Rossiter’s concept of “the thankless persuasion.” On the one hand, conservatives, if they wished to maintain that designation (at least in the eyes of liberals), were obliged to endorse all manner of liberal reforms once they were established as part of the new status quo. Thus, self-styled conservatives who attacked the New Deal were not acting like conservatives because they were in effect attacking the established order—and, of course, “real” conservatives would never do that. So it was that conservatives who wished to reverse liberal victories became radicals or extremists. Conservatives, moreover, could have no program of their own or, at any rate, any program that had any reasonable chance of succeeding, because any successful appeal to the wider public would turn them into populists and, through that process, into extremists and radicals. Not surprisingly, they viewed a popular conservatism as a contradiction in terms. Conservatives, in short, could only win power and influence by betraying their principles, and could only maintain those principles by accepting their subordinate status. Thus, in the eyes of the liberal historians, conservatism could never prosper in America because, if it did, it could no longer be called conservatism.
Rossiter published the first edition of his book in 1955, barely a year after William F. Buckley Jr. launched National Review, thereby launching as well the modern conservative movement. A supporter of Senator McCarthy, ardent foe of the New Deal, and critic of Ivy League colleges, Buckley did not meet the requirements for conservatism as had been laid down by the liberal historians. In their eyes, Buckley was an extremist, as were most of the writers (like James Burnham, Max Eastman, and Frank Meyer) whom he recruited to his new fortnightly magazine. Buckley’s quixotic project to build a conservative intellectual movement was not supposed to succeed and even less was it expected to grow to a point where conservatives might be in a position to challenge liberals for intellectual and political influence. Yet it is undoubtedly true that the most far-reaching political development in the United States over the past half-century has been the rise of conservatism from its designated role as “the thankless persuasion” to its status by the turn of the millennium as the nation’s most influential public doctrine. This did not happen by accident, but rather because conservatives succeeded where liberals had failed in ending the Cold War, rejuvenating the American economy from the “stagflation” of the 1970s, and restoring order and fiscal health to the nation’s cities. Such achievements should have discredited all those claims that there is something “un-American” about conservatism, that it is forever doomed to minority status, and that it must always play second fiddle to liberalism. Nevertheless, despite everything that has happened since 1954 when Buckley announced his new magazine or since 1980 when Ronald Reagan was elected president, there are many who still hold fast to the old myths about American conservatism.
Sam Tanenhaus has now reprised the old arguments about conservatism and tried to bring them up to date in his newly published jeremiad, The Death of Conservatism.[1] Tanenhaus, the editor of the New York Times Book Review and author of a justly acclaimed biography of Whittaker Chambers, argues that the conservative movement collapsed under the presidency of George W. Bush, and that Barack Obama’s victory in 2008 marked the beginning of a new liberal era in American politics. Tanenhaus is not altogether certain as to the causes of this collapse, at times suggesting that conservatives undid themselves because they were corrupt and unprincipled in their pursuit of power and at others suggesting that they lost the support of the American people because of their devotion to right-wing “orthodoxy.” The one thing about which he is certain is that he dislikes conservatives—intensely and unremittingly so, judging by the rhetoric deployed in this book. Tanenhaus says at various points that conservatives are out to destroy the country, that they are driven by revenge and resentment, that they dislike America, and that they behave more like extremists and revolutionaries (“Jacobins”) than as genuine conservatives. In this sense, he has resurrected the liberal literature about Sen. McCarthy and “the radical right,” and sought to apply it to contemporary conservatism as if nothing of importance had happened in the meantime. All of this is nonsense, of course, and given some of the author’s previous writings, particularly his biography of Chambers, one had reason to hope that he would have produced something more elevated than the partisan assault against conservatives that he has packaged in this book.
Tanenhaus argues that conservatives failed because—well, because they did not act like conservatives at all but rather as extremists and radicals out to destroy everything associated with modern liberalism. The paradox of the modern right, he says, is that “Its drive for power has steered it onto a path that has become profoundly and defiantly un-conservative.” According to Tanenhaus, conservatives have been divided since the 1950s between their Burkean inclinations to preserve the constitutional order and their reactionary or “revanchist” impulses to tear up and destroy every liberal compromise with modern life. “On the one side,” he writes, “are those who have upheld the Burkean ideal of replenishing civil society by adjusting to changing conditions. On the other are those committed to a revanchist counterrevolution, whether the restoration of America’s pre-New Deal ancient regime, a return to Cold War-style Manichaeanism, or the revival of pre-modern family values.” In recent years, he concludes, the “revanchists” have gotten the upper hand over the Burkeans, and have thereby run the conservative juggernaut over a cliff and into irrelevance. In an entry that gives the reader a flavor of some of the exaggerated rhetoric contained in the book, Tanenhaus writes that, “Today’s conservatives resemble the exhumed figures of Pompeii, trapped in postures of frozen flight, clenched in the rigor mortis of a defunct ideology.”
These “exhumed figures” are presumably free-market economists and conservatives like Jonah Goldberg and Amity Shlaes, whose books have been critical of the New Deal, neo-conservatives who supported the war in Iraq, and social conservatives who have opposed abortion, easy divorce, and gay marriage. In Tanenhaus’s view, genuine conservatives would accept the New Deal and the welfare state as “Burkean corrections” that served to adjust the American economy to modern conditions. Nor would “real” conservatives have supported a war in Iraq that was based upon a utopian ideal of bringing democracy to the Middle East. He also thinks that conservatives should accept gay marriage as an extension of family values to a new area. The reason conservatives have not followed such advice, he says, is that their attachment to orthodox doctrine trumps the practical advantages of finding areas of accommodation with adversaries. In a most un-Burkean way, he says, they have allowed ideology to prevail over experience and common sense. Thus, as he suggests, the right is the main source of disorder and dissension in contemporary society and the instigators of the long-running culture war that has divided the country.
Employing this framework, Tanenhaus arrives at surprising judgments about some prominent conservatives—for example, that Ronald Reagan was a “real” conservative because, despite his rhetoric, he made no effort to repeal popular social programs but accepted them as an integral aspect of the American consensus. This is gracious on the author’s part, though it is a judgment that few liberals will accept simply because they are certain that the only reason President Reagan did not repeal many of those programs is because Congress would not permit it. After all, one of Reagan’s favorite sayings was that “Government is the problem, not the solution.” Reagan, like every other major Republican office-holder of recent decades, including George W. Bush and Newt Gingrich, was constrained in this area by a mix of congressional politics, interest groups, and public opinion. Tanenhaus also says that Buckley, while starting out as a “revanchist” in the 1950s, turned into a Burkean in the 1960s by his acceptance of liberal reforms, especially in civil rights.
This, one may assume, will turn out to be the broad story line of the authorized biography of Buckley that Tanenhaus has long planned to write, though there are some obvious problems with it. For one thing, Buckley never took back anything he said or wrote during the 1950s about McCarthy, Communism, liberalism, or higher education, nor is it evident from anything he said or wrote that he regretted taking those positions. It is perhaps true that Buckley became somewhat less polemical in style with the passing decades, but it is difficult to discern any change in principles that would justify the conclusion that the Buckley of 1968 and thereafter was a different kind of man from the one who launched National Review.
Tanenhaus uses the terms revanche or revanchism promiscuously throughout his book, plainly as instruments for tarring conservatives as destructive reactionaries, but its use in this context is exaggerated and inflammatory to the point of irresponsibility. “Revanchism,” drawn from the French word for “revenge,” originated as a term to describe European nationalist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that sought to restore lost territory or prestige through new wars of conquest and occupation. Though originally applied to movements in France that aimed to recapture territory seized by Germany in the Franco-Prussian war, the term more accurately applies to the nationalist parties that arose in Germany in the 1920s dedicated to the overthrow both of the Weimar Republic and the Treaty of Versailles. Revanchists reject liberalism and democracy in favor of nationalism and strong-man rule, and surely cannot be said to endorse the ideals of liberty, limited government, and the rule of law that form the core of conservative thought. The repeated use of this term in the American context is thus hard to justify, as much so as McCarthy’s charge that American liberals of the 1950s were “crypto-Communists.” Tanenhaus condemns conservative writers who draw parallels between the New Deal and fascism, but carelessly suggests parallels between American conservatives and European fascists—one of the more unsavory aspects of a book filled with unsavory allusions and implications.
The argument that contemporary conservatives are reactionaries or revanchists is wrong on its face. The market school of economics cannot be dismissed because it is critical of the New Deal or of Keynesian policies, nor are free-market thinkers reactionary in any sense of that term. Tanenhaus does not inquire seriously into the reasons why conservatives are uneasy with the welfare state, why some see in it a threat to liberty and others an encouragement to the breakdown of the family and self-government. The market revolution of the last thirty years, moreover, contributed greatly to world prosperity over that period, to the fall of Communism, and to much else that was beneficial besides. It may be true that the current economic crisis presents a challenge to market thinking, but it certainly does not vindicate central planning or the welfare state, and there is nothing about that challenge that justifies the conclusion that market economics is dead. As we shall shortly learn, the path back to prosperity will lead through free and flexible markets.
Nor does the intervention in Iraq, whatever its ultimate outcome, support Tanenhaus’s case. That intervention, after all, was endorsed not only by conservatives and neo-conservatives, but also by every Democratic candidate for president in last year’s election, save for Barack Obama (who was a member of the Illinois legislature when the war began). President Bush, in addition, justified the war on liberal or Wilsonian grounds, so that if the war discredited anything, it was the liberal ideal of achieving collective security through the promotion of democracy. One may argue that such an approach is misguided or impractical, or even that it is inconsistent with conservative principles, but it is not possible to say that it is revanchist. As for the culture war—well, most conservatives would be glad to have it over with, if only cultural liberals and radicals would call a halt to their provocations. The historical record is clear that the first shots fired in every engagement of the culture war came from the left in the form of school busing, the abortion decision of the Supreme Court, the Mapplethorpe exhibition, political correctness on the campus, and (now) gay marriage. Indeed, what many call the “religious right” came into existence in the late 1970s in response to the Carter administration’s effort to deny tax exemption to religious schools on the grounds that they were segregated. Absent liberal provocations, there would have been no culture war and probably no “religious right” to wage it.
Tanenhaus, taking no prisoners on any side, even rebukes his own editors at the New York Times for signing up William Kristol to write a weekly column for the paper during the 2008 election campaign. The editors were no doubt trying to demonstrate an element of fairness and balance in an election year, an obviously impossible task in view of the overflowing stable of writers at the paper who dislike conservatives and Republicans as much as Tanenhaus does. Kristol, however, at least according to Tanenhaus, “cheapened this valued space [sic] into a shabby storefront for the Republican presidential campaign.” That charge is false as it applies to Kristol, who wrote about many subjects besides the election during his brief tenure at the paper, and even criticized Senator McCain at more than one point during the campaign. If we reverse the party labels, however, the judgment is accurate when applied to the work of other Times columnists, such as Bob Herbert, Paul Krugman, and Frank Rich, who even outdid the paper’s news pages in propagandizing on behalf of the Democratic ticket.
Like the liberal writers of the 1950s, Tanenhaus wants to see a conservative movement that accommodates rather than opposes liberalism, and thus one that will accept its role as subordinate to the dominant liberal tradition in American life. He acknowledges that there is an important role for conservatism, but it must be a “genuine” conservatism that preserves but does not seek to overturn liberal gains. In any event, he says, conservatives will have little choice but to accommodate to liberal leadership because the election of 2008 has effectively ended the era of conservative dominance in American politics. Much as liberals had to accommodate to conservatives after Reagan’s election in 1980, conservatives will now have to accept the newly dominant status of reform liberalism, or else accept the consequences of being turned into “the exhumed figures of Pompeii, trapped in postures of frozen flight.”
Tanenhaus first laid out his theme in a long article in The New Republic published in the breathless aftermath of Obama’s inauguration when it was all too easy to imagine that liberals had scored a permanent knockout over their conservative adversaries and when many entertained hopes that the new president might bring about a wholesale transformation in the conduct of public affairs—a “revolution in the consciousness of our time,” as Norman Mailer put it in 1960 in describing the hoped-for consequences of John F. Kennedy’s victory. The excitement generated by Tanenhaus’s message (Conservatism is dead!) justified a rapidly written expansion of the essay.
The book now appears months later as these extravagant hopes have given way to more sober assessments of what it is truly possible to achieve within the American system, and as President Obama’s poll numbers have come back to earth in response to the public’s wariness about his ambitious proposals. Various opinion polls point to a resurgence in the popularity of conservative principles and policies, while pundits are now forecasting a Republican comeback in the forthcoming elections in 2009 and 2010. The polls offer no support for the claim that conservatism is dead among American voters or that the 2008 election represented a long-running realignment in the fortunes of the two major parties. One may confidently assume, if the past is any guide, that a conservative Republican will succeed President Obama in 2012 or 2016, and that Republicans will recapture one or both houses of Congress before Obama completes his tenure in office. Three of the books currently topping the Times best-seller list (as yet unreviewed by the Times) are conservative titles. It thus appears that Tanenhaus, in pronouncing the death of conservatism, has made the mistake of forecasting a trend on the basis of a single event. His obituary seems less compelling—and ever more exaggerated—with every passing month.
It is certainly true, as Tanenhaus says, that conservatism as a political doctrine has its flaws and weaknesses, which are magnified when it is judged in the immediate aftermath of a lost election or in isolation from alternative approaches to public life. When judged in relation to liberalism, however, modern conservatism takes on a more favorable outlook. Many of the sins Tanenhaus attributes to conservatives—overly zealous attachment to principle or ideology, unwillingness to adapt to change, impatience with popular opinion—are on display as much or more among liberals. If Tanenhaus or anyone else wishes to see liberalism in action, he might venture on to an elite college campus where only liberal and leftist views are permitted peaceful expression, or out to Sacramento or up to Albany where liberal Democrats, long in control, have spent their states into near bankruptcy. The liberal faculty and public employee unions that control those institutions and jurisdictions have not exactly distinguished themselves for their far-sighted and open-minded leadership. As for New York and California, the public employee unions that control the Democratic party, and thereby the state governments, have exploited the prosperity of recent decades to build up huge government establishments that will no longer be affordable in the forthcoming era of austerity, especially as taxpayers and businesses flee to other states like Texas and Florida that have followed more conservative paths. As California and New York unravel, voters will undoubtedly turn to conservatives to restore levels of growth and prosperity sufficient to fund their social programs and educational systems. Liberals will come to understand that in order to fund their programs, they will have to tolerate conservatives and conservative policies. That will be a hard and painful lesson for liberals to learn. If conservatism is dead, in short, then so is liberalism, and much else besides.
Conservatism, moreover, is now a permanent and enduring aspect of American political life, supported by millions of Americans and defended by a large network of writers, journals, and think tanks. There is, however, a more important reason for its enduring appeal among Americans. Conservatism in America deploys the principles of tradition, reason, and orderly change in defense of liberal institutions—the Constitution, representative government, liberty and equal rights, the rule of law. It is generally the conservative, not the modern liberal, who emphasizes the inspired example of the founding fathers, the words of the Constitution, and the sacrifices made to build free institutions. If it is true that liberals want to overcome the past, or apologize for it, then conservatives want us to remember, to learn, and to build constructively upon it. That may be a challenging task in a culture of short memory, but it is far from a thankless one.
James Piereson is a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
The Death of Conservatism - Sam Tanenhaus

Tanenhaus suggested that today’s conservatism is mostly bereft of substantive ideas and instead consists of extreme reactions against the liberal social and policy agenda. He said:
“These radical people on the right – and they include intellectuals and the kinds of personalities we’re seeing on television and radio and also to some extent people marching in the streets – think America has gotten away from them. Theirs is a politics of reclamation and restoration... If you are a free-marketeer, or an evangelical, or a social conservative, or even an authoritarian conservative, you can all agree on one thing: you hate the liberals that are out to destroy us. That’s a very useful form of political organization. I’m not sure it contributes much to our government and society, but it’s politically useful and we’re seeing it again today... The paradox of conservatism is that it gives the overt signs of energy and vitality, but the rigor mortis I described is still there. As a philosophy, as a system of government that all of us can learn from as a means of evaluating ourselves, our social responsibilities, [and] our personal obligations and responsibilities, it has – right now – nothing to offer.”
Reviewing Tanenhaus’ book in THE NEW CRITERION magazine, Manhattan Institute senior fellow James Piereson argued that Tanenhaus ignores much conservative thought while castigating conservatives for failings that are also common among liberals. He wrote:
“Tanenhaus does not inquire seriously into the reasons why conservatives are uneasy with the welfare state, why some see in it a threat to liberty and others an encouragement to the breakdown of the family and self-government... He acknowledges that there is an important role for conservatism, but it must be a ‘genuine’ conservatism that preserves but does not seek to overturn liberal gains... Many of the sins Tanenhaus attributes to conservatives – overly zealous attachment to principle or ideology, unwillingness to adapt to change, impatience with popular opinion – are on display as much or more among liberals. If Tanenhaus or anyone else wishes to see liberalism in action, he might venture on to an elite college campus where only liberal and leftist views are permitted peaceful expression, or out to Sacramento or up to Albany where liberal Democrats, long in control, have spent their states into near bankruptcy... If conservatism is dead, in short, then so is liberalism, and much else besides.”
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